

→ To improve the quality of society, choices have to be made. "Politicians cannot allow time to slip through their fingers, caught as they sometimes are between the need to change and the desire to maintain the status quo and a lack of vision about what could replace it." This quote from New ways, firm values (CDA 1995) is still relevant today. A vision is needed for the future of our society which reflects the changes society is undergoing. Policies which were suitable in the past may not work well in the current circumstances. A set of policies born of vision and courage is called for; policies which do not shelter in the safe haven of automatic responses. It is time for a different approach.

The danger of getting caught up in automatic responses is very real. Anyone with an eye to the future realizes that our country will undergo considerable changes in the coming decades. The composition of the population is changing: at the moment this primarily applies to large cities, but will in time affect the population as a whole. Immigration and integration will be particularly significant issues in the coming years, closely related to development cooperation and human rights policies. Liberal policies on integration issues and international affairs are no longer an option.

The population is ageing. The employment market needs well educated people, but the number of young people with high level qualifications is not keeping pace. Newcomers often have only a low level of education, even though they may be capable employees. The size of the labour force is no longer increasing, whilst the costs of pensions, healthcare and social

security are rising. This means investment in human capital is needed, particularly among immigrant workers. A focused and constructive integration policy is required: a cultural policy based on the key values of the constitutional state. A political system is called for which promotes these ideals and makes high demands based on these ideals.

Christian Democratic principles centre around people: in their consideration for and solidarity with others. This means there must be a place for social organizations: for people's own idealistic institutions and for pluralism. People must have the opportunity to put their ideals into practice, in all their diversity, but still holding in common the fundamental principles of the constitutional state and culture. Our laws, legislation and policies should reflect this principle.

The major issues of today require a different and more focused approach; they are about the affordability of pensions, accessibility of health care, respecting pluralism whilst still maintaining commonality, an employment market where we invest in people, a society where technological developments are subject to firm moral conditions.

Politicians have to demonstrate their leadership capabilities by providing answers to the questions which will arise tomorrow and the day after tomorrow. Only then will they be convincing and can they offer prospects for a stable society. A new approach is needed, and not just as a pretence, but as a matter of necessity.

Investing in Integration

REFLECTIONS ON DIVERSITY
AND COMMONALITY

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Investing in Integration

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FOREWORD

The political agenda is currently largely dominated by integration issues. This applies to The Netherlands as well as to the other countries of the European Union. Germany has its debate about the so-called *Leitkultur* and in France a debate is raging about the secular nature of the state and the rights of Muslims. It is not always easy for political parties to come up with answers to the questions posed by the integration issue. Should the concentration of ethnic minorities in particular areas be opposed or, on the contrary, encouraged? Are ethnic minorities' own organizations beneficial to integration or not? Should the actions of parents who send their children to a white school further from their homes be discouraged, or not?

It is these and other issues which are under discussion in the study *Investing in Integration*. In the extension of Jan Peter Balkenende's dissertation: "What connects us: the basics of Dutch society" (included in *Different and Better*), this study specifically elects for a socio-cultural approach.

The (constitutional) cultural characteristics of Western and Dutch society are examined. The historical background of migration patterns is recognized and compared with current trends. The relationship between religion and constitution, the significance of Islam and the cultural political role of the government are reviewed. In addition, the study addresses those institutions which carry and convey culture: the family, the neighbourhood, schools, the constitutional state and the religious communities. A broad range of policy proposals is formulated based on these principles. These proposals will be significant for integration policies in the coming years.

The management of the Policy Studies Institute would like to express their gratitude to the Wienen commission for its work. Members of the commission were drs. J. Wienen, mw drs. W.R.C.Sterk, mw. drs. P. v.d. Berg, drs. A.B.L. El Manouzi, drs. H. V.d. Born, drs. H. Hoogerwerf, drs. H.J. Kaiser and prof. Dr. H.M. Vroom. In an earlier stage, mw. Drs. G Verburg was an advisory member of the commission. T.W. Spronk carried out activities for the commission as part of her studies. She wrote an essay on Islam and politics. The institute is grateful to the authors of this study, namely mw. drs. P. v.d. Berg and mr A. Klink for their contribution.

The management would like to express the hope that the approach proposed in this report will be valuable for political decision-making and the influence of Christian Democracy on this issue.

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1 Preliminary Considerations

The question of integrating immigrants into our society has many different facets and dimensions. The most obvious aspects are those related to the division of wealth. The question then arises of how we can arrive at a situation where wealth is shared equally among the various population groups. This involves a number of important social spheres, such as education and housing. These resources are crucially important if one is to gain access to the sources of wealth. The issue of the division of prosperity can also be viewed from a deeper perspective where it is not measurable results and visible processes which matter, but our subconscious emotions. Feelings of familiarity or, on the other hand, estrangement; the feeling of having lost one's own familiar world as a result of the influx of a large number of newcomers on the one hand, or the feeling of constantly being confronted with prejudices and discrimination on the other.

It is clear that we are dealing with a relevant social issue. The election themes of May 2002 were particularly dominated by immigration, integration and security. These themes attracted even more attention than other key issues such as shortages of good teachers in schools, waiting lists in the health care sector, traffic congestion and the inadequacies of public transport. It is even more striking that an undercurrent of social unrest could manifest itself so powerfully in a time of great prosperity. Politicians have to decide what their attitude is in relation to this unrest. They will be judged on their ability to unite people and issues.

This malaise arose more from socio-economic than purely economic reasons. To dismiss the different manifestations of dissatisfaction too readily as the "gut feelings of a spoilt nation" would be to ignore the real, hidden issues and concerns. On the other hand, it is also not acceptable to dismiss caution as exaggerated political correctness. Political leaders are faced with the task of clarifying integration issues, setting parameters and offering prospects for a peaceful and inclusive society.

Integration issues cut deeply into our society, as well as into the political scene. Politicians have gradually become used to focusing above all on issues of the distribution of wealth: how do we earn and share our wealth? How do we maintain economic growth? How do we ensure that we have a decent social policy and how can we link growth to concern for the environment? Politicians generally tried to steer clear of moral issues; sensitive considerations were often left to people themselves.

This attitude is understandable. It arises from the need for a political system based on mutual respect. People have the right to hold different opinions, to organising their lives in line with their own ideas and developing their own

identity. Government should maintain a degree of distance, not out of disinterest, but because this distance is an expression of respect. Respect for human dignity allows people, with their individual gifts and cultural backgrounds, to form their own identities and fulfill their responsibilities.

The so-called “multicultural drama” is above all dramatic because an unexpected question arose: does every cultural manifestation always deserve equal respect? And to take this even further: are all ideologies – and all branches of these ideologies - equally compatible with our Western democracy? If not, how should this question be dealt with by a government which may at times disapprove but is nonetheless obliged to respect freedom of expression, etc? Controversies, honourable revenge, threats to those who abandon their faith, etc., demonstrate that the constitutional state with its respect for individual freedom is not a random meeting place for all types of cultures. The constitutional state itself is a political expression of a specific cultural configuration. A political expression is simply not compatible with (every variant of) other cultures. But if that is the case, how does this equate with equality of people and cultures? Where does one set one’s limits? The integration issue has arisen in our country as a result of the need to look for values which bind us together, to connecting values.

The politics of the eighties, including policies on minorities, was based on equal recognition. The government consciously strove towards giving the migrants’ cultures the opportunity to survive in a Western society. Legislation was introduced to cover this aim, as was manifested by the provision of education in state schools in the immigrant’s own language and culture.

Politicians and society came to regard the rich variety of ideologies as an essential characteristic of the West. It could be said that there was a very satisfactory co-existence of ideologies and cultural trends (coexistence). But gradually the question arose of the extent to which the mutual sharing and supporting of key values is a cultural condition for that peaceful society (convergence on the key points). What are the fundamental values? What aspects of our culture do we have in common and what should be common? What is the role of government here? Besides a policy of equal recognition, is there also a need for a policy of setting limits and standards? But doesn’t setting boundaries lead to alienation of certain population groups and cultural minorities? To estrangement from and opposition to a Western culture and society which for a long time believed that its legendary tolerance and openness would themselves prove convincing.

In addition, the question arose of whether the cultural dimension of integration is not in the final event just as important as the socio-economic aspect. It is not only a matter of whether people can provide for themselves individually or as a group in the socio-economic sense, but whether they really feel at home in this Dutch society.

In sociological literature a distinction is made between structural and socio-economic integration. Structural integration is about full participation in social institutions (in the sphere of, for example, education and employment). Socio-cultural integration is about the extent and the nature of the social contacts which members and organizations of minorities maintain with the wider society and about cultural integration into society. Cultural orientation is concerned with the assumptions and values of the immigrant groups and with the extent to which these agree with or differ from those of the receiving society. Eldering in her turn made the distinction between the terms integration and acculturation. Integration relates to the degree of participation in the structures and institutions of society. Acculturation relates to the process of cultural change. Separate from this is the psychological aspect which is demonstrated in attitudes, identity, solidarity.

These socio-cultural issues are of particular concern to the Christian Democratic movement. Christian Democrats have always advocated the value of pluralism, of sovereignty within one's own circle and of emancipation through one's own institutions. Christian Democracy recognises that human dignity is closely related to the ability to expression one's philosophy of life within a social context. For this reason, Christian Democrats attach a high value to the constitution, to freedom of religion and of assembly, the freedom to set up a family and freedom of education. But, on the other hand, this same Christian Democracy is aware that a democratic and social constitutional state with its rights to freedom is the outcome of a completely individual development. Taylor saw this clearly: "Moreover, Western liberalism, as (for example) many Muslims realise, is not really an expression of a secular, post-religious ideology which enjoys wide support among liberal intellectuals, but rather (..) something that emerged organically from Christianity". The separation of Church and state (for example) was also visible in the earliest days of Christian civilization: Elders points out to Taylor, and moreover completely correctly, that it is the concerted action of the Jewish tradition, Christianity and humanism which gave rise to the Western cultural environment with its political institutions (see following chapters).

It is for this reason that the integration debate has been so crucial because it confronts the West with its own beliefs and on the other hand it defines the West through the need for openness towards other cultures. What is characteristic of the democratic constitutional state? What is binding and cannot be surrendered? How can self awareness on these key points be correlated to the so-called “politics of equal recognition” and to pluralism? How can one avoid pluralism resulting in segregation of cultures or in a lack of social cohesion?

The following questions were the guiding principle in developing this report:

- What are the fundamental values of the democratic and social constitutional state?
- How can the government contribute to a pluriform society in which different cultural movements not only exist alongside one another (coexistence) but (can) also respect one another and be represented in the fundamental values of the constitutional state (a policy of recognition of pluralism as well as a policy of realisation)?
- How can the government contribute to continuing contacts between different cultural movements and population groups? Participation and social-cultural society are the key concepts here.
- What will be the role of cultural institutions and what should the government’s policy be in relation to them? These include the family, school, the neighbourhood or local area, religion (the ideological community) and the government itself – as a representative of the constitutional state.

The guiding principle in responding to the questions is the conviction that:

- The most creditable and convincing route to integration is that of unambiguous and open dialogue. Open in the sense that prejudices are set aside, incidents are not viewed in a biased way as being typical of other cultures and that equality is the key principle. Such a dialogue may, in fact, lead to the development of a common vocabulary, where even opposing views can be expressed and reconciled. In the dialogue between world religions this can, for example, bring about the shared belief that a true religious life cannot be based on force or coercion. Such a basic insight in the end has far reaching effects on the state and society and can also influence the opportunities for pluralism and equal treatment within society. On the other hand, this openness also requires problems and differences to be clearly stated.

- Unknown is unloved. Knowledge and understanding of one another's backgrounds are important for successful integration.
- The degree to which newcomers feel welcome in a country is a significant factor for successful integration. It is the basis for reciprocity, which is obligatory for both sides.
- Integration is in the final event essential for newcomers because human dignity relies on the ability to bear responsibility, to use one's talents and the opportunity to put an authentic stamp on one's own life. For this reason, a political system which does not challenge people to do this, which is not sufficiently demanding and therefore ill equips people for bearing responsibility, is inadequate. In the end, a lack of challenges and responsibilities leads to personal isolation. Integration is a question of being obliged to make an investment: from both sides. A society has the right to demand that people who are received into that society should themselves also be prepared to make a contribution to it.
- Making demands of immigrants must go hand in hand with encouraging integration, on the one hand by making facilities readily available and on the other hand by as a society also investing in social cohesion and integration.

We believe that anyone who supports integration also has to offer the necessary facilities and is then entitled to attach demands to these, for example in the form of conditions pertaining to permanent residence in Dutch society or to an application for Dutch nationality. Such a policy will undoubtedly be costly and will require financial support. The "purple" policies of the nineties made a good start on a serious integration strategy in some respects, but did not progress far beyond good intentions. If our aim is to be achieved, more is needed than just a policy of encouragement, dialogue, a good discussion, etc.

In chapter 1 of this report we explore the issues of immigration and integration from a historical perspective. Are we dealing with an issue on which – contrary to the noises of disquiet and alarm which we are currently hearing – society through the ages has always been able to find an answer, or is the question now more complicated than was previously the case?

In chapter 2 we will review the various aspects of integration. There appear to be a number of links between socio-cultural and structural integration. For integration to be successful in such areas as education, employment and housing, it is essential that there is a high degree of understanding of, and affinity and identification with the key values of Dutch society.

In chapter 3 we, therefore, set out clearly the basic values which are fundamental for Dutch society. These are at the same time opportunities and restrictions; people have the right to live according to their own ideals, but in the public domain that right is not without limitation. To maintain the quality of the constitutional state, it is absolutely essential that respect for and tolerance of other people and the efforts people make on behalf of one another are anchored in people's awareness of the laws of the country. It is imperative that governmental policies acknowledge the importance of this.

In chapter 4 we concentrate on the environments where (young) people learn about society. In the first instance these are the family, school, neighbourhood, religious community and constitutional state. Where are the chances and opportunities, where are the problems and concerns within these cultural institutions?

In chapter 5 we examine in detail the significance of Islam for the process of integration and participation. The integration of Muslims is particularly in the public eye because of the growing significance of this religion in the West. The number of Muslims in Europe is expected to increase and this religion will become progressively more significant in social terms.

In chapter 6 policy recommendations will be made which are aimed at strengthening the position of institutions and networks where cultural transference takes place. The proposed policies are related to:

- acculturation, also in relation to family policy
- the approach to dealing with educational arrears, including through denominational institutions in the field of education
- local neighbourhoods
- the constitutional state (acculturation, acquiring Dutch nationality, etc.)

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2 The history of immigration and current integration issues

It is not a new phenomenon for large groups of immigrants to have to make their way in what is for them a new society. Migration processes have played a role throughout history. There have been periods when whole nations were on the move. The third and fifth centuries A.D., for example, saw large scale movements of people.

There have also been times of relative peace and stability as far as migration is concerned, although this has not been the case in the second half of the 20th century. This period is sometimes described as **the** era of migration. It is estimated that at the end of the 20th century in the region of 150 million people were living elsewhere than in their native countries, which constitutes some 2.5% of the world population. Of those 50 million, some 15 million are refugees.

Poverty, war, persecution and natural disasters cause people en masse to seek a better fortune in a different country. The enormous growth in information technology means that people, far more than previously, are aware of the differences in living conditions. Added to this, large distances can now be bridged relatively easily. These processes also influence the course of events in the Netherlands.

1. Immigration in the Netherlands in the sixteenth to the nineteenth century

Throughout the centuries there have been foreign people in our country. Immigration gradually increased in the sixteenth century, particularly to Holland. The increasing prosperity there attracted migrants, the majority of whom came from neighbouring countries. A steady flow of Germans – as well as Scandinavians – attempted to earn their living in our country. These immigrants were mostly in the lower strata of society, in the worst paid professions. Some came for seasonal work in agriculture, but mostly they compensated for the shortages in shipping.

After the Dutch revolt at the end of the sixteenth century, there was an immigration explosion in the Republic. The immigrants were groups, some forced by political circumstances, who suddenly came in their masses to the Republic, such as South Hollanders from about 1580, seafaring Jews around 1600 and Huguenots almost a century later. Around 1585, as a result of the military successes in the Spanish Parma, tens of thousands of refugees left for the Republic. This gave rise to an explosive population growth, particularly in Holland. The percentage of foreigners in the Republic rose around 1600 to between 10 and 12% of the population. They were mainly

concentrated in the cities, where the percentage of foreigners in some cases was as high as 50%.

From 1680 French Calvinists – Huguenots – came to the Netherlands. Their number was estimated at between 50,000 and 60,000. Like the south Netherlanders, they settled mainly in the large cities. In this period, between 6 and 7% of the population of the Republic were foreigners.

It is clear that, at the end of the sixteenth century and for a large part of the 17th century there was a very high degree of migration, in particular to Holland. The number of inhabitants increased dramatically in this period. Slowly but surely, changes began to be noticed; the economy began to show signs of recession, which has also had the effect of slowing down immigration.

During the 18th century the percentage of immigrants fluctuated at around 6 per cent. As a result of the Fourth English War which started in the final days of 1780, the economy was in stagnation. The percentage of immigrants reduced gradually to 2 per cent by around 1860. From that time we even see a reversal of the trend. There was a sizeable emigration of Dutch people to Germany where industrialization was taking place, to the colonies and to North America.

2. Immigration in the Netherlands in the twentieth century

Europe in the nineteenth century and at the start of the twentieth century was mainly an area of emigration. After the Second World War, the situation changed and immigration increased. The reasons for this reversal lie in three significant social and international developments: decolonization, the development of the Western European economy and the unstable international situation after the Cold War.

In the Netherlands at the time of decolonization there was a considerable influx of immigrants. In the forties and fifties these were mainly people who were being repatriated and other immigrants (Moluccans) from the former Dutch Indies. In the seventies the waves of immigrants came from Surinam where this former colony was in the process of independence. In 1975, around the time of the declaration of independence, many people left Surinam for the Netherlands. This process was repeated in 1979 and 1980.

A second cause of immigration is the post-war economic development. With the economic prosperity of the sixties there was a great shortage of

workers. At first these were recruited from Southern Europe, but from the second half of the sixties, they came in increasing numbers from Turkey and Morocco. Most of the immigrant workers who came from the Southern European countries returned home after a period of time. This was partly due to the favourable development of the economies of these countries. The situation was quite different for the immigrant workers from Turkey and Morocco: only very few returned to their home countries. After the first oil crisis in 1973, migration for the purposes of work was over, but this led to only a temporary reduction in the number of immigrants from these countries. Family reunification and formation accounted for a large influx of Turks and Moroccans. In addition, there was a steady influx of people from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba.

As a result of this process of immigration and establishing and reuniting of families, there are now some 300,000 people in The Netherlands of Turkish descent, almost 300,000 from Surinam, 100,000 from the Antilles and Aruba and in excess of 250,000 people from Morocco.

Whilst in the nineties immigration from these “traditional” immigration countries dropped sharply, the number of asylum seekers rose steeply, as a result of a range of international events. After the collapse of the communist system in Central and Eastern Europe and the fall of the Iron Curtain, the international scene witnessed a period of great political and economic instability and of (aggressive and ideological) nationalism. Both within and outside Europe this led to armed conflicts, which gave rise to large groups of refugees and the number of applications for political asylum in the rich European countries, including the Netherlands, rose sharply. This was exacerbated because, with the fall of the Iron Curtain, entry to Europe became much easier.

In 1985, there were applications for asylum from some 5,000 refugees: in the peak year of 1994, this figure rose to 50,000. In recent years the number has stabilized, initially at an annual figure of around 40,000. The largest group of asylum seekers in the nineties originated from the former Yugoslavia, followed by Somalia and Iran. In recent times a clear reduction in this number can be seen. In 2002 there were some 18,000 asylum applications.

At the same time, a different type of employment migration started. This was also related to favourable economic conditions. In the sixties and seventies, immigrants predominantly came from Turkey, Morocco and other Mediterranean countries, who mainly had little or no education, and who came to earn their living in industry, whilst in the nineties, employment

migration took on a different character. An influx of migrant workers came mainly from Western Europe and other prosperous countries, such as Japan and the United States. Employment migration from outside the European Union is increasingly of highly qualified personnel, such as managers, technical people and those skilled in information technology. The increase in the number of work permits for ICT people from India and South Africa is particularly striking.

In the last decades of the 20th century, the overall influx of immigrants has steadily increased. In 2001, 133,000 people came to live in the Netherlands, of whom 96,000 were non-Dutch and 37,000 were Dutch nationals. If we look at the different reasons why people consider coming to our country, then we see that a quarter (24,000) of the non-Dutch immigrants come for reasons of establishing a family: marriage or living together. Of these foreign marriage immigrants, one in ten is younger than 21. Every year this means some two thousand partners, of whom some 800 are Turkish and some 300 Moroccan. One in five (19,000) comes to be reunited with their families. In 2001 there were almost 12,000 non-Dutch juvenile immigrants. Of these 12,000 children, three-quarters are twelve or younger. Some 3,000 are between twelve and eighteen years old. In addition, 22 per cent come as legitimate refugees and 19 per cent to work (employment migration). Smaller numbers come for study purposes, for work placement or as an au pair.

There seems to be a reversal in the area of asylum. The number of asylum applications in the EU is still rising, but in the Netherlands we have seen a decrease in recent times. In 2000, there were 44,000 applications, in 2001 this number dropped to 33,000. This decrease continued in 2002, with some 18,000 applications.

3. The term ethnic minority: definitions

The continuous increase in immigration in recent decades has led to a considerable growth in the number of non-Dutch people living in the Netherlands. Because defining the country of origin of these immigrants is complicated by naturalization (obtaining Dutch nationality by means other than birth), the term ethnic minority has been devised; only the country of birth of the person and his or her parents plays a role. According to the broad definition of the Central Bureau for Statistics (CBS), a person from an ethnic minority is: a) a person living legally in the Netherlands of whom at least one parent was born abroad (first generation), or b) a person living

legally in the Netherlands who was born in the Netherlands but of whom at least one parent was born abroad (second generation). The Central Bureau for Statistics differentiates between ethnic minorities of Western and non-Western origin. A person's country of birth determines the category into which he or she falls. In the case of a member of an ethnic minority group of the second generation, a person who was born in the Netherlands, the mother's country of origin is the determining factor. If the mother was also born in the Netherlands, then the father's country of origin will determine whether the person is considered to be Western or non-Western.

A person from a Western ethnic minority is one who was him or herself (first generation) or of whom one of the parents (second generation) was born in Europe (excluding Turkey), North America, Oceania (Australia and New Zealand), Indonesia and the former Dutch Indies or Japan. A non-Western ethnic person is one who was him or herself (first generation) or of whom one of the parents (second generation) was born in Turkey, Africa, Latin America or Asia (excluding Japan, Indonesia or the former Dutch Indies).

4. The reaction of the receiving society to the influx of immigrants

With a view to the current integration debate, it is useful to consider how the receiving society in former times reacted to the considerable influx of newcomers. Of course, the processes by which immigrants settled in the Golden Age were quite different from those of the 20th century. Huguenots are not people from Turkish descent and the Federal Republic of the Seven United Netherlands is quite different from the current nation state. Yet history shows a number of constants and recurring patterns. Patterns which are inherent in the very nature of the migration process and which, therefore, have a contribution to make to the current debate.

Immigrants who had something to offer were generally welcomed. Among the Southern Netherlanders there was a wide choice of skilled people, of whom the Hollanders were more than pleased to make use; skilled workers from the South made a strong contribution to the textile industry. The Huguenots in particular were welcomed with open arms. As early as 1681 these people were encouraged to come to the Netherlands, with promises of citizenship, free guild membership, tax exemption and financial and material assistance. The Huguenots were not only invited because of their shared religious beliefs, but also because they were prosperous merchants and skilled textile workers. Collections were held in various cities to support

these fellow believers. Also, at the time when the Huguenots came to the Netherlands, the French language and culture were fashionable among the Dutch elite. The upper classes imitated French culture and spoke French among themselves to distinguish themselves from the rest of the population.

By no means every asylum seeker had an easy life. Foreign workers generally did the hardest, most dangerous and least well paid work. Ordinary workers were soon seen as competitors who stole the bread out of the mouths of the established people. The States of Holland in 1629 were reluctant to give permission for a collection for German asylum seekers who had been persecuted during the Thirty Years War, for fear that this measure would prove too great an attraction for them. Amsterdam bricklayers and carpenters even had the right to demand the sacking of foreign workers if they themselves were out of work. In short, if there was no useful skill or other assets, the rule which invariably applied was: "own people first".

Poverty, exclusion, discrimination and irritation played a considerable role in former times. There was grinding poverty among the Brabant, Wallonian and Flemish immigrants. In Leiden, the native Hollanders in those years were in the minority, but, according to records from 1599, only six per cent of the taxable wealth was owned by foreigners. Many had come to Holland with no possessions, and even people who have previously owned property and land, were reduced to begging and had to rely on charity. In the overpopulated Dutch cities they found themselves in expensive and cramped rented accommodation, with no prospects of improving their circumstances.

The immigrants lagged considerably behind the native people in terms of prosperity, and a greater number of them were forced to rely on charity. This led to further discontent. There were complaints about abuse and bands of beggars who lived off the good Amsterdam money and about the immigrants who had come to Holland to live off the state.

Although immigrants did work, the image of Germans and Dutchmen from the South as not exactly flattering. In Bredero's *De Spaansche Brabander* Dutchmen from the south were painted as conceited, arrogant and interfering troublemakers. If the Hollanders felt inferior to the more developed South Netherlanders, the opposite applied to the Germans, who came from less developed rural areas. In the frequent "Kraut farces" they were portrayed as stupid. This image was also true of those who lived in the Eastern provinces.

5. History puts the current integration problems only partly into perspective

From the above it can be deduced that immigration was mainly an issue in the cities. In addition, it is very clear that Hollanders were by no means keen on importing poverty. In spite of a relatively mild climate for foreigners – they could settle here with no real problems and there was also support from charitable organizations – life was hard for immigrants. The majority had to start again at the bottom of the ladder and they were not always well treated. Negative images relating to the first generation are an almost timeless phenomenon, as historian Lucas remarks, but that does not alter the fact that from the sixteenth century almost all immigrants – mostly over a number of generations – have become integrated. This means that their descendants no longer identified with the country of origin of their (great) grandparents, but that they felt themselves to be first and foremost Dutch and their position in the employment market showed no clear distinction.

History teaches us that for the immigrant the process of settlement takes at least two and often three generations. Only thereafter is it possible to say whether the integration or assimilation process has been successful or not. This makes it difficult to assess the fluctuations of the current immigration process in the Netherlands, because we are primarily dealing with the first and second generations.

This last historical observation is encouraging. It puts the concerned discussions about the difficulties of integrating the current immigrants into society into perspective. From a historical perspective, it is advisable to emphasize in the debate about integration issues that it is primarily a question of time. We should not cause unnecessary stress by fostering expectations about the educational and employment performance of the newcomers: things will improve in time – when the next generation grows up here. It worked out well in earlier times and will do the same again now. There is certainly some justification for this belief. But we should nonetheless not make that assumption too easily. Although there are a number of similarities to be drawn from history, there are currently particular forces at work which give the integration process of current groups of immigrants a different character and an extra degree of complication.

6. Changing patterns of immigration and integration

A significant new fact is the country of origin of many of today's immigrants. A large number of them come from very distant countries and from very different cultures. The largest proportion of the immigrants (46,000) come from non-Western countries.

This is made possible by the improvements in transport which means people are today able to travel much greater distances than previously. In earlier times, immigrants came from a few, mainly neighbouring West European countries. It is, of course, true that the differences in language and culture between, for example, Germans and Dutch were then experienced as being much greater than today, yet the immigrants mainly came from similar cultures and comparable societies. We now see a much greater diversity of countries of origin and often a much greater emotional and cultural distance between the societies of the countries of origin and the Netherlands.

For example, people who have had hardly any education, coming from more traditional, conservative societies with a well-structured network of relationships have to find their way in a modern, extremely complex and individualistic knowledge society. It is the number of non-Western immigrants which is rising: from 1.1 million (7 per cent of the population) in 1995 to 1.5 million in 2001 (9 per cent of the population). In 2010 this is expected to be 2 million (20 per cent of the population). Among them are many people from Islamic countries. By that time, some 6 to 7 per cent of the Dutch population will probably be Muslim.

A second important difference from the past is the nature and above all the intensity of the immigrant's relationship with his or her original country and culture. Modern communication technology, which is available to almost everybody, makes it possible to maintain links with one's country of origin. We are faced with a paradox here. Globalisation and high technology allow immigrants to bridge great distances, yet at the same time it enables them to remain within the sphere of influence of their native, often more traditional, cultures, via satellite dishes, mobile telephones and short or longer visits. This is even further strengthened by the increased opportunities for travel. In earlier times, no immigrant was able to make an annual visit to the family he had left behind or have a marriage partner come to join him. Previously, the influx of partners and people who came for reasons of family reunification would at a certain pointing time come to a halt and integration would become a necessity. Today, the largest group of immigrants is made up of those setting up or rejoining families. These are

mainly people whose cultural backgrounds are different from our own and who choose a partner from their native country to come to join them. In earlier times, too, it was, of course, possible to marry someone who had also emigrated from one's home country, but then the immigration process was more a shared experience.

The immigration and integration issue is also coloured by the fact that the Netherlands is a welfare state. This is a third significant difference from the situation in the past. Then, the immigrant was responsible for his own livelihood, and charitable organizations only intervened in cases of extreme need, whereas the situation is – in some ways fortunately – different for the immigrant of today. Newcomers who do not, or are unable to, qualify for the employment market are supported by a strong social safety net. In this situation the responsibility for providing an income is to a considerable degree shifted from the immigrant to the state.

Fortunately, the – until recently – favourable economic situation has improved the position of non-Western immigrants on the employment market. Unemployment among this group has decreased from 26 per cent in 1995 to 11 per cent in 2001. Relatively speaking, nothing has changed. In 1995, unemployment among non-Western immigrants was four times that of native people and in 2000 this had not altered. However, unemployment among the second generation is lower, at 8 per cent. Nonetheless, this has not prevented the formation of a minority sub-class. Immigrants and their descendents continue to occupy a lower social position for generations. This is a fourth difference from earlier patterns.

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7. Historical patterns in a different perspective

There are also certain aspects of migration which are more in line with historical patterns, but which, because of the differences mentioned above, are more problematical in our time. The concentration of migrants in the large cities is a recognized phenomenon from the past. It is clear that the improvements in their employment position have not yet led to a greater distribution throughout the Netherlands. Some 40 per cent of non-Western immigrants live in the four largest cities, in comparison with the 13 per cent of the total population. In fact, the concentration of immigrants in the cities was greater in 2000 than in 1998. Only in Rotterdam has this percentage dropped slightly. This means that in the other large cities the concentration has increased rather than reduced. A number of city districts have become predominantly occupied by immigrants: multi-ethnic areas often with only “black” schools with pupils of many different nationalities.

The problems of becoming part of the society where one has function in order to have a job and an income should not be underestimated. It is in these very districts that problems such as unemployment, poverty and criminality accumulate and become almost hopeless. This can even lead to the third generation – contrary to expectations – integrating less than previous generations.

In spite of recent improvements in the position of foreign workers in education and on the employment market, it is nonetheless so that of the 850,000 households below the poverty line, half of these are of foreign descent. Many immigrants are poorly educated, speak little or no Dutch and have a poor starting position on the employment market. This is a barrier to integration, in a cultural and probably even in a political sense.

The Council for Social Development (RMO) makes the following comment: “The integration process of ethnic groupings will on the one hand show progress, but on the other hand will be constantly affected by the continuous arrival of new immigrants. These citizens combine the uncertainty of being an immigrant with their own culture and sometimes their own religion. They may feel strongly bound to their native country or may be sensitive to political influences from that country. This situation is fraught with risks which can lead to social or political radicalization. It is obviously of great importance how the indigenous society deals with this phenomenon. ‘Desolidarity’ could take place: a decreasing willingness among the native people to fund the financial burden of the ethnic minorities. If political radicalism also takes place (either proactively or reactively), this will initiate a process which could have serious consequences.” In addition, there is the danger that social, cultural and economic disadvantages will become exacerbated.

The concerned tone of the RMO is not unfounded, certainly not now that the economic downturn could undo the improvements in the position of minority groups on the employment market. On the other hand – and these two cases are not necessarily mutually exclusive – it is quite possible that our country in the coming years may be faced with shortfalls on the employment market due to a reducing and greying native population and a disparity between supply and demand: waiting lists in the health care sector, staff shortages in public transport, shortages in education and child care. If vital services in a society can barely be provided and there is excessive unemployment among foreign workers, this can cause tensions to rise. But shortfalls on the employment market may also offer opportunities: opportunities for work, social networks, education, etc. However, this requires strong investment and a focused employment policy.

8. New perspectives

The debate and policies on the pluriform society do not have to be dominated by worries and anxieties. However, this will involve efforts from both sides. It requires a policy which is demanding for both newcomers and indigenous people. It is for this reason that it is important that the integration of minority groups into society is not just incidentally but structurally high on the political agenda. What is important is that people should have the opportunity to make a real and useful contribution to this society and if necessary should be encouraged from their own immigration background to do so. This requires an integration policy that is not harder, but more focused and more ambitious than has been the case to date. Measures to encourage participation in education and the employment market are important, but the socio-cultural component should not be neglected.

A society is more than an economic alliance. Immigration is more than acquiring a passport. Education and employment are, of course, necessary for the integration process to be successful, but at the same time successful participation relies on more than this, namely on a feeling of solidarity with and above all the experience of a fundamental responsibility for the (new) society.

We reject the assumption that integration issues are largely solved when immigrants have acquired a satisfactory position on the employment market and have achieved good educational results. Loyalty, citizenship and involvement are not necessarily related to the acquisition of particular skills.

3 Integration: the role of values and norms

1. Integration has various dimensions

Integration can be interpreted as a central position between the two extremes of assimilation and segregation. With assimilation, there is a forced, though uncritical adaptation to the receiving society. Segregation implies exclusion from the broader society. Assimilation appears to have the advantage of unambiguousness: involvement simply comes about. On the other hand, it often requires a denial of the individual soul and identity. The other extreme, segregation, means that the immigrant's own cultural roots and identity are maintained, but at a high price: isolation and marginalization, and potentially strong tensions between population groups. Furthermore, segregation often leads to inflexibility: one is unable to live in accordance with one's own philosophy of life in a dynamic environment when one is constantly having to contend with new challenges. The tendency is then to avoid contact with the dynamics of society.

It has been mentioned earlier that in the sociological literature a distinction is made between structural and socio-structural integration. Vermeulen and Penninx describe structural integration as full participation in social institutions. These include institutions in the sphere of education and employment. Social integration is concerned with the degree and nature of social contacts which members of minority organizations maintain with the wider society and their adaptation to the culture of the society. Socially, it is a matter of the extent of participation in informal circuits, such as the local neighbourhood, the circle of friends and clubs. Cultural orientation is related to the assumptions and values of the immigrant groups and with the degree to which these resemble or differ from those of the receiving society.

In general, it can be said that successful structural integration is in the interests of both the established society and the newcomers. Paid employment and educational qualifications are important prerequisites for integration. This is also borne out in practice. Access to sources of knowledge and to capital are widely accepted as the hallmark of, as well as a pre-requisite of, successful integration. The ideals of the newcomers generally support this. Whether we listen to Moroccan or Somali mothers, their dreams for the futures of their children differ very little. At the top of the wish list are a solid education and a good social position. It must, however, be said that these common aims and ambitions are no guarantee of successful integration.

Successful integration depends on more than a satisfactory economic position and access to sources of income, knowledge, power and prosperity. It is also a question of participation, of true solidarity, of involvement in and focus on the new society, which is always more than just an economic relationship. It is also about living in accordance with the underlying values which people share with one another. Within a diverse society, it is important that there is also a common constitutional culture which drives society. From a Christian Democratic perspective, pluralism is an indisputable principle. Pluralism demands mutual respect for differences and at the same times calls for common cultural elements, which ensure that society does not become fragmented.

Above all, there is enormous cohesion between the social, cultural and functional (structural) aspects of integration. They are mutually influential and self-generating. Those who share the basic norms and values of society, will more easily connect at a social level and vice versa. Anyone who has a strong (mixed) social network will more easily gain access to the employment market and will be open to the culture of others. Parents who are involved in the daily life of the neighbourhood are better equipped to follow their children and support them in all that happens in and around the school. The gap between the generations in such families is less pronounced than when the worlds of the parents and young people are miles apart. Specifically because of the relationship between the different aspects of integration, this report covers both functional and socio-cultural recommendations.

Visible success depends to a considerable degree on intangible aspects such as shared values, recognition at a deeper level and a fundamentally open attitude. The notion that people in a social and cultural sense can maintain a distance from the mainstream of society and at the same time become integrated socially, is in general a myth. This means that a policy which pays attention exclusively or primarily to successes in the area of education and employment, and ignores the socio-cultural aspects, will fail, even in terms of the position of migrants in education and employment.

The extent of the fixation on socio-economic issues is even confirmed from a quote which now aims to pay tribute to the cultural aspects of integration. The Scientific Council for Government Policy (WRR) writes: "A limited degree of socio-cultural integration mainly appears to correspond with a low social position, whilst a high degree of socio-cultural integration goes with a more advantageous social position". Such a view as this too easily ignores the fact that people in "deprived areas" who have concern for

their fellow human beings – from whatever background – and who are able to discuss problem behaviour should the need arise, often make a greater contribution to cohesion in society than people with obvious wealth and a good career. This is culture and these are the true values and norms! Christian Democratic ideals have always included a strong appreciation of the diversity of integration: society is more than a social entity, more also than a number of functional relationships. It is also a (by definition open and dynamic) cultural identity. It is for this reason that a multi-dimensional integration policy is needed.

2. Integration and cultural institutions

The sociologist Merton in his book *Social Theory and Social Structure* classifies the way in which people integrate into a society. He makes a distinction between cultural values and institutional resources. On the basis of this, the following characterization can be developed (with some slight modifications):

METHOD OF ADAPTATION	CULTURAL ASSETS	INSTITUTIONAL RESOURCES
1) Conforming	+	+
2) Innovation	+/-	+/-
3) Ritualism	-	-
4) Detachment	-	-
5) Rebellion	-	-

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By cultural values we understand the aims which are regarded as being of value in a society. What is regarded as worthy of being aspired to? Are tolerance, openness and citizenship regarded as worthy aspirations, or money, career and useful contacts? What are people's values, their ideals? On what matters can a person be called to account? In addition, there are the resources which are considered necessary to attain these goals (education, working hard, skills etc.).

When people conform, then they accept the society in which they live in terms of its aspirations and resources. With innovation, we are dealing with involved citizens who think critically but constructively about issues in society and who make efforts to bring about change. There is critical identification with society and with the central values on which social relationships are built. Ritualism is more complicated; people act in an exemplary way, have greater or less access to institutional resources, to

education, employment, sources of capital, but they have not internalised the cultural ideals. An extreme example would be the perpetrators of the attacks on the WTC in New York and the Pentagon in Washington on 11th September 2001. People who were perfectly capable of building up a respectable career in the West but in emotional terms felt an enormous aversion to the culture. It cannot, of course, be considered as ritualism (in this study), when people participate in society (structural assimilation or integration), whilst they not only maintain their own cultural and religious values and norms, but also feel at home in Dutch society and identify with the key values of the constitutional state (which will be addressed later). Detachment is seen where people resignedly reject society and also do not have the necessary skills to function independently. In the case of rebellion (destructive behaviour), the tensions are on the surface. In the last three instances, integration is under pressure or absent.

Social-cultural integration at its deepest level is about whether people feel comfortable in a particular society. Is there sufficient synergy between their view of life and the society where they have responsibilities? Are they able to express their deepest convictions within their social relationships? Is there a close link between their ideals and the practical aspects of daily life, or are these two aspects incompatible? This is, of course, a question which not only applies to newcomers. Acculturation and such like are matters which apply to all population groups (Merton's categorization is relevant for all groups: see the general debate about acculturation from the early nineties). This issue does affect the integration of newcomers in specific ways. In the case of integration it is important that people:

a can see the link between their beliefs, life vision and world vision and the society in which they live on a day to day basis authentically and voluntarily (the cultural dimension). Common key values and opportunities for participation are particularly important;

b have above all the skills to carry out their responsibilities (the functional dimension) in a way which is fulfilling for them.

The most important values of society are not abstract ideas divorced from everyday reality. On the contrary, these values are expressed in the manners, moral codes, ideals and modus operandi of organizations such as businesses, schools, public administration, courts of law, political institutions, etc. Anyone who does not feel comfortable with the culture, the mode of behaviour, the ideals and the identity of important institutions etc, feels uprooted and alien. If people's philosophy of life and the sources

from which they derive meaning are not recognized socially or legally, or if they clash with those of the (constitutional) culture, then socio-cultural tensions will result. It is above all the formative institutions such as families, schools, the media, religious communities and to an extent also the state itself which can avert rifts and ensure that immigrants have the opportunity to participate in society. As well as being the carriers of culture, they are also intermediate bodies. They convey particular values and equip people to take up their responsibilities. Families, schools, religious communities etc. therefore have to be given the opportunity to fulfill this role. They are faced with the challenge of ensuring that their principles and their philosophy of life benefit society (if necessary also in a critical sense) and of making sure that these relate to social developments and to the responsibilities and tasks which people have to bear. This is important in equipping people to take their place in society.

To be able to bear responsibility within a society, one needs to have insight into the society and particular skills, such as knowledge of the language, a profession, etc. And this is certainly not only a matter of whether a person can hold a hammer, maintain a set of accounts or fill in a form. In addition to functional skills, social relationships are essential to be able to assess the finer points of social interaction. If there is no meaningful interaction with society, this will lead to isolation, lack of understanding or inflexible resistance. One cannot fully experience social change or make appropriate responses. One cannot get on in society relying on one's own principles, which often leads to even greater inflexibility. To avoid this situation, it is important that people have their own organizations.

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The conclusion is by and large that integration is a matter of being involved (if necessary in a critical way, but in any event involved) with society. It is the formative and cultural institutions which play an extremely important role in integration.

In an ideal situation, they will fulfill a bridging function.

3. Scale and institutionalization

A sociological comment needs to be made here concerning the rationale for an integration policy. This can be subject to gradual shifts in emphasis. When the influx of migrants is more or less incidental, then the integration efforts are obviously focused on the people in question: their work, income and education are key factors here. Social-cultural issues and possible tensions are mainly played out among the migrants themselves. They have

to find their way in new surroundings and in a new culture, which can be very lonely. If the influx of immigrants increases, then two patterns may emerge.

The first pattern is that more or less new homogenous networks come into being, certainly if the origin, religion, values and norms of the migrants overlap one another. This has consequences for the integration policy. The social-cultural dimension of acculturation is then strongly influenced by the group process in these networks. These migrants often gather in particular neighbourhoods, places of entertainment, schools, churches, mosques, etc. In other words, the integration policies come into contact with institutions which carry and convey culture. On the one hand these offer particular opportunities, because close social networks bring people together and offer new perspectives, as well as making sure that people do not go off the rails. Through ethnic institutions, newcomers to our country are able to give expression to their philosophies of life in a way which also has value for society. These institutions can fulfill a bridging function for people who come to our country with their own customs and ideals. They are able to address and solve conflicts and misunderstandings and can call on their broad experience to ease the transition of newcomers into their new environment.

But ethnic institutions can also have disadvantages; they may, for example, form buffers against the rest of society, which means people remain strangers to one another. This may be one explanation for why integration problems in subsequent generations are sometimes greater than with the first generation. This point is illustrated by research both in the Netherlands and Germany which shows that third generation immigrants sometimes speak worse Dutch or German than the first and second generations.

Anyone who is not familiar with this sociological pattern may assume that integration is simply a question of time, of a little individualisation (and secularisation) and of the passing of generations. The first generation has some difficulties, perhaps cannot find permanent work, is too focused on the country of origin, doesn't speak the language, and such like. But – the thought process continues – with the second generation things are different; this generation will begin to integrate into Dutch society. But it is not so simple. If a parallel society develops, this can easily lead to isolation. The interaction issue in this setting has a different character than in the “starting situation”. As has been said, institutional issues become more explicit. With the second pattern, which can occur when there is a more or less permanent influx of immigrants, there is little (cultural) homogeneity.

Highly multi-cultural districts develop: people settle there from all parts of the world, with their diverse backgrounds, languages, customs, etc. There is soon a lack of social cohesion and social control, which impedes integration and increases the likelihood of segregation and results in greater isolation, a low level of education over generations, a high level of (youth) unemployment and a greater likelihood of ending up in criminal circles, etc. It is partly from fear of such a development that efforts have been made in the recent past to stimulate the existence of ethnic minorities' own unifying institutions and to encourage emancipation whilst at the same time maintaining the ethnic minorities' own cultures, for example by providing education in the native language and culture.

Sometimes the two patterns can occur simultaneously. The majority of Moroccans and Turks, for example, have both homogeneous networks and their own communities, while they at the same time live in ethnically heterogeneous districts.

4. Key issues in integration

The lesson to be learned from the above is that an integration policy has to challenge cultural institutions (also for the benefit of their own community) to form a bridge to the new society without reducing the likelihood of the individual with his own philosophy of life interfacing constructively with that society. On the contrary, this is of paramount importance. Then, one can truly talk of connecting values. Such interfaces in any event relate to the fundamental values of the state. If there is no identification with these key values, then people do not share a joint feeling of responsibility for society. There is a reciprocal link between these two extremes, bearing and wanting to bear responsibility on the one hand and identification with the key values of the state on the other. Social and cultural aspects of integration converge here.

If this integration fails to take place, then the consequences can be quite far-reaching. For people personally, because they are unable to find their feet in the new environment. For society, because it can have undesirable social consequences, such as alienation and estrangement (which in turn lead to unemployment, dropping out of school and displacement). For the state, because there is a greater likelihood of criminality and violent tensions between and within population groups. (Compare what happened in Antwerp in November 2002).

Within the Christian Democratic tradition, considerable importance has always been attached to the role of social relationships. This role also seems to be significant in the integration of immigrants. As regards the cultural minorities' own organizations, these have a role in promoting social cohesion and encouraging contacts between people. They help to avert loneliness, anonymity and lack of perspective. They provide norms and values and give people the opportunity to give expression to their religion. They can also play a significant role within the community in a constitutional state.

At the same time there are a number of areas of friction. In the first place there is the question which was posed earlier of whether ethnic institutions may not obstruct broader integration and participation. This gives rise to a second question which relates to the culture and the ideological bias of these institutions. Our society or – in this instance more appropriately – the state is, of course, pluriform, but not in terms of culture. What values are non-surrenderable and in what sense do they offer frameworks and orientations for the institutions?

It is against the background of these questions that in the follow-up of the report particular attention is paid not only to cultural developments in our country, but also to the cultural and intermediate institutions (including those of cultural minorities). Openness and fulfilling a bridging function are the key words here. First, aspects of Dutch culture will be addressed. Later, the institutions come into the picture: institutions which are: a) bearers of culture, and b) important for the social dimension of integration (participation).

This classification is based on the view that integration is a phenomenon with cultural (key values), social (participation) and functional (skills) aspects. All three are important, and are moreover mutually influential.



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4 Cultural differences and Dutch identity

1. Cultural differences

When we state in our meeting with new Dutch citizens that issues about the particular nature of Dutch (constitutional) culture are important, this has nothing to do with such stereotypes as folklore, clogs, tulips and cheese. It is, of course, about connection in terms of the values which are the foundation of the (constitutional) community and the norms which these engender. Certainly, after the attacks of 11th September 2001 it is absolutely clear that there are worlds of cultural differences and disputes hidden behind confrontations, impasses, misunderstandings and linguistic differences.

2. The importance of stating the basic values

Hesitations in stating the basic values should not simply be dismissed. Trying to impose specific values on people simply causes havoc. It engenders resistance rather than leading to genuine support. In addition, it can cause a cultural inflexibility which is alien to the mobility of a society and to the dynamics which are inherent to cultures. Changes occur very quickly within society; cultures are constantly in motion and in the course of time develop links with one another. Undercurrents which were scornfully laughed away yesterday, are today mainstream.

The Dutch culture too is, of course, subject to change. Sweeping changes are taking place even in the most diverse fields of life. Forty years ago if one wanted to find out about homosexuality, for example, one had to consult medical dictionaries under neurotic complaints. What was then unthinkable, has become reality: civil marriage is now open to people of the same sex.

3. Dutch culture as an element of Western civilization

Although the mobility of a culture is very clear, there are also fundamental themes which define (social) life; themes which are so woven into the country's cultural identity and rooted in age old traditions, that they belong to the fundamentals of the social order; they have legal ramifications and translate into civil rights and laws.

In order to discover what factors determine Dutch culture, it is important to look beyond the borders of our own country. Dutch culture is part of the

West-European culture, which in turn belongs to Western civilization. Of course, there are all sorts of national and regional differences between, for example, the French and the British, between Flemish people and Danes. But differences of identity between European countries are not based on differences in fundamental values. There is common cultural ground, fed by the Jewish and Christian tradition and Greek philosophy and resulting in an interaction between Christendom, rationalism and the ethics of authenticity. These are reviewed below.

The report Public Justice by the Policy Studies Institute of the CDA (1989) considered the impact of the Jewish and Christian religions on our culture. This report addresses social legislation in ancient Israel. It also points out the significant and influential internalization (and thereby radicalization) of the ethics of the New Testament. This has obvious forerunners in the Old or First Testament. The focus is not on obedience, but on sincerity, charity, moderation in one's opinions and involvement. Service to mankind (love) is more important than strictly following the letter of the law. Actions do not count on their own nor are they the prime consideration, but what is important is above all the underlying intentions. The Kingdom of God will not be achieved by violent means or by the use of force. The report indicates that this approach has had far reaching political implications. Putting the emphasis on ethics clearly highlights the restricted scope and the limitations of the task of politics. One can never reach a person's heart by using force, any more than one can apply pressure to make a person a sincere believer. "The domain of the kaiser" is not all-encompassing.

Public Justice quite rightly states that this is a significant source of tolerance and Western rights of freedom; for separating different spheres of life each with their own responsibility (Church and state for example). This affinity between Christian tradition and modern human rights is not without some friction and in the course of history has by no means been unambiguous. The religious wars in the sixteenth century and the resistance of the churches to ratifying human rights speak volumes here. If only for this reason, there is by no means any (historical) cause to link human rights (and democracy) one on one, let alone exclusively, with the Christian belief. In addition, movements such as liberalism, social democracy and feminism have in their own way actually stood at the cradle of rights of freedom and democracy - and sometimes in the face of religious pressure. Moreover, we come across these movements in other religions. We will revert to this later, since this is a foundation for the connecting values mentioned earlier.

On the other hand, historical transgressions cannot be allowed to detract from the powerful and decisive significance of Jewish and Christian cultures for the West. Taylor is quite right to state that the pluriform society and the “neutral state” are the expression of a culture which is marked by the Jewish faith, by Christianity and humanism (see below).

4. Rationalism and the ethics of authenticity

Western culture has further sources of inspiration. In the fifteenth, sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the influence of classical Greek and Roman philosophy increased greatly, through the decline of the Christian civilization in the Middle Ages, but above all as a result of the rediscovery of classical antiquity, initially through the intervention of Arabic culture. Experimental scientific and technological progress made their entrance. Gradually the conviction grew that a way had to be found towards a non-religious, natural law but a nonetheless rational basis for society and politics. The Enlightenment further accentuated this development. It is based on the assumption that man can and must be responsible for his own destiny and must make his life meaningful. Charles Taylor talks of a theory of having control over one's life, grafted onto a natural scientific approach: another important source of culture in Western society, therefore. A source of culture which is strongly related to personal autonomy and which is also expressed in humanism.

As a reaction against this theory, we also see the arrival of the so-called ethics of authenticity. This ideal was formed gradually at the end of the eighteenth century and is strongly influenced by Romanticism (for example, by Herder). In the 20th century it cropped up in the roaring sixties with the emphasis on self-expression and the renouncement of (traditional) relationships. Taylor refers to this as romantic expressiveness.

These three movements have put their mark on Western culture: the rationalism of the Enlightenment, romantic expressionism and Christianity. Such notions as individual freedom, human rights, authenticity and social motivation developed. There is a considerable degree of overlap between these three moral traditions, partly because they have had influence on one another. The balance between the three cultural mainstreams is therefore not without its frictions. It cannot be otherwise; these movements put a different emphasis on their view of humanity and the world and this has consequences for their moral and political viewpoints.

A particular aspect of current West European culture also deserves attention in connection with integration. The fast secularization after the Second World War and the great improvement in prosperity have had enormous influences on lifestyle and culture. Hedonism and the disintegration of old accepted relationships with authority have given rise to problems in all West European countries. The influence of the mass media, the inducements to enjoy life without restraint, loose sexual morals and excessive use of stimulants are often all too apparent. The authority of parents, schools and existing institutions has clearly diminished. Migrants come into this at times permissive society, not only from countries with a completely different value system, but often also from rural areas. The culture shock can be enormous.

5. The individual nature of Dutch culture

Apart from the basic patterns described above which are typical for the West, our country also has its own nature and character, the result of a combination of geographical, religious, economic and political circumstances. Ask a Dutchman about what typifies our country and he will quickly come up with such values as openness, tolerance, austerity and above all consultation. It is, however, not so easy to determine whether Dutch people actually are as tolerant as they believe and whether this tolerance is based on sincere convictions and enlightened self-interest or whether it in fact represents nothing more than a necessary way of life.

a Tolerance, consultation and seeking compromise

The sociologist Ter Borg explains the existence of a tolerant living environment as being largely due to the general struggle against water. His theory largely maintains that the Dutchman through the centuries has had to make sure he keeps his feet dry and therefore takes care to bring issues into the open. In the vulnerable polder, shoring up a dyke is just a few hours work, but if it is not addressed, it often turns into a disaster for the whole population. To avoid dissatisfaction being worked off in this way, it is important that all parties sing from one hymn sheet and that a plan of approach is developed which covers the interests of all parties. So, slowly but surely, the polder mentality came into being: a combination of the morals of equality and tolerance, and consequently the tendency to consult all interested parties before taking action. These moderate attitudes have resulted in a country of compromise and consultation, a climate of tolerance and permissiveness. So even today it would be impossible to conceive of any serious decision-making procedure between government

and social partners, employees and employers without consultation. But nonetheless an explanation of the history of Dutch mentality through production means (the dykes) and the production attitudes of olden times (cooperating in the interests of the collective good) goes rather far. Even if they are related, this is a very economical argument.

If Ter Borg regards mutual tolerance as a necessary means of survival, the historian Van der Dunk favours enlightened self-interest. "Holland has been a confirmed trading nation from the beginning (that is from the time of the revolt against Spain), acknowledged no religious, ideological or moral barriers in the area of commerce," he writes, "because it was a matter of the country's fundamental existence. It was and still is self-evident that this basis cannot be harmed and so economic interests have always carried the most weight in the hardest political disputes, either openly or covertly, to such an extent that even those who are motivated by high morals often had to concede or back down."

Indeed, Dutch people were inveterate traders and many turned a blind eye when they had the chance of earning some money (the slave trade and supplying weapons to the enemies of the Huguenots are painful illustrations of this). Yet in our country's history there have certainly been instances when the conviction that mutual tolerance and freedom of religion are desirable has played a decisive role and has been expressed as such in our country's politics.

An important crusader for freedom of belief in our fatherland's history is William of Orange (1533-1584) who, as the viceroy of the Spanish King Phillip II in Holland, Zeeland and Utrecht, came into conflict with the King and politics because of his opposition to the persecutions and his ideal of freedom of religion. There are differing opinions as to what extent William of Orange's attitude always stemmed from personal conviction and whether there were sometimes political considerations to be taken into account. But the fact is that it appears from diverse sources that he regarded religion as a matter of conscience, a matter between God and man, and that no other person should come between them. Freedom of conscience without the right to publicly practise once religion was in his opinion in the end not a viable route. This conviction and his personal abhorrence of violence ensured an endless struggle for freedom of religion. In addition, there were the practical political considerations: the presence of many foreign people and the importance of trade made it almost impossible to deny other religious convictions.

William of Orange contended that freedom of conscience and putting an end to religious persecution would lead to peace, tranquility and unity. He therefore turned around the argument of the proponents of the hard line approach. Whereas they argued that differences of religion would lead to disquiet and dissent within the country, he believed that the use of violence against religious groups would be the very cause of such disquiet and dissent.

While in France religious harmony was pursued through political considerations and by separating religion from politics, William of Orange on the contrary gave tolerance a religious foundation. Religion and ethical awareness can in essence not be achieved by force. Religion both requires and engenders freedom. In this way he voiced a powerful but vulnerable and not undisputed element in the collective Western awareness. An element which in this case goes back to the internalization of belief and ethics at the time of the New Testament, as mentioned previously, and which was also based on humanism and expressed in this ideology.

b The build up and decline of religious pillars

At the end of the nineteenth century a more or less unique characteristic of Dutch society came into being: pillarisation, a process which received considerable momentum in the first half of the 20th century. Society gradually became split into four clusters of organizations based on religion. There was a Catholic, an orthodox Protestant, a social-democratic and a neutral liberal pillar, each with its own parties, unions, radio broadcasts, hospitals, universities, etc. A number of aspects were related to the country's religious pluralism, the school dispute and the social issue; the political system was sub-divided along the same lines. The political movements each had different responses to these questions, particularly in the period when the political parties were being formed.

The sociological views of pillarisation are well known. Because none of the pillars had a majority, consultation was necessary and compromises had to be made. The compromises were made against the background of a nonetheless common history and value system. The pillars shaped the emancipation of groups within society: through their own institutions, the self-awareness of the remaining groups was strengthened.

This pattern has changed drastically since the sixties. "Trusted relationships came to an end and traditional norms and values were open to discussion. Anything that was old was rejected. Followers shook off their former submissiveness; authority figures fell from their pedestals. Personal

development, education, self-determination, independence, democratization and participation were the new key words. Material prosperity increased, largely to the direct benefit of citizens; household equipment, televisions, cars and holidays abroad came within their reach. This had consequences for life style, intellectual development and patterns of expectation." The romantic culture of authenticity and self-expression mentioned earlier (according to Taylor) made a powerful impression. Many, often young and well-educated people began to regard the norms of a profession as more important than maintaining the moral and ideological foundations of the pillars of society. The preference for organizations based on ideology was increasingly called into question. Functionalism was the key word here.

It was these two tendencies which to an extent determined the culture of our country from the sixties; an ideal of self-development which went hand in hand with a culture of authenticity (and at times permissiveness), coupled with commercialism. The politics of the country were typified by – an often latent – resistance to institutions which promoted particular values, by opposition to idealistic institutions in the social centre field and by pleas for individualisation and self expression, against the background of a state which in functional terms was caring and which guaranteed social needs. Society should be enriched and formed along these lines. All this led to changes in morals. For many people, norms and values were replaced with the view that everyone should as far as possible be free to decide how he or she wanted to behave. Idealism and altruism came to an end and there was a move to a more hedonistic culture. There was talk of a flexible "I" in a network society, of a permissive society tending towards narcissism and of a libertarian post-modernism. It will be all too obvious that the resistance to religion and idealistic organizations was also fuelled by a culture which in many instances was much too staid.

This situation has subsequently led to two reactions. After the reaction of the welfare state, came that of the free market. This market liberalism on the one hand strengthened the individualistic and commercial aspects of the country's culture but on the other hand ensured that such notions as a work ethos, professional efforts and managing for oneself were restored to honour. "In the first wave of revenge on the welfare state, liberalism has gained social prestige. In economic terms a number of worthwhile results were achieved. But society still showed signs in an immaterial sense of enormous gaps which could be traced back to basic values such as respect, consideration for one another and decency." The call for norms and values can then also be seen as a second reaction. The importance which is increasingly being paid to spirituality, inspiration and religion is related to this.

6. Insurrenderable values in the Western and Dutch (constitutional) culture

When, against the background of a large influx of immigrants (and in a broader sense: towards the indigenous population), we talk about insurrenderable values in Western (and Dutch) culture, this is not such an immutable concept as to leave no room for dynamics, pluralism or opinions which differ from the mainstream.

The history of a country and culture are always characterized by a continuous search for balance between openness and retaining one's identity. This is no different now. In the document *Diversity within Unity*, the social philosopher Etzioni stated that the shared basic values in every society are subject to change and that this will continue to be the case in the future.

It is therefore completely legitimate for minorities to strive to bring about change via integrated democratic and social processes and to promote the acceptance of their culture.

At the same time, *Diversity within Unity* quite rightly states that it is important that citizens support the basic values and the institutions which belong to the tissue of the democratic constitutional state. The legal system and the democratic institutions are not random options, but obligating frameworks for every citizen and moreover are not surrenderable in terms of a number of basic values which (partly) determine the game and ground rules of our society. (The comment should be made here that this does not apply to all the provisions of the Constitution: the scope of the right to freedom is fundamental; the method of appointing a mayor, for example, is definitely not). No further argument is required that this is a matter of more than following rules and not doing things which are forbidden. The cohesion and identity of a society cannot be imposed from above. The (critical) identification with the (foundations of the) social constitutional state is not complete simply by externally observing the law and abiding by the current legislation. Merton's typology made this clear. "This identification should come from within. It is developed through upbringing, being involved in activities for the common good, shared values, shared language, peaks and troughs which are experienced jointly, public institutions, opinion-forming radio and television broadcasts and public discussions in newspapers and magazines about issues which concern society."

According to the Christian Democratic viewpoint, among others, it is important that:

- people are given the liberty and responsibility to form their own identity and can give expression to this (in and through their own institutions);
- social institutions and private institutes in their activities also themselves respect the above mentioned freedom of people;
- people are sufficiently well equipped, challenged and obliged to bear responsibility in society. The government makes available the necessary resources (such as schools);
- the government promotes the values of the democratic constitutional state, maintains the norms of the state and works on citizenship so that there is broad support for the constitutional society.

In any event, taking the above into consideration, the following are included in the non-surrenderable key elements of the constitutional state:

- Public recognition that man is valuable and unique; he is uniquely responsible and has his own purpose in life. By dint of this, he has the right to self development, to let his voice be heard. That he has the right to live in accordance with his own personal convictions. There is the opportunity to make individual choices, to make mistakes and rectify them, to show dissent, for controversy and pluralism, etc. Rights of freedom, non-discrimination directives and a democratic system of government are essential here.
- The incompatibility of force and personal belief or philosophy of life. This is based on the insight and the (also in Western Europe) sometimes painful experience that combining force and personal beliefs is damaging for freedom of conscience and religion. In terms of civil rights, this translates into the constitutional separation of Church and state.
- The right to give expression to one's own ambitions, to one's own philosophy of life and life mission through one's own institutions. It is through their social institutions that people make their own mark on their lives and on the social environment. Denominational schools, unions, churches and mosques come to mind here. Seen in this light they are vehicles of freedom. But this at the same time implies that they must not be able to force people to conform, using (the threat of) physical or psychological force, for example, even though institutions have their own rules of play, sanctions, customs and practices. A "personal structure" (the term comes from R. Guardini) does not compress an individual (the

private person) into a complete entity. In terms of laws, this notion translates into a certain degree of horizontal working of freedom rights.

- Equality between men and women. This equality is expressed in, for example, article 1 of the constitution. It is expounded in family law (the unacceptability of polygamy, equal rights to joint income, divorce law, etc.), in the social security regulations (equal pay), education law (obligatory education for everyone), the General Law on Equality of Treatment, etc. The idea that a woman would not be heard in a court of law because she is a woman, that she would be paid less money for the same work, would be forced to wear particular types of clothes against her will, that she could with impunity be forced to marry – all these are totally unacceptable.
- The equality of everyone before the law and the equality of all people, irrespective of gender, religion sexual orientation, etc. Within the framework of the law on equality of treatment, this is interpreted specifically for the different spheres of life.

In addition, a democratic constitutional state is more than a society in which the government guarantees rights of freedom and takes care of the basics of existence. The constitution also expects something from people. It makes demands which call upon people to conduct themselves as responsible members of society to (be able to) make a contribution to that society. We may for example think of the following:

- the obligation to earn one's own income, except in situations beyond one's control;
- the duty to bring one's children up well, as partners to care for one another, etc.;
- compulsory education;
- the duty to respect other people as human beings (their freedom) and not to infringe this respect, whether physically, or by other form of force or coercion;
- the different ways in which government defines citizens according to their responsibility for society and for the (further) development of the legal community (via compulsory subjects in education, such as the history of one's home country and the system of government, by means of subsidies from political parties, by calls to make use of the democratic right to vote, etc.)

As has been said, the most important values of a society are not abstractions, not ideas which are remote from everyday reality. On the contrary, those values are reflected in manners, in codes of conduct, in the aims and methods of organizations, including companies, schools, public administration, courts of law, political bodies, etc. It is above all the formative institutions such as families, schools, the media, religious communities and in a certain sense also the state itself which can bring people together (but can also isolate them). As we have already mentioned, they are, as well as bearers of culture, also intermediary bodies. They confer values and equip people to be able to take up responsibilities. If there is a lack of (critical) identification with the society's key values, then this also has consequences for participation and social cohesion, for the social aspects of integration. A breeding ground is created for what Merton referred to as ritualism, disassociation and (in extreme cases) even rebellion.

In the next chapter we will therefore concentrate on the relationships and institutions which have the function of conferring values and where people are equipped to take up their responsibilities. Here we will be talking about the family, education, religious and social organizations and, last but not least, the public legal community itself. What are the opportunities and possibilities, but also the problems and the disturbing developments related to these social relationships in terms of transfer of values and encouraging social-cultural cohesion? We will address this question in the next chapter.

5 Cultural policy and integration

1. Some population groups integrate more easily than others

It is generally recognised that some groups of immigrants integrate more easily into Dutch society than others. People from Indonesia integrate relatively quickly. This also applies to immigrants from Southern Europe. Surinam Creole families in their turn appear to integrate more easily than Moroccan families. There are even foreign groups which after a while perform better than the native population in some respects. This applies to many young Vietnamese people who, although they entered junior school at a later age and with a clear educational arrears, passed through junior education quickly and after completing senior school, have gone on to Higher Vocational Studies or University education, particularly in the technical field.

For other groups of newcomers, the process is more arduous. Some categories of the population, for example, are over-represented in the police and legal records. If the index figure for the whole of the Netherlands (in 1996) for 12 to 14 year olds was set at 100, then the figure for Turks in this age bracket is 180, for Surinamese 300, for Antilleans 466 and for Moroccans 480. The young people concerned come into contact with the law relatively early. They also re-offend relatively quickly. The sizeable differences in criminality scores can to an extent be put into perspective when groups of a similar socio-economic profile are compared. Nonetheless, the figures are still higher by a factor of two to three. That there are considerable differences between the diverse groupings of newcomers is apparent from the fact that criminality figures of Indonesian Dutch, Italian, Cape Verdean, Chinese and Japanese have never been assessed, because no problems have been signaled with these groups.

Leaving school without qualifications is a more common occurrence among certain immigrant groups than among the native population. Also, non-Western immigrants more often pursue a lower level of education and, added to this, their success rate is lower. Whilst 90% of the native population successfully complete senior school, of the non-Western immigrants three-quarters are successful. At the lower level of secondary education, the figures are respectively 95% and 88%, and for lower vocational education 96% as opposed to 85%. This level of performance can be attributed to the different cultural and social backgrounds of the students.

Here, too, the educational arrears seems to be spread differently over the population groups. Turkish, Moroccan and Antillean pupils lag far behind

the indigenous students, whereas Surinamese and other foreign students fare relatively well. Their level is approximately half way between the more weakly performing groups and the indigenous students. This three-way split can be found in junior education as well as in senior education.

We also see differences between the immigrant groups on the employment market. On the whole, unemployment of ethnic minorities has reduced in recent years. In 2000 9% of the Turkish, 13% of the Moroccan, 9% of the Surinamese and 8% of the Antillean population of working age were unemployed. Minorities from non-industrialised countries are, at 14%, most often unemployed. The other non-Dutch – from Western and/or industrialized countries – have a clearly lower unemployment rate, around 7%.

If we look at those dependent on social security, then it has to be recognized that foreign people more often depend on benefits than the indigenous population. Research by the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment shows that, in comparison with Dutch men aged between 40 and 64, Turkish and Moroccan men make use of social benefits three times as often. Some 30% of Turkish men receive benefit; for Moroccans that figure is 66%, as opposed to 22% of the indigenous male population in this age group.

Also, foreign women more often receive an income from social security. Of the Antillean and Surinamese women above 40, 40% receive benefit, as opposed to just under 16% of Dutch women. Almost a quarter of the Antillean women between 15 and 39 do not carry out any paid work, almost all of them receiving social security benefit. This is three times the figure for Dutch women under 40.

In the case of the men, the majority rely on disability benefit, followed by social security or unemployment benefit. Of the older Turkish men, 44% receive disability benefit. The percentage of Moroccan men receiving disability benefit is around 36%. In comparison to Dutch men, Turks and Moroccans receive a disability allowance respectively 2.5 and 2 times more frequently. Also, non-Dutch women are more often unfit for work than their Dutch counterparts and also more often than males in ethnic groups. Turkish women head the list: one in ten receives disability benefit.

Young immigrants in their turn are declared unfit for work on psychological grounds more often than average. The percentage of those with an occupational disability is highest for Moroccans between 15 and 39, at 46%.

The Verwey-Jonker Institute, from where these figures are taken, carried out research to investigate the causes of the over-representation of Turks and Moroccans in the occupational disability figures. From the statistical analysis of the information contained in the research, it appears that an important explanation is the low educational level of many Turkish and Moroccan workers. They, therefore, have to do physically hard work and have a high likelihood of becoming unfit for work.

The attitude of the employer also appears to be important, since one in three Turkish or Moroccan women receiving disability benefit worked previously in the cleaning branch or for a temporary agency. These are sectors where there is a weak employer/employee relationship, which means there is less chance of resuming work after a period of ill health. With this group of employees, the occupational health services play a limited role once the employee has been declared unfit for work.

For Turkish and Moroccan women, psychological stress, for example as a result of the combination of work and family and the cultural conflicts this entails, is one of the prime reasons for their unfitness for work.

A cause which the institute does not mention is the fact that foreigners actually come into the disability system as a result of inadequate education. Poor education and language skills mean that they are not in a position to carry out all types of paid jobs. Physical problems or handicaps may prevent them working in the cleaning industry, while inadequate (or no) education and poor language skills make it impossible for them to find alternative work, work which in physical terms they could well do. The disability benefit is then the way out, while in fact structural facilities should be offered and requirements should be set to educate and train these people. Anyone who is lax about providing these facilities should not be surprised that a proportion of people will adapt themselves "selectively" to Dutch culture: to the level of prosperity but not to the personal efforts which are required if this prosperity is to be maintained.

Nonetheless, it remains a fact that some people manage to overcome their difficulties in a relatively short time whilst others have little or no success.

2. The importance of the level of social-cultural proximity

As has already often been indicated, integration policies have mainly focused on functional aspects of society: adequate education, work and

income. The social-cultural dimension has often been overlooked, apart from the sense that a place has been created for ethnic minorities' own cultural institutions and – in recent years – that a start has been made with acculturation courses.

Unfortunately, a well focused social-cultural integration policy has so far not got off the ground. Junger-Tas, for example, points out that the cultural distance between the country or area of origin and the receiving country is of vital importance. Bovenkerk demonstrates how cultural differences can lead to frictions between groups, such as for example foreign parents and legal institutions: is a policy of toleration on drugs not a veiled encouragement to use them? If a cup of coffee is offered during a reprimand at the police station, is this not indicative of a lax and negligent attitude to minor crime? (Which is another way of saying that cultural frictions also force us to take a clearer look at Dutch society.)

The significance of social-cultural proximity has already been touched on. The occurrence of social-cultural conflicts appears to be one of the causes of the great reliance on social provisions and insurances. Also, there is a close link with educational performance. If there are significant cultural differences between the “host” country and the groups of migrants, and if there is no understanding of how to handle these, then there is also a greater risk of tensions, for example within families, which leads to increased risks of isolation and, often as a result of this, of delinquent behaviour. The openness for relationships with Dutch society then diminishes. Particularly if this is accompanied by poverty, social isolation, poor economic prospects and (consequent) poor relationships with parents and insufficient supervision, then the risks increase. This distance can even lead to loss of faith in institutional justice and in the culture of the new society and can incite resistance. Junger-Tas concluded that unemployment, poverty, poor housing and run-down neighbourhoods (with harassment, drugs and criminality) can lead to a poor level of contact with social institutions. This applies to both indigenous and non-native people. “And if this is accompanied by rejection or selective acceptance of fundamental Western values – such as for example dropping out of school and at the same time wanting to be part of the consumer youth culture – this may well lead to delinquency”. The significance of social cultural proximity is also apparent from the research into the over-representation of foreign people relying on disability and other benefits. Social-cultural proximity is therefore very important. The sentiments expressed after the attack on the Twin Towers indicate (latent) cultural frictions which can again be significant for the cultural support of the constitutional state.

An important consideration here is the question whether the religious background and the system of values differ from those of the guest country, and whether the migrant comes from an urbanized or rural environment. Thus, a partial explanation for the successful integration of South East Asian people in Europe (and the United States) can be found in the fact that the majority of these people come from an urban environment, can read and write well and – from their Confucian background – share important values with Western society. A great deal of significance is paid to a good education, there is a strong study and work ethic, strong ambition to climb the social ladder and a greater participation of women in economic life.

If there is a lack of social cultural proximity, then efforts are needed to bridge the distance at an early stage. It has already been pointed out that the need for this increases as the influx of immigrants becomes greater and more permanent. Cultural differences institutionalize themselves all too quickly. As long as this does not lead to alienation between population groups and does not impede integration, and as long as different perceptions do not affect the key values of society, this is not a problem. Even more so, ethnically-related institutions can contribute to integration in as far as they have the explicit aim of fulfilling a bridging function.

Social and cultural institutions play a particularly important role.

We would mention in particular:

- the family
- the neighbourhood or district
- the school
- the religion and
- the constitutional state

The role of religion will be addressed more extensively in chapter 5. Islam, in particular, will be considered. Particular attention is being paid to Islam since this religion is one of the fastest growing in our country. The relationship between the Muslim community and the constitutional state is high on the agenda. Also, the attacks of 11th September and Muslim terrorism make this religion extremely susceptible to prejudice and generalizations.

In this chapter we will offer an analysis of the other institutions and explore issues, with the aim of proposing appropriate recommendations in the final chapter.

3. Important cultural institutions in our society

3.1 The family

An important aspect of upbringing is to help the child or young person become a competent member of society. In an ideal situation, the young person will receive emotional and moral stability, skills and knowledge which will enable him to function in society and thus to put his own mark on his life.

Upbringing is therefore not a course in conformism. However, non-conformists and innovative characters too can only turn their changeable disposition into constructive, adult and mature actions, if they have the necessary skills, knowledge and responsibility. One has to be able to function in the broader society. If these qualities are absent and if there is no connection with the environment, then generally one can say that this is a case of a dysfunctional life, sometimes with a degree of disassociation and – to a greater or lesser extent – a flawed personal and social life. Merton's disassociation, ritualism and rebellion allude to this.

Immigrant families often have extra difficulties in bringing up their children to be competent adults. They not infrequently have to deal with two cultures, which means a gap has to be bridged (the acculturation process). Eldering refers to the following issues which determine the level to which this occurs more or less spontaneously:

- The expectations about the length of the stay. Migrants who believe they will return, consider it important not to become alienated from their own country and culture. They impart to their children the language, customs and culture of their country of origin;
- The reason for the emigration. Economic migrants have primarily come here to improve their social position. They consider education very important and in terms of income, education and job are very performance oriented. Political refugees seek the protection of the state.
- The experiences which one has with the receiving culture and society. If one meets with hostility or discrimination, this can lead to a feeling of cultural threat and defeatism (retreatism: see Merton). This in turn leads to alienation.

It is not so difficult to identify the risk factors with which migrant families in particular are faced. With the first generation of newcomers there is often a great tendency to hold on to their own culture, customs and pattern

of life and the networks which go with these. At the same time, many of them have the ambition of being successful in the new society; a great deal of importance is attached to school performance and good career prospects. In Merton's terms, people are very well aware of the importance of institutional resources (such as education, knowledge and work), whilst on the other hand there often remains a considerable distance from the culture of the receiving country. Studies show that this attitude leads to tensions within families. A number of factors can be distinguished here.

Differences in the degree of acculturation can lead to problems between parents and offspring. Children learn the Dutch language more quickly than their parents because they associate more with others, they adopt the values and norms of Dutch society. They often know their way around society better and in this way acquire a position of power in relation to their parents. If foreign parents continue to retain the traditional goals of upbringing, this can lead to strong conflicts, particularly during adolescence. These conflicts generally centre around education, going out, friends, sexuality and marriage. In themselves, these conflicts will not differ greatly from frictions in indigenous families, but if there is a wide gap between the worlds of the parents and the children, the ability to manage the conflicts as a rule diminishes. The gap between the social worlds in which the children grow up makes it more difficult for them to develop self-awareness and to determine their position in society as they become older.

These tensions can seep through into the children's educational performance and behaviour. In research by Pels into the aims of upbringing in Moroccan families, almost three-quarters of the mothers report educational problems among their children. Sometimes these are incidental. Some are more serious: referrals to special education, having to do a year over again, moving to a different, lower level school, truancy and dropping out. There are serious problems in 15% of the Moroccan families investigated: running away from home, serious criminality, often a history of school problems and truancy. The problems are concentrated around families of the older generation with a lower level of education. "In addition, in some instances there is divorce, the father may be unemployed, and there may be conflicts about the authority of the father and parental disagreements."

For the parents there is often (considerable) uncertainty and doubt about how to bring their children up, about applying discipline and maintaining authority. Inadequate knowledge of Dutch society, mentality and culture exacerbates this insecurity. Even for those who want to cling on to their own

way of life and their own values, an understanding of the society around them is important. Problems with upbringing can then more easily be put into context and managed. Matters get out of hand less easily.

Conflicts over acculturation can occur not only between parents and children, but also between marriage partners. It often happens that tensions arise because the wife wants to further her self-development outside the home and the husband prefers to retain the traditional role model. So, it can be seen that tensions can easily occur within the first generation of newcomers, but are even more likely in the subsequent waves of migration for the purposes of family formation, or with long delayed family reunification. An illustration of this is the experience among Vietnamese refugees. Many young Vietnamese men who came to The Netherlands as boat people have built up good economic positions for themselves during the nineties and have gone back to Vietnam to look for a partner. When these partners then come to The Netherlands, they fall under the acculturation ruling and in line with this receive language lessons and an introduction to society. But they appear to get into difficulties because in their direct surroundings there is an almost complete lack of social relationships, care or guidance. Many of these women struggle as a result with psychological problems arising from loneliness. These problems spread through the family. Stresses, but also a simple lack of knowledge, generally affect the children (in terms of educational difficulties and behavioural problems). In the problematical situation of young Vietnamese mothers, the integration of their children is a particular cause of stress.

In particular, the mother's knowledge of and insight into the surrounding environment – or lack of this – seem to have a great influence on the success or failure of children in education and in their further life. This is how Lindo compares the swift success of the South Europeans in the Netherlands and the delayed integration of a large number of immigrants of Turkish and Moroccan origin. As well as common factors – little education in the country of origin, mainly working as unskilled labourers, discrimination and stereotyping – there is a significant difference between both groups. There is a very high participation in paid work among South European women. They were and are above all working in the service sectors, in particular cleaning. It is noticeable that the children of Southern Europeans living in the Netherlands score extremely high in education, irrespective of the level of participation in work and the functional level of their parents. Of overriding importance, according to Lindo, is the fact that South European women of the first generation work outside the home and

therefore are better able to make contacts outside the family. In comparison with Turkish and Moroccan families, they have a greater understanding of the surrounding society and more influence on decisions which are taken within the family.

In conclusion we would state that:

- the family has a key position in bringing children up to be competent adults. Immigrant families have an extra degree of difficulty. They not infrequently have to deal with two cultures, between which a bridge has to be built (the acculturation process). If the parents lack language skills, have no understanding of the culture and the social world of the children and lack the experience and flexibility to be able to handle cultural differences, then this can easily lead to problems in the upbringing, the quality of the relationship between the young people and their parents and in the ability of young people to integrate. This leads to more disturbances in terms of learning difficulties, dropping out of school and criminal behaviour;
- upbringing and family relationships are more susceptible to pressure if one of the parents has no or inadequate knowledge and understanding of the (culture and social world) of the receiving society;
- knowledge of and insight into Dutch society and Western values and customs are important conditions for a satisfactory upbringing, even if that upbringing is critical towards certain value patterns in society, for example, in relation to the dominant sexual morality or the degree of personal autonomy and self-interest. Where parents are not able to place their assumptions in a broader context or do not know how to handle the differences in attitudes, this leads to problems in relating to one another;
- it is important that both men and women are adequately educated and are equipped to live an independent life. If one of the partners lacks certain important prerequisites for leading a confident life, then the partners can have a flawed relationship based on dependence. In general, the woman is the weaker party in a relationship. With a lack of education and professional skills, women become too one-sidedly dependent on their partner. In itself, there is nothing wrong with dependence. On the contrary, human life is by definition a web of networks and patterns of dependence. The point is rather that these dependencies should as far as possible be protected from abuse. This is a good reason to: a) invest strongly in knowledge and education, particularly for women (also in view of their meaningful role in bringing up children) and b) put an end to the situation where, contrary to current legislation, women (both indigenous and of foreign origin) are not obliged to look for paid work if the household is dependent on social security.

3.2 Neighbourhoods and districts

There is a wide range of international literature available, particularly from the United States, about the relationship between neighbourhoods and integration. It has already been proposed above that the (spontaneous) concentration of ethnic groupings can have advantages and disadvantages for integration. One possible advantage could be that immigrants are able to develop or maintain bonds of unity and kinship with one another because they have a common background. Also, according to some sources, this would lead to a localised employment market.

However, there is also a great deal of literature which points in a different direction. There is often a complete lack of social-cultural homogeneity in districts with a large proportion of people from ethnic minorities and so the – in themselves already disputed – advantages disappear. Also, support has to be provided for the underprivileged in society and this becomes more difficult when these minorities form concentrated groups. Social deprivation and cultural isolation easily reinforce one another. Immigrants who live in their own districts, learn Dutch less quickly or not at all. This leads to serious disadvantages on the employment market and it in part explains the high dependence on social security and disability benefit. Moreover, it can be clearly demonstrated that segregation exacerbates the problems of deprivation and discrimination.

There is a great deal of research material about the relationship between neighbourhoods and the performance of children and adolescents in the fields of education, work and income on the one side and the risks of delinquency and drugs use on the other. The findings of the bulk of these studies point to the significant role of the district. Yet these relationships often appear much less meaningful if the research also takes into account family factors (particularly the income of the parents, their socio-economic status and the frictions in the direct or wider family). Family characteristics such as the closeness and quality of family relationships and the degree of parental supervision make the strongest contribution to integration (and thereby also to delinquency figures).

We have seen the percentage of ethnic minorities increase in recent decades in The Netherlands, particularly in the four largest cities.

Percentage of ethnic minorities in the four large cities:

	1975	1980	1986	1992	1996
Amsterdam	6	11	16	27	33
Rotterdam	6	10	14	25	30
The Hague	5	9	14	22	32
Utrecht	5	8	9	17	21
The Netherlands	2	3	4	7	8

Source: Lucassen & De Ruijter 2002

In Rotterdam in 1980 there were three districts with a more than 30 per cent occupancy by minorities out of a total of 85 neighbourhoods. In 1996 that number was 27, with 14 neighbourhoods with more than 50% ethnic minorities. This is not only to do with influx of immigrants, but also often with the departure of the indigenous population. The expectation implicit in this has for a long time been that there would be greater diversity within the group of ethnic minorities (for example, social economic status, profession and degree of integration), which would mean that some of the group would leave the district and a more mixed constitution of residential areas and districts would come about.

The government has also endeavoured to speed up that process by means of a policy of differentiation, restructuring and town restoration, at least for the large cities. In this way, building of private housing in deprived areas should not only lead to a better residential environment, but also the gulf between city communities should diminish. Demolition and rebuilding of (private) houses, particularly in the post-war districts with their many foreign households, would lead to a more mixed population of both indigenous and ethnic people.

The rationale is that mixing the populations will contribute to an improvement in their communication with one another. Non-Dutch children would come into contact with their Dutch neighbours when playing together outside and this would help compensate for any language arrears. Parents would have contact with Dutch mothers and would then start to participate in society. "Moreover, this mixing would help prevent the neighbourhood becoming socially stigmatised: not a desolate ghetto, but a multi-coloured meeting point of cultures."

This policy assumes: a) that the district is a very important framework for social integration, and b) that improvements in the district and new housing would have a beneficial side effect, namely more participation by

minorities in Dutch society. This side effect would be even greater if ethnic households were better dispersed across the regions.

To prevent social and cultural segregation, it is indeed important that housing for those on lower incomes should also be available in more expensive areas. In addition, it would be preferable if housing corporations and, if no initiatives are forthcoming from these organizations, then municipalities in (the policies concerning) their systems of allocation of houses, were to take into account the diversity of the population composition and the social support within districts. It is to be recommended that municipalities, together with corporations, residents' associations, district committees and neighbourhood associations, as well as with immigrant organizations, develop a suitable allocation policy. It may have advantages to house newcomers from the very beginning in areas with a varied population composition.

However, one should not expect wonders from this policy. An enforced spread of population groups will not work and violates people's freedom of movement and their choice of location to live. In addition, it appears from urban geographical studies that people with particular similarities not infrequently seek one another out. People generally want to have neighbours similar to themselves: areas with children, districts with young single people, so-called gold coast areas for people with high incomes and areas with households which have a similar culture and lifestyle. In itself there is nothing wrong with this, unless it leads to segregation and barriers which are difficult to overcome, to a pattern of established people and outsiders. This is what will happen if immigrants have no knowledge of the Dutch and Western culture, if they have a poor command of the language and if they have no contact with native Dutch people. Then there is a threat of segregation and rising tensions. Tensions within the family – see elsewhere in this chapter – with all the consequences of this for children and their future. Tensions also on a broader social level, namely if alienation ensues. For this reason above all, a policy is needed which focuses on education and schooling, on acculturation and knowledge of our language and culture.

3.3 School

Apart from the family, the school is also an institution that can equip young people with the knowledge, skills and moral insights to be able to live an independent life. This bridging function of educational establishments is under pressure in many senses.

Many pupils from ethnic minorities have a considerable language deficit at the very beginning of their education. The following issues play an important role in this:

- a the level of education of the parents
- b the educational climate within the family (taking part in pre-school activities, emotional support, reading of books, attending parents' evenings)
- c the language spoken at home
- d any stresses at home or relationship problems

There are, of course, also educational arrears if young people come to our country late as part of family reunification. Taking care of these pupils is an enormous task for schools, particularly if the numbers of such pupils are high and if the areas or countries of origin of the pupils are very diverse. In this case, pupils within one class may have very different mother tongues and cultural backgrounds.

Educational arrears

Research shows that many young people from the second generation do well at school and achieve good educational results. However, this does not detract from the fact that there is still a lot to do. There are still deficits and these have a great impact on the (school) career and opportunities for young people.

Research also shows that the openness of the family to Dutch society, stimulating children to have contact with Dutch children and to speak Dutch have a great effect on the school careers of young people. This also applies to the use of cultural facilities such as the library and attending mixed schools, as well as maintaining good contacts with teaching staff. It is apparent that many parents stimulate their children to perform well at school but that they are by no means always able to do this in an effective way. Often they have too little involvement with the school and their language skills and knowledge about their environment are too limited. It is these very factors which so strongly determine the success of young people at school. If there are learning deficits at the start of the infant school (which is largely related to the - non-Dutch - home language), then it appears almost impossible to turn these deficits around. The language deficit at the start of the period of compulsory education is often as much as 2 years. This deficit continues to dog children and causes a much higher percentage of repeated school years and drop outs. For a long time it was assumed that these deficits would only be temporary. It was supposed that

the third generation would have recouped the language and cultural deficits.

Indeed, the performances of the second and third generations of immigrants are considerably better than the first generation, but this development is not automatic. The permanent influx of newcomers, their concentration in large cities and specific districts, the continuing orientation towards their native country (via satellite and family formation) can even lead to “parallel societies”. In these cases, it is not common for Dutch to be spoken, whilst it is these very language skills which are crucial for the educational performance and school careers of the young people. The fact is that the language arrears of immigrant children at the start of the infant school in 1996 were not significantly less than that in 1988.

The inequality of educational opportunities is also apparent from the choice of further education. As regards senior schooling, we see an over-representation of immigrant children in vocational training and in lower secondary education. In 1999/2000, 71 per cent of non-Western immigrant final exam candidates took a vocational training or lower secondary exam, whilst for native Dutch pupils the figure was 5 per cent. These pupils already have a considerable deficit when they enter senior school.

Black schools

During and after the election campaigns of 2002 and 2003 there were intensive debates about black schools and the extent to which their existence was encouraged by denominational schools. Some of the images which arose around that time have since then been rectified by the Education Council. The idea that immigrant children are not welcome in denominational schools bears no relationship with the reality: 86% of Catholic schools and 70% of Protestant schools have immigrant children as pupils. This difference relates primarily to demographic factors. North Brabant and Limburg are simply more urbanized than Friesland and Zeeland. Of the immigrant pupils, 53% attend denominational schools, of which 47% are Roman Catholic or Protestant. Only a very small number of schools differentiate in accepting pupils on the basis of religious background. In these schools it is not a question of an entry policy based on origin or ethnicity, which is illegal according to the General Law on Equality of Treatment introduced by the third Lubbers government. Other, in fact most, denominational schools regard the acceptance of, for example, non-Christians as a mission: investing in these young people is a social task.

This does not detract from the fact that the number of black infant schools where more than half of the pupils are from ethnic minorities is increasing. The explanation for this is not only the increase in the number of pupils from ethnic minorities. The number of pupils with a non-Dutch cultural background in junior education has, it is true, increased by 8% in the past three years, but the number of black schools has grown faster, namely by 16 %. As for performance, the average language and maths performance in schools with 10-25 per cent minority pupils does not differ from schools with no or less than 10 per cent of pupils coming from minority groups. Once the percentage exceeds 25 per cent, then the performance decreases. As far as language is concerned, the difference is substantial once the figure exceeds 50%.

Except for the composition of the neighbourhood, the reason lies in the phenomenon of the “white flight”. Indigenous parents are increasingly choosing not to send their children to a black school or even to remove their children from black schools. This means that schools with a large number of immigrant pupils become blacker and smaller. As a rule, the “white flight” is followed by a so-called “black flight”. Once a large number of the white pupils have disappeared, the more ambitious ethnic minority pupils follow in their footsteps. The result is an increasing segregation in education: the average number of immigrant pupils in a school differs from the percentage of immigrant children in a particular place or district. All in all, this has an effect on young people’s educational performance.

Islamic schools

Sometimes the existence of black schools is also related to the identity of the educational establishment.

Some 35 junior schools and one school for senior education in our country are Islamic. The potential is much greater; there is a considerable demand for Islamic education, but the supply is too limited. This is because the number of Islamic teachers is insufficient to meet the demand. An advantage of such identity-related schools is that the social-cultural distance between parents and pupils in the school is generally small. The educational climate at home and school complement one another. This can have the effect of lowering tensions in families because young people and their parents do not live in separate worlds. The degree of tension experienced by individuals may lessen, but, nonetheless, the stress curve is seen elsewhere, namely at institutional level. To what extent do the ethnic minorities’ own institutions encourage alienation between population groups? There is a difference between on the one hand the “black” schools which have unintentionally come into existence – and which in general have little social

cohesion :they come about as a result of the exodus of indigenous people – and on the other hand the schools which consciously choose, for example, an Islamic character, to which native Dutch people are not attracted. In general, in these schools, there is a degree of social-cultural cohesion, but on the other hand the ideological distance from the receiving society can be greater. “Can be” because these institutions offer on the other hand the opportunity of usefully linking ideology to the responsibility which one will bear in society. They offer the chance to make young people aware of cultural differences and to learn ways of managing these.

Denominational schools and the breadth of educational freedom
The social-cultural gap may, of course, become too great to manage. Fortunately, there is no hard evidence that this is the case. The AIVD (Public Information and Security Service), formerly the BVD (National Security Service), has in the case of some 20 per cent of the Islamic schools indicated concern about the influence of people who have connections with radical Islamic movements. Some members of the school management maintain relationships with radical organizations such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Hamas. Neither the AIVD nor the educational inspectorate has found any indication for the incitement of hatred. In three schools there was cause for concern. The degree to which the AIVD and the inspectorate have received insights into the education being offered by the schools is questionable.

Leading on from this, critical comments have come from various sources about denominational education as such. Education should as far as possible be neutral. A separation between religion and education should be necessary in order to cut off radical movements. From a Christian Democratic point of view, this assumption is unacceptable and quite idiotic. It is in direct opposition to rights of freedom and misses its aim. Even more so, this puts the values which one purports to protect, the rights of freedom, under pressure.

In the meantime the question arises of how to handle this flawed view of education and the fear that socialization could take place in a way which opposes the key values of the constitutional state. Of course, the question may arise of whether schools should be tolerated which teach or promote that lapses in belief should be punished and that a fatwa in response to publications which challenge or even target sacred books can be justified. It has to be borne in mind that such types of education are difficult to challenge in penal law, particularly if the ideals that they are promoting are of a general nature.

In relation to this, it is useful to first gain an insight into this aspect of education. Is such a fear real or simply based on emotion? Also, in relation to the question of how to handle a form of education that is at right angles to the key values of the constitutional state, a parallel can be drawn with the other demands made of education. Not only is religious education under discussion here, but education across all subjects. Denominational schools must continue to meet the legal requirements imposed in terms of the content of the education provided, in the sense that the government sets final levels of attainment and monitors that these are met. So, schools now have to make clear how they prepare young people for taking part in a multi-coloured society, with diverse religious movements. This should apply to the connection with the key values of Dutch culture and society.

In conclusion we can state that:

- the deficits suffered by pupils at the start of their educational career are often difficult to rectify at a later date. For this reason a very specific policy is needed to avoid this situation;
- pupils' achievements are not only dependent on the attitude of the parents to performance, but even more on their knowledge of the (new) language, culture and society and their openness to Dutch society. In particular, what is key is whether parents create for their children and young people a cognitively stimulating environment and whether their attitudes support education;
- schools with pupils from predominantly ethnic minorities often have to deal with a high turnover and with groups of children from the most diverse linguistic and cultural backgrounds. This makes the task of integration more difficult. Other schools, and in particular Islamic schools, find themselves faced with the task of building bridges to Dutch society from their own identity;
- freedom of education is an indisputable right. The question does arise here of how this freedom can be combined with a focus on the key values of the state (diversity within unity: individuality whilst maintaining commonality, that is);
- the pressure on some schools and school types is very great: the efforts at integration fall on their shoulders and this can lead to a "white flight" from schools, but also to extra tasks for particular school types (lower vocational training).

3.4 The constitutional state

Christian Democrats consider the state to be an institution based on fair and just social relationships. The state is a community based on laws, which should provide opportunities for and respect other institutions each with its own place in society (a reason for freedom of worship, freedom of education, etc.).

However, the state community is more than a collection of laws and constitutional regulations. There are factors other than legal ones which play an important role. These ensure that the state is more than a set of rules, more than the notion that you may not harm other people, but that there is a community based on law. The following factors come to mind:

- The cultural aspect (sense of public responsibility). To what extent is the constitutional community actually accepted, recognized and experienced on the basis of its own values? To what extent is there affinity with the democratic state?
- This is related to the historical aspect. The law-based community did not arise out of nowhere. It is founded on learning processes which have come to be part of the collective sense of justice and the identity of the state community. One can consider here such matters as religious disputes, the effects of the industrial revolution and impoverishment and the struggle for freedom of education. These learning experiences are emphasised by particular symbols: the national anthem, taking the oath, the flag, national holidays, 1st May, liberation day, the royal family: these are all elements which constitute a nation.
- The environmental aspect. A community develops a particular relationship with the countryside where her history is played out. The countryside and the climate with their challenges and opportunities in part determine the identity of the society. In the event of border conflicts, the environmental aspect comes clearly into play.
- The social aspect. Common public holidays, the collective free day in the week, the rituals surrounding the day of the Queen's speech, etc., are social events which express a common pattern of life and rhythm around the social constitutional state and which contribute to social cohesion.
- The language aspect. Language has a strongly integrating function and is also to a great extent a symbol of cohesion and identity.

A community based on law has its own identity. It has, it is true, an open but nonetheless individual history and course of development. It is for this reason that history, symbols, traditions, social customs and state (national and European) institutions and rituals matter. There is an inner affinity

between these symbols and the values and rules of the state. In the context of democracies, it is not a matter of restrictive nationalism or romantic patriotism, but of values such as openness, tolerance and democracy. The document "Secure Borders, Safe Haven" produced by the Blair government puts this in the following words: "In this context citizenship is not just for those entering the country – it is for all British citizens. Citizenship is not taught in schools as a fundamental part of the national curriculum. But we need to engage people of all ages and walks of life. The Government will initiate an open and constructive debate about citizenship, civic identity and shared values. It is only through having such a debate that we will have the basis for bringing together people of different races, cultures and religions in a cohesive society." Citizenship is not based on (blood) relations or ethnicity, but on participating in a historic community, with its own culture and identity. "To join this community is to share in that history, culture and identity: diversity within unity" therefore. Values play an important role as a unifying element in society. This cannot just be a non-committal observation, but on the contrary has to encourage a focused policy which offers prospects, specifically by being demanding. Once again, a quote from Secure Borders, Safe Haven: "In an increasingly diverse world, it is vital that we strengthen both our sense of community belonging and the civic and political dimensions of citizenship. In particular, we intend to offer language teaching and light touch education for citizenship for those making a home in the UK. This will strengthen the ability of new citizens to participate in society and to engage actively in our democracy. This will help people understand both their obligations as citizens of the UK, and strengthen the bonds of mutual understanding between people of diverse cultural backgrounds. It will also help to promote individuals' economic and social integration. We have no wish to see applicants fail the requirements. We want to see them meet the requirements and become British citizens." These notions agree with the view that a person's gifts are never only for his or her own development, but also are (or should be) always for the good of society as a whole. According to Christian Democratic views, people are not individuals in isolation, but members of a community which validates claims on those concerned.

There are particular questions related to these insights in the fields of:

- acculturation
- rituals
- nationality

Acculturation

The question arises of whether and to what extent explicit attention should be paid in the acculturation process to the culture and history of our country, to the values and ideological movements which are the foundation of democracy and the organization of the state community. In addition, there is the question whether a particular degree of acculturation should be a condition for obtaining residency.

The constitutional state, as well as making particular claims on the government, also has obligations and responsibilities. This is, of course, not a new concept and can even be said to be self-evident. One such obligation is compulsory education from the age of five. Later there is the requirement to have a profession and to be able to function in society (for example, as a citizen or as a member of a family). There is also the obligation to be able to provide for oneself and – where possible – to take responsibility for one's own means of existence. Since 1990, this obligation has applied to both partners of a long term relationship. A chosen allocation of roles releases nobody from the obligation to make him or herself available for paid employment if there is no income. Both partners are in principle obliged to provide a family income. Acculturation courses are necessary in order to give newcomers the ability to meet their various obligations.

The Law on Acculturation of Newcomers (WIN, 1998) makes efforts at adjustment to Dutch society obligatory. The aim of acculturation is a first step on the way to being able to manage independently within Dutch society, the objective being to equip people for work, education or the role of bringing up children. The course includes: learning the Dutch language (writing, reading, listening and speaking) and knowledge of the various aspects of society (work, finances, residence, health, traffic and transport). There is evidence that there are a number of serious problems in the operation of the Law on Acculturation of Newcomers. These include:

- dropping out
- lack of clear criteria
- the limited number of participants who achieve the target level
- external effectiveness

Drop out

The figures for 1999 show that 90% of the target group was reached. An acculturation contract was made with about 80% of the newcomers contacted, of whom finally 71% actually started the course. About 60% of these completed the course within a year. This means that approximately a

quarter of those who eventually started the course left it early. An important reason for dropping out for the men was that they found employment.

There are no detailed and comprehensive analyses available for the high drop out rate during the programme. The factors which may explain the drop out rate and disappointing results can be divided into two groups:

- the personal characteristics, circumstances and attitude of those on the course (house moves and re-migration, pregnancy, psychological problems, low level of education, obtaining employment, lack of motivation);
- the attendees may drop out for reasons of work or pregnancy because they are not motivated by the type of acculturation programme (lack of clear prospects, lack of stimulus, not tailored to the circumstances and not enough combination courses, for example combining language study with work or with bringing up children).

Lack of clear criteria

One of the reasons for dropping out is probably the lack of clarity about the results to be achieved. The newcomers are obliged to take two tests within two years, namely the profile test in the Dutch language (NT2) and social orientation. As regards language, the aim is to reach level 2 or 3 of NT2. These are so far just target levels; the newcomer cannot fail or pass. The number of tests taken is decisive for the granting of subsidy funds to the Regional Education Centres (ROC). This type of retrospective financing is an unsatisfactory element. It has the effect of not emphasising the progress of the student, but causing the taking of the tests to become an aim in itself. Whether the student has made any progress and, if so, what, is unclear. This also applies to the difference between the starting qualifications and the final test level. This lack of clarity means that employers, too, do not see the added value of acculturation courses. They are in general not prepared to create the necessary conditions. There is only limited information available about the levels of knowledge and skills achieved.

Only a limited number of participants achieve the target level

The figures which were available in the WIN assessment show that as regards level of language many newcomers do not progress beyond level 1 of NT2. Having achieved this level, a person can understand basic conversations and can more or less manage in everyday situations.

The person concerned can express him or herself in separate words and in short, simple sentences about everyday topics. He or she is strongly dependent on the help of a benevolent conversation partner. He will

understand only the odd detail (such as a name or a time) of texts which are not adapted to his level of competence. He can obtain information from simple standard texts and can look up elements such as names, times etc. in more difficult texts. He can fill in words (such as personal details) in forms and can write down a word that is spelled out.

Level 2 is achieved by 49% of students in the section on listening, 44% in the section on reading, 38% speaking and 37% writing. A language user can at this level hold conversations relatively easily in standard situations, as long as the conversation partner offers help. He can pose and answer questions, and exchange ideas and information about familiar matters in predictable, everyday situations. He will understand the basics of radio and television messages provided the speed is low and the subject matter is familiar. He can read single and clearly structured texts for information and instruction. He can write short, informal letters and note messages in telegram style.

The number of students achieving level 3 is not mentioned in the IBO report, but it will not be more than a small minority. For the sake of completeness, we also include the description of level 3 of NT2. The language user can at this level take part relatively easily in conversations with native speakers, for the purpose of maintaining social contacts and organizing matters. The language use is simple, and reasonably correct, in short sentences and standard expressions. Under pressure (a difficult subject, emotions) a lot of grammatical errors are made, but not of such a nature that communication is endangered. He will understand the main points and specific information from radio and tv programmes about concrete subjects provided the speed of speech is low and the visual support good. He will understand the main points and, for important sections, the main details of texts aimed at the general public of a comparable level. He can carry out simple routine writing tasks in daily life, during the course, or at work with a reasonable degree of accuracy.

For oldcomers there is as yet no (national) obligation to take a test and there is no target level. Oldcomers are immigrants who have settled in the Netherlands before the win came into force in the Netherlands. Many of these have a limited degree of integration, because they are too far removed from the employment market and do not have a good command of the Dutch language. The total size of the target group is estimated by the Dutch Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI) and the Social Cultural Planning Bureau (SCP) at 464,000 people. The second Kok government differentiated a number of priority groups among oldcomers, that is the unemployed and those bringing up families. Municipalities organize a

selection of courses for this target group. The section Social Orientation is as far as possible related to the requirements of the students. The drop out rate of students for this target group is somewhat higher than with the newcomers: 35% of those who follow the programme drop out early.

For anybody examining these target levels and the actual results, it will not come as a surprise that the progress to paid employment is too limited. About half the students do not get further than the basic level 1 of NT2. It is clear that this is completely inadequate for, for example, bringing up young people, for basic communication with schools or for a position in the employment market.

The external effectiveness is limited

Detailed research into the reasons for drop outs during the acculturation course in the large cities shows that for the men 40% find work and for the women 36% drop out because of pregnancy. This means that some 10% of the men on the course find work during the programme, 6% of the students find work after finishing the course and 18% move on to another (educational) programme. If we make an optimistic estimate and assume that those who take a follow-up course find a job afterwards, then some 34% of the newcomers find a position in the employment market within a reasonable time. So, the external effectiveness is quite limited. This conclusion is supported from another source, namely from the business community. In the 2001 annual report of the company's work opportunity plan, Philips talks of a "worrying situation" on the Dutch employment market. "The problem of learning and language deficits among immigrants with a lower level of education, which has for years been insufficiently recognized, is now becoming increasingly obvious", can be read.

Conclusion

Offering newcomers acculturation courses and oldcomers a chance to catch up is an effective means of stimulating integration in various areas. For a long time this policy did not extend further than good intentions. Quite rightly, the Balkenende cabinet wanted to bring about change by linking the granting of permanent residence permits to successfully completing the acculturation course.

Even so, the levels of the courses are low. In spite of the intentions of the Balkenende cabinet, the desired level is often not reached, is not seriously tested and either cannot or can only barely serve as a basis for the employment market and for a serious introduction to Dutch culture and history. It appears that only a very small percentage of the students are

successful in finding employment within a reasonable space of time. There are signs that it is becoming increasingly difficult for companies to find positions for unemployed people from ethnic minorities. The limited language skills are a significant factor here.

The most important issues with acculturation are:

- too little clarity about the results to be achieved from the acculturation courses. The levels to be achieved are not clear, which makes it difficult to assess the difference between the starting level and the level attained at the end of the course;
- too little clarity about the consequences for the immigrant if he does not achieve the targets (the problem of non-participation, drop outs and absenteeism play a role here);
- the parties who play a guiding role in the acculturation process (municipalities, those providing the programmes) are not sufficiently stimulated to perform well;
- too little flexibility in the range of acculturation programmes;
- combination programmes are difficult to achieve (combining the courses with work or with bringing up children).

In view of the great importance which has to be attached to active participation in Dutch society and culture, it is not only important to provide practical skills for daily life, but also that people become familiar with aspects of Dutch history and culture. The Balkenende cabinet quite rightly makes a point of this, but will also have to consider the question of whether the compulsory final level of acculturation is adequate.

Nationality

According to Dutch legislation, a person applying for Dutch nationality must relinquish his old nationality. There are, however, a number of exceptions to this rule.

The basis of the legislation on the principle of one nationality is worthy of support. There are provisions within the legislation for individuals in specific circumstances to retain their original nationality, which demonstrates a degree of wisdom and empathy. These cases are, however, the exception rather than the rule. The decision to choose a particular country is more than just a practical choice of where to live. A person who decides after a period of time to settle in the Netherlands instead of staying temporarily, has good reason to apply for Dutch citizenship and will in principle have to relinquish his old nationality.

Anyone who considers that “becoming Dutch” is a meaningful step will not find it strange that there are on principle more than just formal conditions which have to be met in order to be granted Dutch citizenship (the correct documents, residence status and length of stay). Since 1993, the statute on Dutch citizenship has contained a stipulation that the applicant has to have completed an acculturation course. Command of the language and the fact that one “has made efforts to become part of Dutch society” are explicitly mentioned in the text of the law. There are some good aspects to the formal legislation, but too little has been invested in integration, and partly as a result of this the conditions have not been strictly adhered to.

It cannot be considered surprising that certain demands are made since there are a number of distinct rights attached to the obtaining of Dutch citizenship. The person is no longer subject to the immigration laws; he has the right to settle indefinitely and to have travel documents. A further fundamental change is that the person has active and passive voting rights. He has the right to take part in elections to the House of Commons and the provincial councils. It is not possible to vote in a responsible way if one scarcely has any understanding of the political relationships and is not in any way able to follow relevant information on this subject. It is for this reason that it is also important that a person applying for Dutch nationality has a number of essential insights and skills so that he or she can function independently, and that there are conditions for (critical) loyalty with regard to the democratic legal system and the values which inspire that system.

Rituals

The question has also arisen, in connection with the acquiring of a permanent residence permit and certainly concerning naturalization, whether there is a place for so-called rites of passage, such as, for example, a pledge of loyalty to the Constitution – as the Americans know it – or to the European constitution. The constitution provides a common focus for people of diverse backgrounds. The key to what binds them is expressed in the constitution. Leading on from this Sap also calls for the so-called oath of loyalty (a motto which American children repeat at the start of every school day) to be introduced in the Netherlands. “Now that the Netherlands is an immigration country, it would not be such a strange idea to consider having a similar “oath of loyalty”, related, for example, to the struggle of Orange for freedom and tolerance”. The scope of Sap’s idea is interesting. It is not so simple to put this into practice. The pathos of his pledge does not appear to fit in with the Dutch mentality. Nonetheless, it is worth considering a text which links the traditional Dutch values of freedom and tolerance with the constitution as it currently stands.

A national public holiday for other religions

Some years ago an appeal was made by the Muslim community, in the interests of their integration and identification with our country, to introduce a national holiday on one of the Islamic religious festivals. These could be exchanged for a Christian national holiday or simply be added to the existing number. The second Kok cabinet did not adopt a firm position on this.

The question has also arisen in terms of the law. The question arose of whether through the concurrence of Christian holidays with national holidays and the special position of Sunday, there was not a situation of unequal treatment of religions. The judge ruled that this was not the case: the explicit Christian nature of these days has gradually disappeared to the background and they have become, according to his judgement, part of the national culture. The prayer in the Queen's speech and the national anthem, etc. stand for values, religious principles and cultural movements which are interwoven with and intrinsic to the constitution and to our culture. Maintaining such symbols has a particular significance: they are an expression of the continuing importance of the roots of our culture and the traditional values of our society. The question is whether amendments and additions are useful in view of the increasing pluralism of our country, particularly now that Islamic groups constitute a substantial part of the population. We will come back to this in the concluding chapter.

From the above it can be concluded that:

- a community based on the rule of law focuses on organizing society in terms of legislation, but it must be realised that the history, culture, language etc. of a country also endow the community with a specific identity;
- the government creates good conditions to equip people for a responsible role in our society. For this reason, full-time education is compulsory for young people up to the age of sixteen. The purpose of compulsory education is not only to earn one's living later, but also to be able to manage in society in a broader sense: as parents, as volunteer workers, etc. Education equips people to fulfill their responsibilities and to develop themselves. This should, in fact, apply to all newcomers and to all less well educated oldcomers;
- it is important for the government to be aware of the internal relationship between national symbols and the prevailing culture of the state;
- acquiring a residence permit and – even more so – Dutch nationality is

an important step. These are conscious choices. Anybody wanting to acquire Dutch citizenship will have to demonstrate relevant knowledge, skills and loyalty. A number of conditions stipulated in the legislation on this subject, drawn up by the third Lubbers cabinet, specifically art. 8, section 1 of the statute on Dutch citizenship, have not been sufficiently strictly observed.

3.5 Inference

The final chapter will address the question marks concerning the cultural institutions, but then in the form of recommendations; recommendations which comply with the analyses which have been reviewed in this chapter

6 Religion, Islam and the constitutional state: pillars or obstacles

1. Introduction

“Islam is an important bearer of an exemplary culture.” Words like this were written by the notable benefactor of Christian Democracy and Protestant, Groen van Prinsterer, in his dissertation on the means by which the truth will be known (1858).

These words express a view which is not commonly held in 2002. On the contrary, since the events of 11th September 2001, the conflict between the extremist “political Islam” and the democratic West has been dominated by the image of Islam. Enough warnings had already been written about an imminent clash of cultures and civilizations. The conflict which was ushered in with the collapse of the prestigious Twin Towers in New York alerted everyone to the integration issue. Islam has come under greater scrutiny. Mosques and the message that Imams preach there are the focus of considerable interest. Probing questions are posed of Islamic educational establishments about their financial sources, text books and orientations. Interest in the position of Muslim women has increased by leaps and bounds.

Muslim radicalism has again confronted the West with the question of the relationship between religion and the state, between Islam and democracy. What is the relationship between orthodoxy, fundamentalism and extremism? How far should tolerance go? Where are the limits of rights of freedom in the areas of, for example, religion, education and political party formation?

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The question of the compatibility of Islam with democracy and with the cultural and religious pluralism of Western societies is, of course, closely related to the awareness that the number of Muslims in the Western world has risen strongly and will increase even further. Furthermore, in the coming decades, the West will have to deal with such issues as an ageing population and dejuvenation, and with the consequent need for migrant workers. Migration for the purposes of work, family formation and re-unification will continue to ensure an influx of people from diverse cultural backgrounds into the countries of the European Union. Added to this, the notion of a more or less automatic secularisation is by no means regarded as an added advantage by second and third generation immigrants.

The dialogue about the relationship between religion and the constitutional state, and of the attitude of Muslims to pluralism and democracy should, of course, not be restricted to a debate about the activities of extremist

Muslims. Geopolitical tensions show that small minority groups can incite frictions worldwide and can put pressure on relationships between population groups within a country.

We will take a fundamental look at the question of the relationship between religion, tolerance and rights of freedom. This is particularly important now in view of the commonly expressed view that a secular state could be the only way of guaranteeing democracy, rights of freedom and tolerance. Such an assumption has broad ramifications. It can, for example, be found in M. Wessels. In his book about Muslim extremists produced for the Telerstichting (related to the vvd), he strongly expresses the view that a strict separation of religion and politics is a guarantee for democracy and freedom. It is useful to explore this view further. The fact that attention is paid to important movements within Christendom as a pillar of the constitutional state has more to do with the theme of religion and the constitutional state, and is definitely not related to a denial of the immense role which the Enlightenment and humanism have played in the democratic constitutional state.

Furthermore, it is noted that many migrants have backgrounds other than Christian or Islamic. Almost all the significant world religions are represented among the ethnic minorities. Comparable analyses are available, mutatis mutandis, for these groups also, but it has already been indicated earlier that, because of their growing size and influence, the Muslim communities deserve more thorough investigation.

2. Secularisation, religion and tolerance

Professor Cliteur, from the University of Delft, quotes in his contribution to *The Empty Tolerance*, Voltaire's classic formula as it has now become: tolerance is the acceptance of opinions or behaviour of which one disapproves and which one could forbid. To tolerate is a form of acceptance which pre-supposes power. One accepts something that one could in itself resist and prevent. This includes notions of self-restraint and control. Cliteur emphasizes that there can only be a question of tolerance if there is also an opinion. If you are indifferent to everything, it doesn't cost you any effort to be permissive towards others. Anyone who is indifferent, does not need to practise self-control in respect of others. He does not develop at the deepest level the virtue of making compromises with other people. This justifiable observation is in direct opposition to the widely held view that tolerance conflicts with the conviction that one has found the truth

oneself. Cliteur also expresses the remarkable view that: "Anyone who believes in his own infallibility will never be tolerant. Anyone who considers himself infallible, such as the Pope or any other spiritual leader speaking in the name of God, can only be as tolerant as God can be fallible." Religious convictions apparently serve here as a model for intolerance. It is this view of religion which is the inspiration for the secular state. According to this interpretation, general considerations above all, which are often typified as rational, will be the basis of the democratic constitutional state.

Following on from this, it is also often said that Islam first has to experience a kind of Enlightenment before it can be truly compatible with the democratic constitutional state. Limiting certainties to those things which can be shown to be rationally thought through and empirically proven, creates room for doubt about irrefutable truths and therefore also for tolerance. This opinion is too easily based on the fact there are no real or only very limited points of contact between religion and democracy. This will be further addressed later. This notion will be strongly disputed.

In the century of the Enlightenment, rationalism will have come as a relief to many people after the religious wars which tore through Europe in the previous period. Also, the Edict of Nantes (1685) was, for example, not specifically a result of the philosophy of the Enlightenment, but of a politically strategic solution to the religious question, yet it created the space for an increasingly secular view of the foundations of the state: for example, in the form of the philosophy of a mutual contract.

A different route was followed in The Netherlands. The Union of Utrecht (1579) expressly bears traces of the view that religion itself preaches tolerance. Religion is intrinsically opposed to force. Religion cannot be forced, as we said earlier. The Union was based – however precariously – “on freedom of conscience and the freedom to publicly confession one’s religious beliefs, as William of Orange intended.” Tolerance and freedom of religion go hand in hand with strong convictions. Tolerance acquires a religious basis here. Spirituality and faith demand freedom, because faith is qualitatively different from obedience and because religion can indeed only be described as faith when it is freely adopted.

Hans Küng argued, quite rightly, that besides the Enlightenment there was a further route to tolerance, namely a way which was closely bound up with the religious opposition to legalising the Christian faith and to applying force in matters of faith. This opposition can be found in significant movements in the Roman Catholic Church (also before the Reformation) and

was at least in part the basis on which the Reformation was founded. What is fundamental here is that freedom of worship was not based primarily on politico-strategic or rationalistic motivations, but on religious principles. The internalization of ethics and the belief in the Gospel mentioned earlier were, therefore, very significant (for further details see Public Justice, chapter 2). It was not the fear of the state disintegrating as a consequence of religious feuds and wars which was the motivating factor. On the contrary, religion is inherently incompatible with domination and force. And, indeed, anyone who holds deep convictions on this subject and who considers the internalization of these views to be both defining and essential, is himself most likely to be inherently tolerant. Also, a distinction must be made between on the one hand the conviction that one really has true insight and on the other hand the possible claim to complete knowledge or even to infallibility. A person who believes does not necessarily claim to know the whole truth. Insight into the truth does not necessarily imply a claim to infallibility. The opposite is more likely to be the case: freedom of religion by its very logic implies the possibility of holding different views. So, for this reason, religious belief does not exclude a tolerant attitude, but is more likely to include it. This idea can also be found in the encyclical Centesimus Annus.

Although in the history of Christianity there are, unfortunately, also enough examples of intolerant behaviour and of lapses into (at times extreme) violence, an inner affinity can be seen between Evangelism, the Jewish and Christian traditions and modern human rights. There is no exclusivity here, but, contrary to the emphasis on the theme of the Enlightenment and the French Revolution (which have their own transgressions), we put forward the idea that the real roots of our Western freedom and human rights can just as easily be linked to religious motives expressed in the Dutch Resistance to Spain, in the Glorious Revolution which England experienced (interestingly enough both led by a Dutch monarch) and in the American revolution.

3. Islam, the constitutional state and human rights

3.1 The Unity of life in Islam

The question of the relationship between Islam, the constitutional state and human rights has, of course, been posed many times in recent decades, both within Muslim circles and in a broader context. Before we address this further, there are a few terms which need explanation. It is worthwhile

making a distinction between orthodoxy, fundamentalism, theocracy and extremism.

Orthodoxy stands for traditionalism, for adhering strictly to traditional (religious) doctrine. Fundamentalism has above all to do with people's behaviour, with strict adherence to traditional rules. There is a strong emphasis on following rules, because it is felt that this will benefit the (future and/or current) wellbeing of mankind and society. Theocracy means literally government by God but can be more broadly defined as a situation in which the government imposes on its citizens a religion or the moral codes inherent in the religion. Here, the (institutional) relationship between spiritual leaders and the governments can be very diverse. Degrees of freedom can differ widely in terms of doctrine and the way of life. Theocracy can be directly opposed to democracy, insofar as the followers consider obedience to religious rules too important for them to be dependent on democracy and periodic elections. Extremism is where violent actions occur or where there is support for violence (financially or verbally). Following (even rigid) moral rules of life is, of course, not extremism provided one does not impose these on other people and certainly not by radical means.

In Islam, religion, law and politics often form an inseparable entity, generally with the sharia occupying a central position. Sharia means literally "the path to the watering place" and stands for the sum of holy laws derived from the Koran, the sunna and the hadith. The sunna relates to the customs and religious practices of the prophet Mohammed as defined by his companions and relatives. The laws express the total submission of Mohammed to God, an example which should be followed by everyone. The hadith stands for the documented narratives and traditions of the teachings and actions of the Prophet which are not to be found in the Koran. Various schools of laws reproduced a number of these in their legal systems, so that Muslims all over the world could imitate the Prophet's behaviour and his worship of Allah. "By imitating the Prophet they too hope to experience his inner submission to the divine being." The five so-called pillars are fundamental here: the belief in one God and his Prophet (the shahada); the ritual prayer (al-Salat) which is offered five times a day; fasting during Ramadan (al-Si-vam); care for the poor (al-Zakat) and the pilgrimage to Mecca for those who are physically and financially able (l-Hajj). The rules of life devised and practised by the Prophet are key.

The Islamic religion (and this also applies to many other –if not all – religions) is considered to have bearing on the whole of one's life. It does not only affect one's personal life, but also one's life in the context of society and within the constitutional state with all its ramifications (penal law, civil

law, etc.). Many Muslims agree that it is not possible to isolate a particular area and declare this out of bounds for religion. This would be a violation of the principle of unity (tawhid: a cardinal Islamic virtue). It is for this reason that politics is for devout Muslims what Christians would call a sacrament. It has to be sanctified in order that it becomes a channel to divinity. Government should be oriented towards religion and should support the laws of that religion. But, on the other hand, a number of distinctions are made here. Not every commandment or moral rule is normative for public life, for the sphere of government. The activities of Muslims can be divided into five categories: forbidden, discouraged, indifferent, recommended or compulsory. For this reason, Islam historically recognises a form of separation between the state authorities and the religious authorities in spite of their often close relationships.

In a number of Islamic countries, Islam is in fact the state religion, for example in Pakistan, Iran, Malaysia, Morocco and Saudi Arabia. Nonetheless, the picture is diverse. In Indonesia there is on the one hand an Islamic movement focused on the (more or less secular) parliamentary democracy, where former president Wahid was particularly active, and on the other hand there is a traditional political Islam which was gradually winning influence. The current president, Mrs. Megawati Sukarnoputri, belongs to the more secular political movement. In Egypt (but, for example, also in Algeria), the government has in recent decades demonstrated an increasing orientation towards Islam and the sharia, but they nonetheless distance themselves from – and in fact even have conflicts with – fundamentalist movements. Islam has a moderating influence on the state. Specifically because of this moderation, some countries reject democracy: free elections could lead to a theocratic state. Since the 1920's, Turkey has been a laity; the separation of Church and state is guaranteed by the constitution, which is consistently monitored by the constitutional judge. The election victory in November 2002 by a clearly Islamic oriented Party for Justice and Development shows that among the population the religious factor is definitely important. There are broad hopes and expectations that the formation of parties based on Islamic principles will clearly demonstrate the compatibility of Muslim belief, political ambition and democratic constitutional state in Turkey.

The image of Islam in the West is currently strongly influenced by theocracy and even by the extremist ambitions of notorious Islamic movements and by fundamentalists. The fact is that, particularly in recent decades, the strong growth of fundamentalist Islam has become a significant factor. There are signs of a re-Islamisation in political terms. This

re-Islamisation is largely a reaction to the convergence and sometimes the confrontation between Western culture on the one hand and the culture of Islam on the other. It is only one reaction. Also, different religions may sometimes merge into one another although it is important to continue to distinguish the ways in which the Islamic cultural circle deals with modernism.

3.2 Islam, pluralism and the constitutional state

Here we will explore some of the reactions to the typical Western differentiation of Church and state and to the democratic constitutional state. First, we will look at (extremist) political Islam and the more moderate forms of theocratic sharia philosophy. Then we will explore the tensions which this causes with the Western constitutional state. Subsequently, we will look at three other movements: they hold views which cause no – or much less – friction with the Western culture of the state based on the rule of law.

3.2.1 Two domains and Islam

The background of the theocratic Muslim ideology – often referred to by the term political Islam – is the more or less classical division of the world into a dar al-harb (the domain of war, where the classical term does not necessarily have a warmongering emphasis) and dar al-Islam (the domain of Islam). The house of Islam has to be spread over the whole world. This Islamisation of the world and the legal realization of the sharia (the divine rules of life) are from this fundamentalist point of view a very real part of the Islamic world and philosophy of life. The hegemony of the divine life rules, whereby governments are supported by the spiritual leaders and their legal experts, is an essential characteristic. According to radical Islamic groups, the divine appeal which is expressed in the Koran and the sunna, and which is lived by example and has gradually been given form in the “Islamic culture” and schools of law, is the only path to a civilized society. Radical followers of Islam claim that God has prescribed a very particular and detailed way of life which dictates very precise terms for human interaction: an Islamic system. Anyone who does not live according to these dictates, lives in jahiliyyah, or uncultivated immorality. Extremist movements want to combat disregard of God, to reject materialism and individualism. They identify the struggle against the West with the resistance of the prophet to Mecca before the city turned to Islam. This can be termed a holy struggle, where the threshold to using violence is very low. This kind of attitude can very soon lead to what is often called resistance as a means of self-defence.

3.2.2 A sharia of two or more levels

Many Muslims, as has been said, make no distinction between profane and sacred aspects of reality. To believe is to obey and to act accordingly. The creator appropriates every domain of life. Divine law controls the whole of life and every aspect of existence. Yet it is important to bear in mind that, according to certain significant movements, there are gradations within the law. Some stipulations of the sharia are by nature moral recommendations or guidelines, others are intended as obligations. But even within these obligations, there are distinctions to be made. There are both individual and collective obligations. Daily prayers are, for example, a personal obligation, while building orphanages and hospitals is a collective responsibility. There are also social rules governing economic life, for how one should treat the natural environment, etc. Jürgensmeyer describes this as a two-level sharia. At the level of society and culture there are social rules of life which apply to all people in a particular country, whether they are Christians, agnostics, atheists or Buddhists. In Islamic countries, the rules of life are closely related to Islam (and, of course, to the specific tradition of the country). This is also expressed in the national symbols. According to Jürgensmeyer, the rules themselves closely resemble those of every civilization or civil society. At a more individual level there are the detailed personal and family obligations, behavioural codes which only apply to Muslims. Some Muslim leaders with whom Jürgensmeyer discussed this (in Egypt and Gaza), pointed to the West: Muslims living there are expected to observe the public laws, but there should be a place for Muslim rules and customs in the private sphere. They want a state which does not deny their history, which supports public institutions being anchored in Islamic culture, and a society whose structure has parallels with Islamic codes, but which offers the opportunity for personal views and religious convictions.

3.2.3 Less rule-based movements

Significant movements within Islam have from ancient times had less strict or – rather – less traditional opinions about the sharia and the fiqh (the Islamic jurisprudence). The rationalism of the falsafa comes to mind here, the internally oriented devoutness of the shia and of the mystic teaching of Sufism.

In the nineteenth century, the representatives of the falsafa discovered Greek science and philosophy. They attempted to apply these to the religion of the Koran and to enforce them as timeless truths. The falsafa can be seen as a movement which for a brief period represented an interpretation of

Islam which was related to the Enlightenment (or rather the Renaissance). This movement never became very influential.

Shiism too with its tragic perception of life, interpreted Islam differently from the Sunnite men who were versed in law, and therefore also differently from the guardians of the legal and religious traditions (the oelema) which were specifically focused on the holy laws and the rules governing behaviour. Shiites generally turned away from politics: they lived from a messianism which was linked to the hope of a return of the so-called hidden imam. In recent decades a change has come about in the separation of religion from politics. Significant schools of doctrine have begun to focus more on radical politics. Mysticism has merged with a political and theocratic activism and extremism, particularly during the leadership of Khomeini in Iran. After his death, the tone and political practices in the mainly Shiite Iran became more moderate, but the focus on political Islam remained.

Sufism is still an important element. This movement prioritises the personal experience of religion (and ascetism) above rule-bound behaviour, and is relatively tolerant. Sufism is non-theocratically oriented and for this reason is favoured by regimes which are opposed to political Muslim-fundamentalism (Egypt, Tunisia and Algeria). Sufism has never been dominant in the cultural circles of Islam, although its influence differs and has differed per country. Some authorities on Islam in their turn argue that the devoutness of Sufism, and its emphasis on inner sacredness, presupposes that adherents will live their lives according to the rules which are enshrined in the sharia.

3.a intermezzo: areas of friction

Areas of friction between the above named “movements”, with their particular “sharia vision”, and Western cultural circles are mainly played out in the public domain, and relate particularly to the relationship between men and women (family law), penal law and freedom of religion. In the case of Muslim radicalism, these tensions cannot be bridged. This is probably less so for the “two-level sharia” and Sufism.

Opinions on family law and inheritance law, taken from traditional interpretations of the stipulations of the sharia, have a strained relationship with those of Western systems; polygamy is permitted, divorce is sometimes a prerogative of the man, the wife may be considered to have an inferior position in inheritance law, etc. In the area of penal law, the (classical

interpretation of) the sharia identifies serious crimes as detailed in the Koran: stealing, slander, drinking wine, adultery, etc. The (traditional) physical punishments are very strict. There are differences of opinion about whether or not these should be put into the context of the time and whether they are therefore still valid. In the area of freedom of religion, some movements assume that Islam is not only superior to other religions (which they have every right to do), but also that this superiority should be acknowledged within the system of state and should be validated in the country's laws. Generally speaking, there is room for other religions. Jews and Christians, as well as followers of other ideologies, can be seen as minorities which need to be protected, although extra burdens may be placed on them and privileges withheld. Nonetheless, they may claim full citizenship. Freedom of religion is most disputed in instances of renouncement of faith. Traditionally, this has been subject to severe punishment and now, too, we see that spiritual leaders call fellow Muslims via fatwa's to punish by death those Muslims who, for example, by advocating the separation of Church and state, are seen as having lapsed. These appeals apply worldwide: Western countries are also affected by this because it affects their citizens. In some Islamic countries there is a complete lack of religious freedom.

It should be noted further that it has already been said earlier that the actions of Muslims can be divided into five categories. These vary from forbidden, discouraged and indifferent actions, to recommended or compulsory actions. Sometimes states may decide to move a particular action or behaviour to a different category. Tunisia, for example, after independence banned polygyny (being married a number of women at the same time) because in practice it is not possible to treat all the women equally (a precondition of polygyny according to Islamic law). Polygyny is, on the other hand, allowed in Morocco, but in recent decades more conditions have become attached to this. In Turkey polygyny has been forbidden since the 1920's. In this country, legislation on marriage and the person has been introduced along the lines of the Swiss model. There are less – or even no - conflicts between (traditional interpretations of) the sharia and the modern constitutional state with its observance of human rights when the Muslim community itself argues in favour of constitutional reform.

3.2.4 Reformist arguments

Many influential Muslims advocate a modern interpretation of the Islamic legal tradition. They want to distance themselves from medieval casuistry.

In their view, the Koran and human rights follow on from one another naturally. Attention should be paid to context and goal – one should formulate proposals instead of adhering strictly to the letter of specific texts. Reformist thinkers point out that the concept of the sharia was not meant originally as a law but as a guideline. The sharia should not be considered so much as legally binding, but as ethical-religious. This puts an end to theocratic claims and there is the opportunity and foundation for rights of freedom. There is then a moral place for trial and error, for personal responsibility: an opportunity which is not reduced to a bare minimum by a set of compulsory religious obligations. Building further on this, modern Muslims advocate a Western form of Islam.

3.2.5 Living in the domain of peace

In 4.2.1 it was seen that political Islam divides the world into two categories: the domain of Islam and the domain of war. This last category indicated those areas where Muslims could not live, because they could not practise their religion and because the laws of those countries do not take account of the sharia. Since then, lawyers have distinguished a third domain, the *dār al-sulh* (the domain of peace). This refers to countries which are not part of the Islamic world, but where Muslims could practise their religion. Currently, many Muslims see Western Europe and the United States as domains of peace. Islamic law requires Muslims who have settled in those countries to respect the laws of the country, as long as these do not conflict with Islamic law and customs. Moreover, there are Islamic minorities in all countries and all parts of the world. Depending on the degree of freedom, splendid local cultures have been built up. It should, however, be borne in mind here that behind the respect for the laws of the host country, the ambition remains (or can remain) to convert these countries to Islam.

3.2.6 The separation of religion and politics: a secular state

Finally, there should be mention of Muslims who support a secular state. A country may be Islamic culturally but should in a political sense be secular. In the middle of the last century, former President Nasser, for example, strove for such an Egypt. The Shah of Persia was faced with a similar situation and Turkey knows – or knew – such a secular state system. In these countries, the separation of religion and politics seems in practice to have given rise to strong tensions. Bassam Tibi, a Muslim writer and scientist, also advocates a secular state and refers to the verse in the Koran that separates belief and force. (His supposition is that the sharia as a constitutional system is a post-Koran product: of human and not divine origin).

3.3 Rights of freedom and Islam: some official documents

The debate about the constitutional state, rights of freedom and human rights has, of course, been ongoing in Islamic circles for many years. Views of human rights have also been opposed by diverse Islam-inspired documents.

Thus, the General Islamic Declaration of Human Rights published in 1981 states that fourteen hundred years ago Islam established human rights comprehensively and fundamentally as law. The authors worked on the assumption that human rights could be directly derived from Islam and that the sharia was, in fact, already an expression of these. Ministers of Foreign Affairs in 1990 at the time of the Islamic conference (in Cairo) established the Declaration of Human Rights in Islam. The declaration contains conditions about the freedom of religion, the freedom to hold different opinions, etc. The relationship with the sharia remains on some points unclear in the text. The text, for example, has temperance clauses in favour of the sharia when talking about the right to life and about the physical integrity of mankind (art. 2). The passages about marriage and the relationship between men and women reflect the traditional division of roles (art. 6). In the area of religion, the priority of Islam is emphasized, but with the comment that it is forbidden to attempt to convert people by putting pressure on them, and to exploit poverty or ignorance (art. 10). The document makes no reference to possible reactions to lapses of faith. The Arabic human rights charter of 1994 is different. Here there is talk of a right to political participation, but this is (traditionally) not a synonym for Western style democracy, with elections, parliaments and codes of integrity.

These official documents are based on Islamic law. Rights of freedom are legitimized and based on the sharia, but this also imposes certain limitations.

In Europe, too, there is an ongoing exchange of ideas about the constitutional state and Islam. The Islamic Charter of the German Central Council of Muslims which was established in 2002 is significant here. The authors mention in the foreword that Muslims do not consider themselves guests in Germany, but citizens. "As larger minorities in this country, Muslims are obliged to integrate, to have an open attitude and to enter into dialogue about the content and practice of their faith." The receiving countries have the right to be informed about how Muslims relate to the fundamentals of the constitutional state, the Constitution, to democracy, pluralism and human rights. Muslims use the charter to justify these

aspects. The text indicates that Islamic law obliges Muslims in the diaspora to observe the laws of the receiving country. Visas, residence permits and acculturation can be seen as contracts which the Muslims have to adhere to. Muslims are, therefore, positive towards the separation of powers guaranteed in the Constitution, the law-based and democratic system in Germany, including the pluralism of parties, the active and passive right to suffrage for women and freedom of religion. For this reason, they also accept the right to change religion, to transfer to a different religion or to completely reject religion. The Koran forbids violence and coercion in religious matters (art. 11). Article 12 of the declaration states that: “we are not interested in clerical theocracy. We are more likely to support a system in which state and religion exist together in harmony”.

This charter is a splendid document. It describes how Islam and human rights can complement one another. As well as approval, there is also a degree of criticism.

A fundamental question is above all whether subscribing to the constitutional state, pluralism, democracy and freedom of religion is based on the Islamic commandment in the diaspora to, as a minority, adhere to the rules which are applicable in the receiving country, or to a particular political conviction.

The text of the document is not absolutely clear on this. The word “therefore” gives rise to the suggestion that embracing the principles of the constitutional state is related to the circumstances of the diaspora. In this way the document is linked to what has in the above text been called the point of view of the domain of peace (“when in Rome, do as the Romans do”, as long as this does not conflict with one’s own religion). The intention of the document at times goes further: This is apparent from the desire to live in the country not just as a guest, but to embrace the constitutional state from within. Some uncertainty remains about particular clauses: for example, about the intentions and implications of article 10, namely that Islamic law is binding.

4. Political implications and conclusions

4.1 Islam as a pillar of the social constitutional state : connecting values

It has been stated earlier that for many Muslims the Islamic religion affects their whole lives. It does not just touch their personal lives, but also their social and legal lives in all its branches (penal law, civil law, etc). Anyone

partitioning off one particular area and declaring this forbidden for religion, would in principle be violating the principle of unity (tawhid: a cardinal Islamic sin). In this respect, it is not infrequently mentioned that Christianity, because of its emphasis on religion as a personal experience, in general accepts the secular nature of the state. Yet, that image is not complete. It has already been demonstrated that the choice for rights of freedom and for democracy is not a secular privilege, but one which itself arises from religious insights.

This undoubtedly applies to followers of a “Western” Islam, namely for those who take seriously the command that coercion has absolutely no place in matters of belief (and therefore also not in the event of lapses of belief). Just how much this approach is supported in Islam is apparent from such texts from the Koran as: “Force has no place in religion” (sura 2, 256) and “As your Lord had wished, so should all those on earth come to believe together; should you then force people, that they should become believers?” (sura 10, 99). The term secular is, therefore, not in fact an appropriate description of the democratic constitutional state. The term “political Islam” is, then, an equally unfortunate choice. By political Islam, one generally understands a movement which advocates total adherence to the sharia.

But, as we have seen, political variants of Islam are also possible which do not elect for a theocracy, but on the grounds of Islam, advocate democracy and rights of freedom (even in the area of religion). These movements advocate a political Islam (Western Islam) which may, for example, be based on the text from the Koran mentioned earlier about the irreconcilability of belief and force and which, therefore, rejects (legalistic and extremist interpretations) of the sharia; a political Islam, which sees the traditional law schools as a product of human and not divine actions. They also support a political form of Islam, which takes seriously the scope of the terms of the sharia, but adapts these to the framework of a constitutional state (and does not revert to a medieval model). The two-level sharia offers interesting parallels, particularly as far as the internally focused and reformist movements are concerned. What it comes down to is that these movements should be taken seriously in Western cultures and should be treated as a (sometimes potential) support for the social constitutional state.

With the political-reformist movements (also referred to as Western-style Islam) there is an obvious link with the key values of the constitutional state. The approach of a two-level sharia also offers parallels: there are

elements in this approach which reflect the notion of sovereignty within one's own circle (every sphere of life has its own mission and rules). This also applies to the movements among Muslims which are more internally focused. The emphasis on personal and internalized belief can be a powerful basis for distinguishing qualitatively different life spheres (state and religious community, etc.). Claus Leggewie describes in his *Alhambra – Der Islam im Westen* various ways in which Islamic religious communities treat the West. "Dazwischen gibt er verschiedene Strategien zur Bewältigung der erfahrenen Dissonanz: die probeweise Lockerung, die reflexive Transformation und die dogmatische-orthodoxe Intensivierung der religiösen Weltanschauung. Der erste weg, das abwägend-pragmatische Durchwursteln, kommt der Privatisierung der Religion nahe: Religion wird zur subjektiven Frömmigkeit nach eigenem Geschmack(..) Diesem offenbar häufigen Fall läuft die der Anspruch des Islams als ein 'Handeln in aller Öffentlichkeit' zuwider. Im zweiten Falle, der gedanklichen Durchdringung von Islam und westlicher Moderne wird die dem westlichen Lebensstil unangepasste religiöse Symbolik rational den Gegebenheiten der modernen Gesellschaft mit ihren wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen, Marktkalkülen usw angepasst und selektiv weiterentwickelt. Diesem Versuch widerspricht die Totalansprüche der Scharia wie ihn integristische Muslime oft vortragen. In dritten Fall wird darüber hinaus die Religion offensiv positioniert; gestützt auf die wörtlich übertragene Auslegung der heiligen Texte mit Gesetzescharakter werden die sozialen Verhältnisse im Westen die Kritik unterzogen." The layout corresponds with the layout chosen in the heading. Whether and to what degree there are connecting values in this relationship will - and should - become apparent from a critical and unprejudiced dialogue (neither in a politically correct nor in a negative sense).

As well as a common agenda in terms of connecting values, and democracy and rights of freedom, they have other aspects in common. In the above, the emphasis has been placed heavily on the first of these, but this point of view can lead to other public dimensions of Islam disappearing over the horizon. What is meant is the appeal from the Koran and the hadith to apply oneself in the interests of social justice. As has already been indicated, this effort is one of the key aspects (pillars) of Islam. There is considerable affinity with the social aims of the social constitutional state, certainly in terms of striving for mutual solidarity which as far as possible is supported by society itself.

4.2 Integration and the opportunity for identity at personal, social and constitutional level

For a modern constitutional state, the existence of a social arena to express one's individual identity is essential. This right exists for all religions and philosophies, subject of course to the responsibilities ensuing under the law (which in a democratic constitutional state specifically guarantees this right for religions). This also means that there should not be a policy of providing only minimal opportunities for expression of identity for and by Islamic organizations. The legal system should offer full openings for Muslims to express their religion in their personal and social lives.

In the personal life sphere, this means that Muslims (and followers of other religions) should be able to dress according to their own codes. There should certainly be opportunities for rituals concerning marriage, funerals, etc., for personal interpretations of the role of the relationships between men and women, for ritual slaughtering and suchlike, as long as this does not infringe fundamental rights and obligations and public order. The question is, of course, how far the sphere of personal life extends. Does the wearing of a headdress, for example, conflict with the public nature of such institutions as courts of law, schools, etc?

In the social sphere, rights of freedom also apply to Islamic organizations, provided these observe the relevant legal system. The government can, of course, apply rules in which the key values mentioned earlier play a prominent role.

In the sphere of the constitutional state, the domain of the government and the state, other questions arise. Are governments obliged to provide information in multiple languages, via folders, websites, etc? Is it useful to include the most important Islamic celebrations in the repertoire of national holidays? When representing the state, should people be allowed to wear clothing which expresses their religious convictions? One example is the wearing of a headdress in a court of law as mentioned previously. Should there be facilities in public areas to call people for religious prayers, by means of loudspeakers? Should government and legal institutions in the field of penal law take into account people's cultural backgrounds?

In responding to these questions, it is important to keep sight of the character of the institute of state as described earlier. The state is a legal community, which has to make room for and respect other institutions with their own guiding principles (a reason for freedom of religion,

freedom of education, etc.). Yet, the state is more than the country's legislation and constitution. The state is more than a set of legal rules. Aspects such as the language, symbols and customs also play an important role. These demonstrate that the state is more than a set of rules, more than the notion that you must not harm others, but that there is an open and legal community. For this reason, it is important to emphasise the integrating nature of these aspects of the state and, for example, to consistently use Dutch as the official language. Religious symbols have no place in a court of law, etc.; this is a public office. In penal law there should be no distinction between cultural groups because the law and the application of the law must be unambiguous and equal. New symbols and institutions may perhaps in time be appropriate, but this implies that there will be a deepening of the relationship between the Dutch constitutional state and these symbols. It is not possible to say in advance how this will develop: often there are significant moments in the history of the state which raise symbols above their group character and give them a general, constitution-defining stature.

Further, the possibility cannot be excluded that there may at some point be practical reasons to devise specific rules for a common public holiday – for example in a neighbourhood or city which is primarily populated by Muslims. The Collective Employment Agreements (CAO) should include provisions for people to be free on their religious celebration days, unless this causes insurmountable difficulties for the company or organization.

4.3 Constitutional limitations to pluralism

The right to hold different opinions is a fundament of democracy. Freedom of expression is a constitutional right. There can be no democracy without pluralism. The right to express one's opinion does not only apply if the ideas and views conform to the opinions of the majority of the population. There has to be room for different opinions, even if these are experienced by many people as shocking, offensive or disturbing. For this reason, there is a place for discussion and fundamental debate about the organization of the state and society. For this reason also, there is room for political movements which subscribe to different political ideals. Theocratic parties and Church societies are traditionally not a strange phenomenon in the Dutch landscape. This has seldom or never caused problems and has scarcely given rise to public discussions. But a condition of this is that democracy and the key values of democracy do not come under pressure. This very subject has recently been the focus of discussion. A number of significant incidents have wrought change in the relative peace. The pronouncements of Imams

about homosexuals, sermons from mosques about the obligation to engage in acts of retaliation, the reports from the AIVD (formerly the BVD) and the schools inspectorate, enquiries about the extent to which attacks can count on support from ethnic minorities, the announcement of the establishment of an Arabic-European League in our country: these issues can give rise to disturbances and unrest. It should be remarked here that not every comment is a sign of extremism and that almost no extremist noises are to be heard among small minorities. But the question remains of where the limits lie.

Banning organisations

In considering the question of which organisations can and cannot be tolerated within the Dutch constitutional state, it is instructive to explore the decrees dated 31 July 2001 and 13 February 2003 (in the last instance) of the European Court of Human Rights (EHRM) in the case of the Welfare party against the Turkish state. The criteria set by the Court provide the necessary framework.

The Welfare party was formed in 1983, achieved 22% of the votes in 1995 and a year later gained the support of as much as 35% of the electorate. That year the party formed a coalition government with a centre right party (The Right Path) only to be banned in 1997 by the Constitutional Court of Turkey because the party was alleged to be a hub of activities opposed to the principles of the secular state.

The Constitutional Court of Turkey decreed that the Welfare party represented a clear and direct danger to the secular republic with its respect for all religions and its democratic character. The EHRM rejected an appeal on the grounds of violation of the EHRM and supported in general terms the findings of the highest legal college of Turkey. It considered the ban on the party to be in accordance with the stipulations of the EHRM. The Welfare Party's ambition and methods, theocratic aims and extremist methods have apparently been rejected by the Court.

The reasons why the European Court rejected the appeal against the ban, on the grounds of the EHRM, lie in the fact that the party:

- apparently intended to introduce the sharia for Muslims and would therefore elect for a system of legal pluralism, which offers openings for a theocratic regime for Muslims;
- would question the secular nature of the state and work towards the supremacy of the Koran;
- alluded to the possible use of undemocratic and violent methods where necessary to turn Turkey into a Muslim state.

The guidelines of this legal verdict may offer points of connection for the way in which the government in a constitutional state has to handle fundamentalist organizations with extremist tendencies. It is a matter of guidelines, because in some aspects the legal verdict fails to address certain issues. For example, no direct answer was forthcoming to the question of whether the theocratic aim of political Islam would in itself be justification for a ban on the party, i.e. independent of the methods which may be used, such as threats of violence. Moreover, an internal appeal was made against the legal verdict as a first principle. In the Court's final verdict, the appeal against the ban on the party was equally unsuccessful. The highest authority of the Court decreed on 13 February 2003 that the ban on the party did not conflict with the terms of the European Treaty on Human Rights (<http://www.echr.coe.int>). The criteria which the Court applied in its judgement are of relevance for this study.

It is important to make a clear distinction here. Institutions with theocratic ambitions:

- may be democratically inclined: their aim is to acquire a majority position and to achieve their ideals. Once they have come to power, they no longer strive to overturn democracy or to violate fundamental human rights, but, for example, towards closer cooperation between Church and state. But, they also seek a democratic legitimacy for their theocratic ambitions. In the Netherlands, the SGP can be considered to belong to this category;
- may decide to accept that they are a minority. They continue to cherish the theocratic ideal and to promote this, but – given their minority position – do not explicitly think about the question how it would be if they could gain a majority. With this group, it is a matter of a relatively apolitical ideal, but with no or very little connection with the democratic constitutional state;
- may try to realize their ambitions in a democratic, completely legal manner through general elections and try to win power, but with the more or less explicit intention of renouncing democracy and fundamental legal rights;
- may, not only in terms of their goal, but also of the methods used or promoted, not eschew violations of democracy and of rights of freedom.

After making these distinctions, it is possible to draw the conclusion that the last two categories of institutions are in direct opposition to the fundamentals of the constitutional state, namely as regards rights of freedom (freedom of expression, freedom to practise or reject religion) and parliamentary democracy. Institutions which have the political ambition to

undermine the democratic state fall within the category of a legal ban. In addition, there may of course be social institutions which have no political aspirations, but which at times promote values which are directly opposed to the (freedom) rights in the constitutional state. House searches should not be permitted unless there are firm grounds for suspicion. For this reason, the message which these institutions propagate must in the first instance be clear. The CDA parliamentary party has also included this position statement in the debate on inspections in denominational education. Should it become apparent that there are institutions which, for example, to a greater or lesser extent approve of violence and therefore apply their own methods to enforce religious convictions, that there are institutions which generally speaking support fatwa's in cases of religious lapses or suspected blasphemy, then there is justification for measures to be taken.

Once utterances are sufficiently concrete to be seen as agitation or incitement to violence, penal action can be taken against the parties involved. If this is not the case, and there is no direct call to violence, then the Ministry of Public Affairs is not empowered to take action against them. The question then arises whether the state can or should take some other form of action. This is strongly dependent on the context in which events take place. Generally speaking, wherever the state has a relationship with the social organizations (either in a regulatory or a functional sense), it should be able to apply legal instruments to reinforce its disapproval. In the field of education, these instruments are the conditions pertaining to soundness of the schools and their financing. Elsewhere, the terms of funding and the subsidy rules may be used.

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7 Summary, conclusion and recommendations

7.1 Summary

7.1.1 Introduction

Integration issues cut deeply into our society. Politics have in recent decades primarily been focused on issues of the distribution of wealth. How do we earn and distribute our wealth? How can we maintain our economic growth? How can we ensure a decent social policy and how do we correlate progress and care for the environment? Politicians too often fought shy of moral questions; sensitive issues were left to the people themselves. This attitude stems from the desire for a political system of equal respect. Respect for human values gives rise to a (liberal) arena where people, with their diverse cultural backgrounds, can express their own identity and carry out their obligations.

The “multicultural drama” is above all a drama because of an unexpected question which has arisen: does every cultural expression always deserve equal respect? Controversial concepts such as honourable revenge, threats against those who renounce religion (fatwas), the wearing of the chador, etc., demonstrate that the legal state is not simply a meeting place for all cultures. The constitutional state is not by definition a melting pot of cultures, because it is itself a political expression of a particular culture. How does this then correlate with equality of people and cultures? Where are the boundaries? How can politics make a contribution to the integration of newcomers and second and third generations of ethnic minorities? What are the key values of our (constitutional) society? What is common to our culture and what should be common? What is the government’s role?

The following questions underpin the guiding principle in designing this study:

- What are the key values of the democratic and social constitutional state?
- How can the government contribute to a pluriform society in which different cultural movements not only exist alongside one another, but (can) also respect one another and recognize one another in the key values of the state (a policy not only of acknowledging the different religious groups but of including them)?
- How can the government contribute to ensuring that different cultural movements and population groups remain in contact with one another? The key words here are participation and social-cultural cohesion.
- What is the role of cultural institutions and what policy should the government adopt towards them? These include: the family, school, neighbourhood or district, religion (religious community) and government.

The main criteria in responding to the questions was the conviction that:

- the most effective route towards integration is open dialogue. Prejudices will be set aside and incidents will not be viewed as typical characteristics of other cultures. The dialogue between world religions, for example, may lead to the conclusion that a genuine religious life cannot be achieved by force. This has considerable consequences for the state and for society. Openness relies on unambiguous statements on difficult issues and differences, and steadfastness as far as the key values of the constitutional state are concerned;
- “Unknown is unloved”. Knowledge and insight into one another’s backgrounds encourage integration;
- integration is a very real process for newcomers. Human dignity relies on the ability to bear certain responsibilities, to use one’s talents and to put an individual mark on one’s life. A policy that does not challenge one to do this, which is not sufficiently demanding, and thereby does not equip people well to bear responsibility, is completely inadequate. A lack of challenges and responsibilities leads to personal isolation. Integration is about investing in people and setting certain obligations. A society has the right to require that people who are received into the country are willing to make a contribution to that society;
- placing demands on immigrants must go hand in hand with encouraging integration, making ample facilities available to them and, as a society, investing in social cohesion and integration.

A key premise in responding to these questions is that integration has cultural (key values), social (participation) and functional (skills) aspects. All three are mutually influential and are important.

7.1.2 Migration processes today and in the past

It is not for the first time that large groups of immigrants have come to our country. This is a process which has been going on for centuries, but certainly in the twentieth century has received a new impetus. In the 1930’s many Jewish people sought asylum in The Netherlands. It is painful to have to admit that our country – putting it euphemistically – did not show its best side at that time.

During the period of decolonisation, our country had to deal with large streams of immigrants. In the forties and fifties, this was mostly related to repatriation and other immigrants (Moluccans) from the former Dutch Indies. In the seventies there were two waves of immigration from Surinam,

a former colony which was going through the process of independence. The economic prosperity of the sixties led to a great shortage of workers. The first oil crisis (1973) put an end to immigration of those seeking work, but the decrease in the number of immigrants was only temporary. Family reunification and formation brought about a great influx of Moroccans and Turks. Also, there was a steady flow of people from the Dutch Antilles and Aruba. The collapse of the Communist system in Central and Eastern Europe was followed by a period of political and economic instability and of aggressive and ideological nationalism. This led within and outside Europe to armed conflicts, consequently with large influxes of refugees.

In 2001, one quarter (24,000) of the non-Dutch immigrants came for reasons of family formation. This accounts for 2,000 partners every year, among whom some 800 Turks and 300 Moroccans. One in five (19,000) comes for purposes of family reunification, 22% as approved refugees (asylum) and 19% to work (work migration). Smaller numbers come in connection with a study, on work placement or as au pairs. In the area of asylum, there appears to be a reversal of the trend. The number of asylum applications in the European Union (EU) is still rising slightly, whereas in The Netherlands it is now decreasing.

The settlement process for immigrants often takes up to three generations. It is, therefore, difficult to evaluate the current immigration process because we are mainly dealing with first and second generations. Historical research indicates that integration is generally complete after three generations. Nonetheless, there are currently forces at work which make the integration process of immigrant groups into society difficult.

Many immigrants come from distant parts of the world and from very different cultures. We see a great diversity of countries of origin and an even greater emotional and cultural distance between the original society and our own society. The number of non-Western immigrants is rising strongly, from 1.1 million (7% of the population) in 1995 to 1.5 million in 2001 (9% of the population). By 2010 this is expected to be 2 million (12%). Probably 6 to 7% of the population will then be Muslim.

A further important difference from previously is the closeness of the relationship with the country and culture of origin. Modern communication technology (satellite dishes, antennas, mobile phones) allow immigrants to maintain contacts with their countries of origin. Partly as a result of visits to and from the country, people remain within the sphere of influence of their traditional cultures. Previously no immigrants went

regularly on family visits. In general, they did not have marriage partners come over to join them. Today, formation and reunification of families account for the largest group of immigrants.

The extent of immigration is also influenced by the fact that The Netherlands is a welfare state. Previously, the immigrant was responsible for his own livelihood. Charitable organizations could only alleviate the greatest need. Immigrants with no opportunities for employment are now supported by a comprehensive social safety net. There is also a concentration of migrants in the big cities. In spite of recent improvements in the position of ethnic minorities in education and the employment market, half of the 850,000 households below the poverty level are from ethnic minorities. Too many members of ethnic minority groups have too little education, speak Dutch poorly or not at all and have a poor starting position on the employment market.

Integration, in other words, costs effort. It is important to pre-sort people early because integration will remain a far-reaching and enduring social theme for a long time to come. The Council for Social Development (RM) cites the following risks: "The integration process of ethnic groups will on the one hand show progress but on the other hand will be impeded by the arrival of increasing numbers of immigrants. These citizens combine the uncertainty of life as an immigrant with aspects of their own culture and sometimes their own religion. They can be strongly oriented towards their home country or susceptible to political influences from that country. These are risky circumstances which can lead to social or political radicalization". It is obvious that it is of great importance how the indigenous society handles this phenomenon. There could be "desolidarisation"; the decreasing willingness of the native population to provide the financial burden for ethnic minorities. Also, if there is political radicalization (either pro-active or reactive), then a process will have been started which may have serious consequences.

Worry and anxiety should not be the prime movers in the debate and in the policies on the multi-ethnic society. What is necessary is mutual commitment and a policy which is demanding both for the newcomers and the receiving society. The integration of minority groups must be placed high on the political agenda. There must be the opportunity for people to be held responsible for making a useful contribution to society by means of a more focused, stricter and more ambitious integration policy. Participation in education and the employment market must be encouraged, without damaging the social-cultural component. Integration

issues are not in themselves solved when immigrants acquire a satisfactory position in the employment market and get good educational results. Loyalty, citizenship and involvement do not always have to coincide with possessing certain skills.

There is a distinction between structural and social-cultural integration. Structural integration includes participation in social institutions (education, employment, etc.). Social-cultural integration is about the degree and the nature of social contacts which members and organizations of ethnic minorities have with the wider society and the cultural fit into the society. Cultural orientation relates to the opinions and values of the immigrant groups and the extent to which these agree with or differ from those of the receiving society. There is considerable cohesion between social, cultural and structural aspects of integration. People cannot in a social or cultural sense stand back from the key values of society and still achieve an integrated social position.

7.1.3 Integration and cultural institutions

The sociologist Merton makes a distinction between cultural assets and institutional resources. By cultural attributes we understand the aims which society considers to be of value. What is worth striving for (tolerance, openness, a sense of public responsibility, money, career, good relationships)? In addition, there are resources for achieving these aims (education and working hard).

People who conform, accept society in terms of its aims and methods. In the case of innovation, the citizen concerned thinks critically and constructively about the state of society, also in terms of effecting change. With ritualism, the situation is more complicated. People behave in an exemplary fashion; they have access to education, employment, sources of income, but have not internalized the key cultural values. We see detachment where people have turned away from society and do not have the skills needed to function independently. In the case of rebellion (destructive behaviour), the tensions are on the surface. In the last three situations, integration is either under pressure or absent. Social-cultural integration at its deepest level is about whether people feel at home in a society, or have the opportunity to express their deepest beliefs in their social environment. Is there a link between their view of life and the society in which they have particular obligations? Is there sufficient overlap between their philosophy of life and their daily activities? With integration it is important that people:

- a) can connect their belief, life and world vision in an authentic manner – and not in a forced way - with the society in which they live on a daily basis (the cultural dimension). Key values and opportunities for cooperation are of particular importance here.
- b) have the skills to handle their responsibilities in a way which brings them satisfaction (the functional dimension).

The conclusion is that integration is about being involved in society. Integration is seen here (as indicated earlier) as a phenomenon with cultural (key values), social (participation) and functional (skills) aspects. These three aspects have influence on one another.

The bridging function of formative bodies and institutions which support (and confer) culture plays an important role in integration. When the influx of migrants is incidental, the integration efforts are focused on people; their work, income and schooling. Social-cultural issues and tensions then play a role particularly for the minorities themselves. They have to make their own way in the new society. If the influx of migrants increases, then there are two possible patterns.

The first pattern is the formation of more homogenous networks, certainly if there are parallels between the origin, religion, values and norms of migrants. The social-cultural dimension of integration is strongly influenced by the group process in these networks. Migrants often congregate in neighbourhoods, places of entertainment, schools, churches and mosques. Integration policies are then related to the cultural institutions. Social networks encourage connection between people and a broadening of their outlook, and they guard against religious lapses. But if these institutions have the opposite effect and form isolated strongholds, then people remain strangers to one another. If a parallel society develops, dividing walls are formed between different sub-cultures. The integration issue takes on a different character from at the start: cultural and institutional questions become more explicit.

With the second pattern, cultural homogeneity is limited. Mixed neighbourhoods develop with people coming from all parts of the world. Social cohesion and control soon disappear and, as a result, integration is slowed down and there is greater likelihood of segregation. The result: growing isolation, a continuing low level of education and high (youth) unemployment, which can lead to criminal behaviour. Ethnic minority institutions and emancipation coupled with the maintenance of their own culture, such as education in the immigrant's language and culture, were

as a result often encouraged, specifically in order to strengthen social cohesion.

In itself this is fine. But then, an integration policy must challenge and equip cultural institutions to form a bridge to the surrounding society, to link the individual's own life vision in a constructive way with that society. If this is missing, the consequences can be far-reaching: for people personally because they cannot settle, for society because it can have undesirable consequences such as alienation, unemployment, dropping out of school or even antagonism towards migrants and for the constitutional state, because there is more likelihood of criminality and friction between and within the population groups.

The Christian Democratic tradition has always attached great value to the role of social relationships. The organizations established by cultural minority groups promote social cohesion and connections. They enable people to express their religion. They can also have considerable significance for the constitutional society. At the same time, frictions can arise. So, one might question whether these cultural institutions stand in the way of a broader integration. Moreover, the question also arises whether the culture and institutions, which often have a religious background, are a binding factor or not. How do they relate to the values of the social state? What are these values? And which values cannot be relinquished?

7.1.4 Cultural differences and the Dutch identity

In the meeting with new Dutch people, the questions about our culture which arise are generally about connections or about tensions in the area of the values which form the basis of the legal society and the norms which these represents. May an employer object to the wearing of a headdress by Muslim girls and women? Should celebration days other than those of Christianity receive legal recognition?

Hesitations in stating key values should not be too easily dismissed. It can cause an inflexibility which is alien to the mobility of society and the dynamics of cultures. Undercurrents which yesterday were scornfully laughed off are today mainstream. Our culture, too, is changing dramatically.

Some matters are so interwoven with cultural identity and rooted in traditions that they are part of the fundamentals of the social order. Culture in the West is fed by Jewish and Christian traditions and by the Greek and humanistic philosophies. It is of essential importance that:

- people can form their own identity in freedom and responsibility and can give expression to this within society (in their own institutions);
- social institutions and private organizations themselves also respect this personal freedom in their practices;
- people are adequately equipped, and are both challenged and obliged to have a responsible role in society. The government as far as possible creates the conditions (educational resources, for example) and places people and organizations under certain obligations;
- the government promotes the values of the democratic constitutional state, maintains the norms which are inherent in this and stimulates citizenship in order to engender broader support for the constitutional society.

Bearing in mind the above, the non-surrenderable key elements of the constitutional state include in any event:

- the recognition that man is unique, that he has personal responsibility and an individual purpose in life. Each person has the right to self-development, to live according to his own internal beliefs. Rights of freedom and a democratic system are essential;
- the right to give expression to one's ambitions, life convictions and aims through one's own institutions. In doing this people put a personal stamp on their lives and on the social area (family, school, union, church, mosque). This implies that these institutions may not apply force internally and must not be able to pressure anyone to conform, even though institutions have their own rules of play, and apply their own rites and even sanctions. A "personal framework" (a term used by R. Guardini) cannot compress a person (the individual) into a particular entity. This calls for a policy of solidarity rather than constraint. In terms of state law, this notion translates into a certain horizontal effect of rights of freedom;
- the incompatibility of force and personal belief. This is based on the belief and the at times painful experience (mainly in Western Europe) that if these two coincide, this can have consequences for freedom of conscience and religion. In a state based on the rule of law, this means the constitutional differentiation and separation of Church and state;
- the equality of men and women. This equality is defined in article 1 of the Constitution (equal treatment of men and women in equal situations) and is expressed in family law (no polygamy, equal entitlement to the joint income, divorce law, etc.), in the social security system, (equal pay), in legislation on education (compulsory education for all), etc. It is, for example, unacceptable that a woman may not be heard in a court of law because she is a woman, may be paid less for the same work, that

against her will her marriage can be dissolved with no repercussions for the perpetrators, etc.;

- the equality of all people before the law and the equal value of everyone, irrespective of sex, religion, sexual inclination, etc. This is expressed within the framework of the legislation on equal treatment in different spheres of life.

The government in a democratic state guarantees rights of freedom and ensures elementary conditions of existence. The state also has expectations of its citizens. For example:

- the obligation to provide one's own income, except in circumstances beyond one's control;
- the obligation to bring one's children up well, to care for one another as partners;
- observance of the law on compulsory education;
- the obligation to respect others in their own right (their freedom) and not to violate this, either physically, or by any other form of coercion, force, etc.;
- the ways in which the state defines citizens in terms of their responsibility for society and for the further development of society (obligatory school subjects such as the fatherland's history and form of government, subsidising of political parties, etc.).

The most important values of a society are expressed in manners, codes of life and goals, and the ways in which organizations function (companies, schools, public administration, courts of law, political institutions).

Formative institutions such as families, schools, the media and religious communities – and in a certain sense also the state – as bearers of culture and as intermediary institutions, encourage interfaces between citizens and society.

7.1.5 Cultural policy and integration

For a long time, integration policies were focused on functional aspects of society: education, work and income. The social-cultural dimension was often ignored, although opportunities were created for ethnic minorities' own cultural institutions and – in recent years – acculturation courses were introduced.

The social-cultural integration policy is not yet sufficiently focused, even though the necessary initiatives have been taken. The distance between cultures – or on the other hand their proximity – is a significant

consideration in integration. Social-cultural distance appears to be one of the causes of the strong dependence on social benefits and insurances. The importance of social-cultural proximity was demonstrated, for example, in the research into the over-representation of ethnic minorities in the disability system and other social provisions.

Educational performance, too, is closely related to social-cultural proximity. If the culture-related differences between the native country and the host country are great and if there is a lack of knowledge about how to deal with these, then there is a relatively high risk of tensions arising within the family. This in turn leads to further risks of alienation and even of delinquent behaviour, certainly in an environment where there is also poverty, social isolation, poor economic prospects and inadequate supervision. The confidence in the fairness of the institutions and culture of the new society then diminishes.

What is important is whether the religious background and the value system of the immigrant differ from those of the host country and whether the person comes from an urban or rural background. If there is a lack of social-cultural proximity, then prompt action is needed to bridge the gap. The need for this will be greater as the influx of immigrants increases and becomes more permanent. Social and cultural institutions play an important role here. We would mention:

- the family
- the neighbourhood or district
- the school
- religion and
- the state

a Family

In conclusion, we could state in relation to the primary relationships that:

- bringing up young people to be competent adults is given a key position within the family. Immigrant families often have to bridge a gap between two cultures (the acculturation process). If the adults' language skills, their knowledge of the culture and world of young people and the flexibility to be able to deal with cultural differences are inadequate, then this often has repercussions for the children, not infrequently with all the attendant consequences (learning problems, dropping out and criminal behaviour);
- upbringing and family relationships are put under extra pressure if one of the parents in the family has no or too little knowledge of and insight into the culture and world of the receiving society;

- knowledge of and insight into our society and Western values and customs are important for bringing up children satisfactorily, even if that upbringing is critical towards particular values of the society, for example, the dominant sexual morals, the degree of personal autonomy and the focus on the self. If parents do not know how to deal with the differences in outlook, this can lead to relationship problems;
- it is important that women, too, have an adequate education and are equipped to live confident lives. If they lack education and professional skills, women will end up too dependent on their partners. It is important that this dependency should as far as possible be protected against abuse. This is reason enough to invest heavily in the training and education of women (also in view of their significant role in upbringing) and to end the situation where, in contravention of the law, women (including those from ethnic minorities) are not actually obliged to look for paid employment if their household becomes dependent on social security benefit.

b Neighbourhoods and districts

The spontaneous concentration of ethnic groupings in certain neighbourhoods and districts can have advantages and disadvantages for integration. One advantage could be that immigrants with common backgrounds develop and maintain feelings of unity and involvement. There is a lot of literature which points in the other direction. Indeed, there is often no social-cultural homogeneity in districts with a high density of ethnic minorities. One should also be wary of concentrations of underprivileged groups. Social deprivation and cultural withdrawal soon have the effect of reinforcing one another. Immigrants then learn the language much less quickly or not at all. This increases the arrears on the job market and partly explains the high influx into the social security and disability system. Segregation also leads to increased prejudice and discrimination.

The government has encouraged mixed districts with a policy of differentiation, restructuring and urban renewal. New private homes in deprived areas would lead to a better living environment and would reduce the degree of segregation. Demolition and rebuilding of houses in post-war districts with a large number of ethnic minorities would ensure a more mixed spread of the population. This policy, if measured against the goal of a more even distribution of the population, has not been successful.

Nonetheless, it deserves to be pursued

Housing corporations and, if necessary, municipalities should take into account the diversity of the population composition and the district's

capacity for social support. It is recommended that municipalities, together with corporations, residents' organizations, district committees and the migrants' own organizations should together develop a housing allocation policy and should settle newcomers in neighbourhoods where the population is more mixed.

But enforced dispersal does not work and it also violates people's freedom to choose where they live. Urban planning studies show that people with similar characteristics often seek one another out. Households want neighbours who are similar to themselves: neighbourhoods where there are a lot of children, areas with mainly young single people, "gold coasts" for people with a high income and districts with households having a similar culture and lifestyle. The freedom to choose where one lives is an important right, but this must not lead to segregation and impenetrable barriers. This mainly occurs if immigrants do not get to know our culture, if they do not speak the language and if they have no contacts with indigenous people. There is then a threat of segregation. The tensions are mainly played out within families with all the attendant consequences for the children and for their future prospects, and the broader social context is affected if alienation occurs. The policy should above all be focused on schooling, education, acculturation and knowledge of our language and culture. A dispersion policy is difficult to define and for this reason efforts to this end have not been effective.

c Education

In conclusion we can say in relation to education that:

- the educational arrears of students who are just starting education are often difficult to recoup later. A more focused policy is needed to avoid this situation;
- the school achievements of children are not (only) dependent on the parents' attitude to performance, but even more on their knowledge of the (new) language, culture and society and their openness for the new society;
- schools with a majority of pupils from ethnic minorities often have a high turnover. Many children have diverse languages and cultural backgrounds, which makes integration efforts more difficult. This then leads to the so-called "white flight";
- freedom of education is a great asset, but education has to be focused on life in Dutch society and on the key values of the state. Freedom of education is an incontrovertible right, but should be related to a focus on the key values of the state. Denominational schools have a particular value but should maintain commonality (diversity within unity, that is);
- certain schools and school types are under considerable pressure; inte-

gration efforts fall mainly on their shoulders, which can lead to a “white flight” and to extra pressure on particular types of schools (lower vocational schools).

d The constitutional community

In the area of the constitutional state and society, the following conclusions can be drawn:

- the community focuses on the organization of legislative aspects of society. The history, culture and language of a country also contribute to the identity of the community;
- the government should put a clear stamp on the identity of the state, and should make a contribution to ensuring that the key values of the community are fully experienced and promoted. If one wants to foster the interests of the social state, one must make sure that newcomers are made aware of society’s values;
- the government must understand the inherent relationship between national symbols and the state culture;
- acquiring a residence permit and Dutch nationality are significant steps. Anyone who applies for Dutch citizenship will have to be able to demonstrate relevant knowledge, skills and loyalty. The Law on Dutch citizenship contains particular requirements, which are only observed in part – and often not at all;
- the government creates good conditions to equip people for taking a responsible position in society, and as citizens. For this reason, young people are obliged by law to follow full time education up to the age of sixteen. Education equips people for their responsibilities and enables them to further develop their abilities. This should also apply to newcomers.

7.1.6 Muslims and their communities

In the issue of the relationship between religion, the state and human rights, it is good to make a distinction between the concepts of orthodoxy, fundamentalism, theocracy and extremism. Orthodoxy stands for conformism, for strictly adhering to the traditional (Church) dogma. Fundamentalism is about people’s behaviour. Traditional rules are strictly observed and it is assumed that the welfare of mankind and society depends on this. Theocracy (rulership by god) can be defined as the situation in which the government imposes on its citizens a religion or a moral code derived from this. Theocracy can conflict with democracy, insofar as adherents consider obedience to the religious rules too important to allow them to be dependent on endorsement by the people and on periodic

elections. It can contravene rights of freedom, insofar as a particular philosophy or religion is imposed on people and alternative beliefs are politically and socially excluded. If violent acts are committed or if these are supported financially or verbally, one is then dealing with extremism. Adhering to a moral code (however strictly) is not extremism, provided one does not force one's own views onto another person and provided also one does not use radical methods.

In the true Islam, religion, law and politics are part of the whole, with the sharia occupying the central position for many people. Sharia ("the path to the watering place") represents the complement of holy laws derived from the Koran, sunna and hadith. The sunna contains the customs and religious practices of the prophet Mohammed. The laws express the total submission of Mohammed to God, which can be imitated by everyone. The hadith stands for the documented accounts, lessons and actions of the prophet which are not in the Koran. Islam not only affects the personal and social lives of adherents, but also the legal aspects of society (penal law, civil law). "For this reason politics is for devout Muslims what Christians would call a sacrament. It is something which they must sanctify in order for it to become a channel to divinity." The government focuses on the religion and puts appropriate laws in place.

But, on the other hand, this does not happen indiscriminately. Not every command, or every moral rule is representative of public life, or the sphere of state. The actions of Muslims can be divided into five categories: forbidden, discouraged, indifferent, recommended or compulsory. For this reason, traditional Islam separates the power of the state and the religious authorities, even though they are generally closely related.

The West's view of Islam is determined by the theocratic and extremist ambitions of prominent movements and by those holding fundamentalist religious views. In recent decades, fundamentalist Islam has become a very significant force. Re-Islamisation in a political sense is above all a reaction to the convergence and sometimes the confrontation between Western culture – or rather, post-modernism and modernism – and Islamic culture. It remains important to distinguish carefully between the ways in which the Islamic cultural circle handles modernism.

7.1.6.1 Islam, pluralism and the constitutional state

A number of reactions to the typical Western separation of politics and religion have been explored. They include:

- Two domains and Islam
- Theocratic Muslim doctrine splits the world into dar al-harb (domain of war, where the classical term does not have to contain any war-mongering emphasis) and dar al-Islam (domain of Islam). Islam has to be spread worldwide. Islamisation of the world and achieving legal recognition of the sharia (divine rules for life) are from this point of view a real part of the Islamic view of the world and of life. The supremacy of divine rules for life, whereby governments are supported by the clergy and legal experts, is an essential characteristic. According to radical Islam, God has prescribed “a particular and detailed way of life” which shapes the exact form of human actions: an Islamic system. Anyone whose behaviour diverges from these rules, lives in the jahiliyyah, uncultured immorality. Extremist movements want to engage in combat with those who ignore God, with materialism and individualism. They identify the struggle with the West with the resistance of the prophet against Mecca for the conversion of the city. In this holy conflict, the threshold to using violence is very low. Retaliation as a means of selfprotection soon rears its head.

A sharia of two levels or more

Most Muslims make no distinction between profane and sacred elements of reality. Still, there are gradations, according to important groups. Some conditions of the sharia have the nature of moral recommendations, others are obligations. Some stipulations are aimed at the person, others at the community. Daily prayers are a personal obligation, whereas building hospitals is an obligation for the community. Jürgensmeyer calls this a two-level sharia. In society and culture, social codes of life apply to everyone; at a private level there are personal and family obligations.

Intermezzo: areas of conflict

Conflicts between the above named “movements”, with their specific view of the sharia, and the Western cultural circle are played out in the public domain, mainly related to aspects of family law (the relationship between men and women), around penal law and freedom of religion. In the case of Muslim radicalism, these tensions cannot be bridged. This is less so with the “two-level sharia” and with Sufism.

Reformist arguments

Frictions between interpretations of the sharia and the modern constitutional state occur much less frequently – or even not at all – with reformist arguments from the Muslim community about the modern constitutional state. Many Muslims advocate a revised or more modern

interpretation of the Islamic legal tradition. They want to distance themselves from the medieval legal casuistry by making the sharia more constructive in terms of human rights. They are particularly concerned here with the aims and not the specific details of the Koran and other religious sources.

Life in the domain of peace

It was mentioned earlier that political Islam divides the world into two categories: the domain of Islam and the domain of war. This last indicates areas where Muslims could not live, because they could not practise their religion there and because the sharia had not put its stamp on the laws of the country. Later, lawyers have distinguished a third area, the *dār al-sulh* (the domain of peace). They mean by this, countries which are not part of the Islamic world, but where Muslims are able to practise their religion. At the present time, many Muslims consider West Europe and the United States to be areas of peace. Islamic law requires those Muslims living in a country to respect the laws of the country as long as these do not infringe Islamic laws and customs.

7.1.6.2 Political implications

— Islam as a pillar of the social constitutional state: connecting values?

It has been proven that electing for rights of freedom and for democracy is not a privilege of secular societies but can arise specifically from religious principles. This undoubtedly also applies to followers of a “Western” Islam, namely for those who take seriously the command that in religious affairs, force is never acceptable (not even in cases of lapses from faith). Important texts from the Koran clearly indicate that this approach is also endorsed within Islam.

There are certainly also politically oriented Muslim (groups) which do not favour a theocracy, but on the grounds of Islamic principles advocate democracy and rights of freedom (including religious freedom). This is then a political form of Islam which in its own way takes seriously the stipulations of the sharia without resorting to a medieval model. The two level sharia offers interesting parallels, particularly for internally oriented and reformist movements. What it comes down to is that these movements have to be taken seriously in Western cultural circles and should be explored critically as to the way in which they can be a (sometimes potential) supporting pillar for the social state. The CDA should take the lead and initiate discussions with representatives of the Muslim community on the theme of religion and the constitutional state. Also, there are more

parallels for a common agenda on connecting values than on democracy and rights of freedom. The aim is to respond to the appeal from the Koran and the hadith to strive for social justice. There is considerable affinity with the social aims of and within the social state, certainly if this includes striving for mutual solidarity supported as much as possible by society itself.

– *Integration and the opportunity for identity on a personal, social and constitutional level.*

The existence of a social arena to express one's individual identity is essential for a modern constitutional state. This means that one should not minimise the opportunities for expression of identity of and by Islamic organizations. The legal system must offer Muslims every opportunity to express their religion in their personal and social lives.

In the personal sphere this means that Muslims (as well as followers of other religions) have to be able to dress in accordance with their codes. There has to be room for individual rituals on marriage, funerals etc., for individual opinions on the roles of men and women, for ritual slaughtering and such like, provided these do not infringe fundamental rights and duties or the public order. The question is, of course, how far the personal sphere stretches. Does the wearing of a headdress in a court of law, for example, conflict with the public nature of these state institutions?

In the social sphere, rights of freedom also apply to Islamic organizations, provide these comply with the applicable legal system. The question is whether the government in its relationship with these institutions (and others) can apply rules in which the key values mentioned earlier play a role.

In the sphere of the constitutional state, the domain of the government and the state, other questions arise. Should governments provide information in several languages via folders, websites, etc? Is it useful to include the most important Islamic festivals in the programme of national holidays? Should people when representing the state be permitted to wear items of clothing which expresses religious opinions? An example here is the wearing of a headdress in a court of law, as touched upon earlier. Should there be the facility in public areas for people to be called to prayer via public address systems? Should government and legal institutions take into account the cultural backgrounds of people in the sphere of penal law?

– *Constitutional limits to pluralism*

The right to hold different opinions is a cornerstone of democracy. Freedom of expression is a fundamental right. There can be no democracy without pluralism. The right to express one's own opinion does not only apply if the ideas and views expressed agree with the opinions of the majority of the population. There has to be room for different opinions, even if these are shocking and experienced by many as offensive or disturbing. This is why opportunities are provided for discussion and fundamental debate about the organization of the state and society. For this reason there is also room for political movements which hold different political ideals. The question does arise of where the boundaries lie.

– *Banning of organizations*

When considering the question of which organizations can and which cannot be tolerated in the Dutch state it is useful to make a distinction here between theocracy and radicalism. Institutions with theocratic ambitions can:

- support democracy: they are interested in acquiring support from the majority of the population in order to achieve their ideals. Once they have achieved power, they do not strive to overthrow democracy or to influence fundamental human rights, but may, for example, strive for a closer link between Church and state. But even then they seek a democratic legitimacy for their theocratic ambitions. In The Netherlands, the SGP can be included in this category;
- accept the fact that they are a minority. They continue to cherish the theocratic ideal and promote this, but do not think – given their minority position - explicitly about the question of what it would be like if they could acquire a majority position. This is a relatively apolitical theocratic ideal, but with no or a limited degree of connection with the democratic constitutional state;
- try to realize their ambitions in a democratic, completely legal way via general elections and try to win power, but then with the explicit intention, once they have achieved this, of overturning democracy and fundamental legal rights. These are not necessarily political parties. Schools and other organizations can also promote this “ideal”;
- not only as regards their aims, but also the methods they use or promote, do not eschew violating democracy and/or rights of freedom.

The last two categories of institutions directly oppose the fundamentals of the constitutional state, mainly as regards rights of freedom (freedom of opinion, freedom to practise a religion or to reject it) and parliamentary

democracy. Institutions whose political ambition is to undermine the state itself, soon come into the sphere of a legal ban.

– *Legal measures*

There may, of course, also be social institutions which do not have any political aspirations, but which promote values which oppose the rights (including the right to freedom) in the constitutional state. Institutions which support violence and, therefore, more or less advocate taking the law into their own hands in order to impose their convictions on others: in a general sense approving fatwa's for lapses in religious adherence, for suspected blasphemy, etc. This, too, is in opposition to the key values of the constitutional state. Once their activities are concrete enough to be considered as incitement or inducement to violence, then legal action can be taken against those involved. If this is not the case, and there is no direct call to violence, then the Ministry of Public Affairs is unable to take action against them.

The question which arises is whether the government can or should take some other form of action. It depends strongly on the context in which the events take place. Generally speaking, whenever the state has a relationship with social organizations (whether in a regulating or functional sense), it has to be able to apply legal instruments to enforce its disapproval. In the field of education, these instruments are the conditions pertaining to soundness of the schools and their financing. Elsewhere, the terms of funding and the subsidy rules may be used.

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7.2 Some constructive conclusions

- The constitutional state is the political expression of a particular culture. This culture is characterized by tolerance towards those of other religious persuasions, by acceptance of and respect for all human beings. There must be room for individual identity and the opportunity for people to express their identities – in groups and as an individual – so long as these people also respect the key values of the constitutional state.
- The history, culture and language of a country give the community a specific identity. The government is obliged to mark the identity of the constitutional state, to promote the values of the state and to encourage its citizens to support these values.

- In the integration process it is important that people can relate their identity and view of life to the mores of the society in which they live, in a free, authentic and voluntary manner. It is important that: a) the key values of the society are shared, and that b) people are able to take bear responsibility (participation) and can be called to account about this.
- Integration is about being involved in society.
- Cultural institutions play an important role: families, schools, religious institutions, etc., have to be challenged to fulfill a bridging function here.
- The government has the task of creating appropriate conditions so that people are adequately equipped for their responsibilities. They also hold newcomers to account about these same responsibilities, precisely because they too realise that it is often difficult for them to overcome problems. (Certainly now that the cultural distance between countries and areas of origin and our society are much greater than for immigrants in previous times.)
- Islam is a factor of growing significance in our society. In the dialogue with Muslims it is important to realize that there are differing opinions on constitutional issues within the Muslim community. There are movements which bridge the gap between the constitutional state and their religion and make a valuable contribution to society. Other groups are less capable of this. The government has the task of finding a suitable way of safeguarding the key values of the constitutional state mentioned in this study.

7.3 Recommendations

In this final chapter, a number of conclusions will be reviewed. They are grouped along the lines of the cultural institutions which were reviewed earlier.

The proposals are made in the knowledge that integration requires a great deal of effort, both from the immigrant and from the receiving society. There are obvious connections between the two. A society which does not invest in integration, in education, in the emancipation of women, etc., is hardly in a position to place demands on the immigrant. This is not only

true in a moral sense (reciprocity), but also in practical terms. If you do not offer people a good education, for example, then you have no right to impose expectations on them since a person who has little or no education can hardly be obliged to work.

It was mentioned earlier that integration has both a cultural and a social and functional (skills) side. In the cultural area, a sketch has been given of the key values of the constitutional state. Mention has been made of the importance of connecting values. Attention has also been paid to the importance of maintaining social relationships and of participating in society. It is obvious that nobody can do this without the necessary skills, knowledge, etc. In our recommendations, we make a distinction between cultural integration based on the law on the one hand and encouraging participation on the other.

7.3.1 Creating a constitutional state: the legal cultural dimension of integration

It has been pointed out that the constitutional state is more than a complex of (ground) rules. Such aspects as language, symbols and customs also play a significant role. They demonstrate that the state is more than a set of rules, more than the notion that one should not harm others, but that there is an open, constitutional community. The integrating function of linguistic, social and symbolic aspects of the community demand attention. It is also important to acknowledge that particular fundamental key values have crystallized in the Dutch (law-based) culture. These values may be consciously maintained within the legal community. The government also has a task here. It is important to make recommendations as to how these key values will be supported and maintained, in other words to carry out a cultural policy.

It has been said that religion is not at its best as a neutral player in the field of state and society. By separating religion and the social state, one robs oneself of important cultural conditions for citizenship and democracy. Moreover, such a segregation ignores the contribution which religion has – also historically – made to tolerance, rights of freedom and social awareness. Furthermore, separation makes the dialogue with religions which expressly connect politics and religion more difficult, and also ignores the fact that for large sections of the population religion is a very real motivation. Public denial will not change this. Bearing in mind the above considerations, the following recommendations can be made:

- It is of fundamental importance to continue and to intensify the discussion between Christians, Muslims, other religious communities and humanists about the relationship between religion and politics.
- Rights of freedom are available to all religions and identity-based institutions in The Netherlands, including religious institutions (such as Islam). Anyone who advocates a compulsory neutral status for schools, welfare institutions, media, etc, misunderstands the importance of religion for people, misunderstands their right to give expression to their beliefs socially, and also misunderstands at the deepest level the democratic character of the Dutch state. The government, then, makes generous room in the public domain for religious communities and ideological institutions as bearers of culture and of values which the constitutional state promotes. It encourages the dialogue between (world) religions.
- Considerable attention is paid in the acculturation programmes to the key values of the constitutional state as mentioned. In these programmes, not only should attention be paid to skills, culture and history, but also to the key values as formulated in the constitution.
- The key values of the constitutional state are discussed in the curriculum which newcomers receive in the transition classes.
- Schools indicate in their curriculum etc, how they handle the key values of the constitutional state. The key values mentioned earlier as a general requirement for the soundness of education need to be anchored and specified in the educational legislation. This legal definition is necessary to give schools a clear picture of what is required and to avoid such a vague concept as social cohesion becoming normative for education. Of course, schools have complete freedom to define how they will handle these key values in relation to individual identity. A clear view of the content of the education provided can prevent prejudice. Should education not be in line with the key values of the legal state as mentioned and if schools adopt a position which opposes these key values, then there is of course reason to take legal measures. Good education is in this respect a much broader concept than just what can or cannot be prevented in penal law: good education is also about educating young people to become competent citizens. The education inspectorate has a supervisory role here.
- Governments can, if necessary, also set these frameworks in other sectors by applying particular conditions for subsidies.
- Legislation will be introduced relating to gifts to schools, comparable to the rules which apply to political parties. Schools have to make clear where their financial resources come from. The government sets rules concerning the nature and size of the donations. Accountants will

monitor whether these rules are observed. According to analogy with legislation in the United Kingdom (VK) concerning donations to political parties, it may be worthwhile exploring whether it would be useful to work with so-called permissible donors (in the UK these are natural persons, institutions and other organizations insofar as their activities take place in the UK and their head office is situated there). Schools then know from whom they may and may not receive donations.

- The recommended policy is that the government will consistently use the Dutch (or Frisian) language, except in circumstances beyond their control.
- There must be opportunities for personal beliefs to be expressed. Only if symbols and behaviour stand in the way of a person fulfilling a public duty (a member of the police force or a judge, for example) or undermines public morals, or key functions of institutions (headdresses in schools) is there reason to impose restrictions.
- There should be no distinction in penal law between cultural groups because the law and the application of the law must be clear and equal.
- New symbols and institutions expressing the identity of the Dutch constitutional state may in time become subjects for discussion, but the relationship between the Dutch legal state and these symbols first need to be further strengthened. It is not possible to indicate in advance whether and how this will develop: these are often significant junctures in the history of a state which raise symbols above their group status and give them a general, constitution-defining stature.
- Granting a temporary or permanent residence permit may be accompanied by a ceremony that underlines the values of the Dutch law-based state. An appropriate ceremonial has been developed for the obtaining of Dutch citizenship. How exactly this will work is, of course, a subject for further study and consideration. In terms of content, the ceremony attached to granting of Dutch nationality should express respect for human rights, for democracy and the preparedness to accept joint responsibility for this society.
- Only in exceptional situations which will later be defined within the law will dual nationality be allowed.
- Firm legal action will be taken against extremist utterances which incite people to violence (including by religious leaders). Persons who are guilty of extremist remarks are certainly not discussion partners for the government: they are not representative of the immigrant population and therefore nothing should be done to give this impression.
- The government must ban those organizations whose goal is to undermine democracy and the key values of society.
- From the viewpoint of equality, the government considers that it is in

principal responsible for offering all residents of our country an elementary level of education. This goes hand in hand with obligations pertaining to results achieved. The purpose of this is to ensure people are given the necessary skills, and at the same time to make a contribution to emancipation.

- The Queen's birthday is a national holiday which expresses the cohesion and unity of our society. Quite rightly, in recent years immigrants have been expressly invited to take part in the festivities. The multi-coloured nature of Dutch society came emphatically into the picture in the national festivities in celebration of the marriage of crown prince Willem Alexander and princess Maxima. On the Queen's birthday our nation celebrates its unity, with Orange dominating the multitude of colours.

7.3.2 Working towards participation: the social-cultural and functional dimension of integration

A policy which is demanding (this English term gives just the right nuance) is a condition for a successful transfer from one country to another. It is a condition for a satisfying existence. Satisfying in the sense that responsibilities can be taken: responsibilities for one's own means of existence, for work and income, for the upbringing of children and the guidance of youth, for a balanced relationship between men and women, for a feeling of responsibility and independence. The receiving country cannot and should not expect that it will be easy to achieve this. A demanding policy requires focused, structural investments. It requires understanding of the problems of integration, and above all awareness of the fact that integration is more than an education or paid employment. It touches people's deepest convictions, their familiar social structures, etc. This notion, too, should be expressed in governmental policies. Integration policies should on the one hand not decline into an excess of goodwill and a lack of demanding requirements, and on the other hand should not slide into a spiral of stigmatisation and negativity.

Dutch society will have to invest more than ever in people. "This is the crux of the proposals on integration. This means ethnic minorities will have to work hard. Many have already shown how far one can come on the basis of belief, trust, effort and determination, and have in a relatively short time achieved a good position in society. Anyone who is not willing to make this effort should seriously ask him or herself whether this country is the right destination for them. The country's policies should be clear on this.

The family

For the family to function well in terms of: a) a good upbringing and socialization of children in Dutch society, and b) equality of partners, the following are important:

- acculturation courses must be adequate in terms of level and content. In terms of the content of the courses, account should be taken of the lifecycle of people (see below). The policy on the acculturation courses should be more demanding: not in order to create barriers for immigration, but to make sure that the courses are successful. Residence permits will only be granted to those who have achieved a certain level of integration. The level required is higher for a permanent residence permit than for a temporary stay. This obligation applies to men and women, as well as to persons who come here for reasons of family formation and reunification. A good settlement programme will be developed for asylum seekers who are allowed entry.
- Acculturation courses should include not only knowledge of the Dutch language, but also a thorough introduction to Dutch culture, society and history. In addition to these basic elements, for those who want a permanent residence permit, the acculturation course will include modules on upbringing and education, and subjects oriented to vocational aspects. Education will be accessible via modern communication tools. For those older than 55, the courses will include the basic elements mentioned and practical experience via voluntary work. Of course, the demands will be accompanied by a temperance clause: those people with limited capabilities, for whom this requirement is obviously not achievable, will be released from the obligation.
- Partners who come to our country for family formation purposes must have had the opportunity to make a balanced and well-thought out decision. The step which they are considering taking has far-reaching consequences. The minimum age for marriage partners wanting to come to The Netherlands to set up a family is therefore set at 21 years.
- Health centres carry out regular health checks on children and advise parents of very young children on how any areas of arrears can be counteracted. A nursery, preferably linked to the infant school and located there, will familiarize them with the Dutch language through play and will prepare them for their future education. This is a variant on the transition classes in schools. This puts a language offensive and the (further) development of the relevant skills into a concrete form. Parents will be invited to take part in related programmes.
- In discussion with the health centres, people can be considered for extra support from family coaches. This, of course, also applies to native Dutch families.

- Children who at four years old have insufficient knowledge of the Dutch language will be obliged to attend school for a number of hours each week. They will receive focused language training. To achieve this, the necessary resources will have to be allocated to schools (building on the type of schools offering additional opportunities to pupils with extra needs).
- Parents who speak no (or little) Dutch (below level 3) will be given the opportunity to follow elements of the basic level programme in parallel with their children. Progress will be monitored frequently and at regular intervals. The parents can also take these tests.
- The non-working immigrant partner must also follow a course which will qualify him or her to carry out paid employment, whether this is necessary or desired. This will create more equality within relationships which will in turn reduce the involuntary dependence of a woman on her partner. Furthermore, the law obliges both partners, if they receive social security benefits, to make themselves available for employment. This should also apply to partners from ethnic minority families. Those who withdraw from the acculturation courses and therefore are more difficult to place in the employment market, will have their benefit payments reduced in the event the family finds itself dependent on social security.
- Also, in order to prevent unnecessary isolation, when reviewing people's suitability for employment, account should not only be taken of the person's current earning potential, but also of the possibility that after specific training they will be qualified to carry out a broader range of professions. More priority will be given to investing in people than in declaring them unsuitable for employment.

Education

Education equips people to fulfill a responsible position in society. In a complex society such as ours, this requires specific knowledge and training. If things go wrong in the sphere of education, this can have long lasting consequences, both for the individual in question and also for society. Particularly now that the employment market is greying, it is necessary to invest in the human capital which is available.

The school is then an excellent bridge to a responsible position in the society in which one lives. This places high demands on schools: they have to fulfill that bridging function and contribute to the – if necessary critical – integration of cultural minorities (as opposed to alienation).

Preventing and counteracting educational arrears

- There will be a system of transition classes. These will give schools the opportunity to develop and bundle expertise in handling educational arrears. The transition classes ensure that pupils who have recently come to our country can make good their educational shortfalls, via an individual curriculum and set of courses. This will also reduce the burden for regular education: the level will not be lowered – or only to a lesser extent – and there will be less likelihood of the so-called “white flight”. In situations where schools themselves have too few students to give separate transition classes, there will be cooperation agreements with other schools;
- The above applies to newcomers, to children who join the education system at a later age and to children whose education has been interrupted by stays abroad. They will be placed in transition classes which will bring them up to the level of language and other key subject of the class where they would normally enter;
- Children with a considerable starting arrears in group one of the infant school will be given the opportunity to recoup the shortfall by joining a transition class. There will also be intensive instruction and guidance to work towards the level of the regular infant school. Once this has been achieved, then the child will join mainstream education.
- The principle of transition classes for newcomers and for pupils who have arrears in particular areas, also applies to secondary education. In the transfer from junior to senior education and with obvious educational arrears (which can be corrected) particularly in the area of language development, the possible use of transition classes will be investigated. It is also true that educational arrears not only apply to newcomers and ethnic minorities. Sometimes there can be a considerable language deficit among native Dutch people. These too – from a particular level – should be able to recover the shortfall by means of transition classes.
- As regards the approach to learning deficits, the transition classes should be related to the so-called KEA method (KEA in Dutch stands for small scale experiment in countering learning deficits). This method is characterised by intensive guidance by teaching staff. The teacher receives specific resources to allow for an optimal organization in the class. Through focused instruction, the available teaching time can be used more effectively than in classes where the KEA system has not previously been used. In the classes where lessons are given in line with this method, better learning results are achieved than classes where the method is not used. Teachers who are going to work in the transition classes will be given specific teaching modules.
- Funding for modules in transition classes will be provided by the educational deficit fund.

- Children's school careers should not be interrupted for long periods for reasons of stays abroad, which would result in the pupil having a gap in his or her school career. Investigations should be made into the extent to which this takes place. Apart from unforeseen circumstances, the government discourages such situations. Consideration is being given to whether child allowance should be stopped for those parents whose children who spend long periods out of the country while they are of educational age, separate from the parents who are living in our country.
- Local municipalities are recommended to conclude covenants with school boards to reach a balanced distribution of pupils. The covenants embrace not only agreements about combating segregation, but also about the way in which schools enable young people to recover educational deficits.

The identity of schools

- Freedom of education applies to all (potential) providers of education. Providing education based on life convictions is a fundamental right. The flipside of that right is the duty of schools to bring pupils up to be persons who can and will bear responsibility for society.
- Explicit attention is paid in the educational programmes to an understanding of the backgrounds of significant migrant groups in Dutch society and to ideological movements in our country. It is also important to acknowledge the multi-coloured nature of our society.
- Schools make visible the way in which they express their identity and shape education. It should be made clear in what way schools intend to fulfill their bridging function.
- Certainly if the organizational freedom of schools increases, it is important that the schools inspectorate checks that schools meet the general quality demand that the curriculum should be focused on integration into Dutch society. The inspectorate will develop a protocol for testing methods.
- The proposal to give a minimum of one-third of seats in the management board of schools to parents of pupils is also important for ethnic minorities. It gives them the opportunity to strengthen their involvement with the school. (This proposal is made in Trust in Talent published by the CDA's Policy Studies Institute/2002).

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Social security

Educational and language deficits have to be combated by an obligatory and adequate acculturation programme. Also, it is so that:

- an inadequate command of the Dutch language and a poor level of knowledge cannot and should not be a factor in assessing an individual's

earning capacity in the framework of the claim assessment of the Disability Benefit Law. This all too easily places a person in the disability system but also leads to hospitalization and isolation. The need to enter into relationships diminishes in this way, which certainly does not promote integration;

- anyone who has not gained the necessary qualifications through the acculturation courses and who makes a claim on the social security system, will be faced with a reduction in the level of benefit. If there is a family relationship or a partnership, then this applies to both partners.

Neighbourhoods and districts

To avoid social and cultural segregation it is important that:

- housing corporations also build rental accommodation in new neighbourhoods;
- housing corporations or municipalities take into account the diversity of the population composition and the social support within neighbourhoods;
- municipalities, together with corporations, residents' associations, district committees, neighbourhood clubs and immigrant organizations, develop an allocation policy. It can be useful here to house newcomers from the start in neighbourhoods with a varied population composition. A rigorous and obligatory distribution policy is not an effective option. In fact, enforced distribution will not work and, moreover, violates the freedom of movement and the freedom to choose where one lives. In addition, it appears from urban geographical studies that people with similar characteristics not infrequently seek one another out. This does not necessarily have to lead to segregation and insurmountable barriers, or to a pattern of the established group and outsiders. This may, however, be the case if newcomers have little knowledge of Dutch and Western, if they do not speak the language, if they have no contacts with native people, etc. It is for this reason above all that a policy is needed which is focused on schooling and education, on acculturation and on knowledge of our language and culture. It is important to make sure that people do not make more than average use of social safety nets such as social security.

Constitutional state

A constitutional community is more than a set of rules. It has an individual identity, an individual history and development path. Immigration is therefore more than just obtaining a residence permit. It makes certain demands of the person involved, demands which are a pre-condition of participating in society as a full citizen.

Acculturation

A valuable and demanding acculturation programme is necessary for the integration of cultural minorities. Without this, immigration is often followed by isolation and a lack of social responsibility. The consequences for the family, for education and for the position of women have already been clearly indicated. For these reasons, it is vital that attention is paid in the courses not only to language, but also to Dutch history and culture, to the system of state, the constitution and the way society is organised. The courses include practical (social) sessions. This is necessary from a learning perspective, but it is also a stimulus for people to build up relationships and to become familiar with the environment. It also encourages reciprocity.

- A general starting principle is that, those people who are obliged to attend acculturation classes will be required to attain a particular degree of acculturation in order to acquire a residence permit (asylum seekers and those who come to the Netherlands temporarily, for example those who come for a study or for temporary work, are exempted). An exception is also made for religious authorities. Subjects of the EU and of countries with whom treaties have been agreed are also exempted, for example the United States (us) and Poland, except in the last case for the purposes of family formation. In accordance with the Immigration Law 2000, there are two types of residence permit: one for a fixed term (a maximum of 5 years) and one for an unlimited period. These residence permits are granted for reasons of family formation or reunification, temporary work or asylum.
- For a system to work in which the granting of a residence permit is linked to the degree of acculturation, it is necessary that the government clearly defines the contents of the acculturation tests and monitors them to ensure that the tests are conducted properly. This can be linked to the present system. The contents of the acculturation courses are adapted to people's life cycles, in the sense that for newcomers who come to The Netherlands at a later age (for example, those aged fifty-seven and a half), the emphasis of the course lies less on preparing for employment but more on maintaining contacts, supporting children and grandchildren, etc.

Conditions for residence

- In the case of family formation or reunification, immigration is a voluntary decision. It is important that those who decide to join a partner or family here prepare themselves thoroughly for the migration. Those who are obliged to attend acculturation classes and who are

intending to stay for a temporary period should have achieved language level NT2 1 in their country of origin and should have acquired some knowledge of the culture and history of our country. Teaching resources (new media) can be provided by embassies, for example.

- To obtain a residence permit for an unlimited time the State Examination NT2 1 (not to be confused with NT2 1) is in principle obligatory for every newcomer. The curriculum includes the subject social orientation, which covers such aspects as support for bringing up children, and computer skills. Suitable tests need to be developed here. For people with a low starting level this is a considerable requirement. They will need to work extremely hard in order to achieve the required level. The purpose here is not to create unnecessary barriers for immigrants, but to optimise immigration. The NT2 State Examination programme 1 is comparable with NT2 3. Command of Dutch at this level means that after completing the course, a person can take part in basic vocational education in a secondary school or in a comparable educational course related to employment, or in the workplace. Also, the language skills at this level equip a person to carry out less complex functions in the employment market.

However difficult it may be, this is an important basic requirement to be able to function satisfactorily in our society. A person who does not achieve this level will probably never be able to stand on their own feet in our society. This is not a desirable situation, also not from the viewpoint of emancipation. Temperance clauses, of course, guarantee that people who through circumstances beyond their control (age, a combination of educational background and capabilities) are unable to complete the education, will not become the victims of these requirements.

- Also, more demands than just those concerning income should be made of the partner who is staying in The Netherlands. "The person with whom the migrant intends to stay, should have adequate means of support", according to the text of the law (art. 16c Immigration Law). This in itself is not enough; acculturation requirements should also be imposed. The person who brings a partner over from abroad, should not only have sufficient means at his disposal, but should himself also have reached at least level NT 3. He or she should be in possession of the State Examination NT2 1 or a similar level of education.
- For the purposes of supplementary education, the ideas developed by the Policy Studies Institute for the life course insurance can be applied: learning rights give entitlement to following education for a period to be determined later.
- It is useful to develop a complementary media and information policy.

It is important that those following the acculturation course reach the required level. In questioning how they will do this, there is complete freedom for individual initiative. A continuous (24 hour) offering of courses in Dutch and society orientation which can be followed by television, internet, etc. means a significant broadening of the educational opportunities and above all an improvement in flexibility in the form of opportunities to combine the course with work and bringing up children.

- Oldcomers who are entitled to social benefits and who are not qualified to work because they have inadequate command of the Dutch language and who – in view of their age – cannot reasonably be expected to carry out paid employment, will nonetheless be offered a training course to the level of State Examination NT2 1. Oldcomers with obligations to bring up children will receive a similar training. Three months after the first child is registered in the Register of births, the parents will receive a visit from the school attendance officer. Attendance at a course for these oldcomers is not a matter of choice. In line with the analogy of the Rotterdam Deltaplan for acculturation, those who take part in the programme must accept the obligation to complete the course successfully. Success should be rewarded with a bonus and there will penalties for those who drop out of the course.
- In order to help reduce the number of people dropping out, parents can buy in childcare via the CDA's discount system.
- Similar demands are made of asylum seekers who are allowed entry, although if they do not complete the course successfully, it has no consequences for their residence status. Settlement programmes will be developed for asylum seekers along American lines.

Nationality

The decision to take on a new nationality is different from the practical choice about where to live. Anyone who after a time decides to stay in The Netherlands and to regard this country in future as his or her home, has good grounds to apply for Dutch nationality. Once a person has acquired Dutch nationality, he or she is no longer subject to the Immigration Laws but has the right to settle here and to have Dutch travel documents. He or she also has active and passive voting rights. This last point in particular is a significant change.

Because acquiring Dutch citizenship confers the right to take part in the democratic system, it is reasonable to require that the applicant should have an understanding of the principles and assumptions on which the democratic system is based. It is for this reason important that a person

who applies for Dutch nationality after having completed the examinations in the Dutch language and the Dutch social system necessary for obtaining a residence permit for an unlimited period, can demonstrate a good understanding of Dutch history and culture and above all the system of state.